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Preface
The Health Systems in Transition (HiT) series consists of country-based reviews that provide a detailed description of a health system and of reform and policy initiatives in progress or under development in a 
specific country. Each review is produced by country experts in collaboration 
with the Observatory’s staff. In order to facilitate comparisons between 
countries, reviews are based on a template, which is revised periodically. The 
template provides detailed guidelines and specific questions, definitions and 
examples needed to compile a report.
HiTs seek to provide relevant information to support policy-makers and 
analysts in the development of health systems in Europe. They are building 
blocks that can be used to:
• learn in detail about different approaches to the organization, financing 
and delivery of health services, and the role of the main actors in 
health systems;
• describe the institutional framework, process, content and implementation 
of health care reform programmes;
• highlight challenges and areas that require more in-depth analysis;
•  provide a tool for the dissemination of information on health systems and 
the exchange of experiences of reform strategies between policy-makers 
and analysts in different countries; and
•  assist other researchers in more in-depth comparative health 
policy analysis.
Compiling the reviews poses a number of methodological problems. In many 
countries, there is relatively little information available on the health system and 
the impact of reforms. Due to the lack of a uniform data source, quantitative 
data on health services are based on a number of different sources, including 
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the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe’s European 
Health for All database, data from national statistical offices, Eurostat, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Health 
Data, data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators and any other relevant sources considered useful 
by the authors. Data collection methods and definitions sometimes vary, but 
typically are consistent within each separate review.
A standardized review has certain disadvantages because the financing 
and delivery of health care differ across countries. However, it also offers 
advantages because it raises similar issues and questions. HiTs can be used to 
inform policy-makers about experiences in other countries that may be relevant 
to their own national situations. They can also be used to inform comparative 
analysis of health systems. This series is an ongoing initiative and material is 
updated at regular intervals.
Comments and suggestions for the further development and improvement 
of the HiT series are most welcome and can be sent to info@obs.euro.who.int.
HiTs and HiT summaries are available on the Observatory’s web site (http://
www.healthobservatory.eu).
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Abstract
This analysis of the Ukrainian health system reviews recent developments in organization and governance, health financing, health care provision, health reforms and health system performance. Since the country gained 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, successive governments have 
sought to overcome funding shortfalls and modernize the health care system 
to meet the needs of the population’s health. However, no fundamental reform 
of the system has yet been implemented and consequently it has preserved the 
main features characteristic of the Semashko model; there is a particularly high 
proportion of total health expenditure paid out of pocket (42.3% in 2012), and 
incentives within the system do not focus on quality or outcomes.
The most recent health reform programme began in 2010 and sought to 
strengthen primary and emergency care, rationalize hospitals and change 
the model of health care financing from one based on inputs to one based 
on outputs. Fundamental issues that hampered reform efforts in the past 
re-emerged, but conflict and political instability have proved the greatest 
barriers to reform implementation and the programme was abandoned in 2014. 
More recently, the focus has been on more pressing humanitarian concerns 
arising from the conflict in the east of Ukraine. It is hoped that greater political, 
social and economic stability in the future will provide a better environment 
for the introduction of deep reforms to address shortcomings in the Ukrainian 
health system.
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Executive summary
Introduction
Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe by area, after the Russian Federation. In 2013, Ukraine had a population of 45.5 million; 12% less than 1991, when the country gained independence from the Soviet 
Union, due to a combination of below-replacement birth rate and emigration. 
Although key population health indicators such as life expectancy and all-cause 
mortality fell after independence, they have since recovered to improve slightly 
on pre-independence levels, with rapid improvements between 2008 and 2012. 
Nevertheless, life expectancy in 2012 was still low by European standards: 
66.2 years for men (compared to a European average of 73.1) and 76.2 years 
for women (compared to a European average of 80.3. High mortality rates 
in the general population are mostly attributable to cardiovascular diseases, 
which accounted for more than 60% of total mortality in 2010. However, 
infectious diseases are also key public health issues, particularly HIV/AIDS 
and tuberculosis (TB), which have increased rapidly as a cause of disability and 
premature mortality in Ukraine. There are also conflict-affected populations 
in the east of the country, who lack access to basic facilities (including health 
services, water and food), and 1.2 million displaced people.
Rapid marketization and hyperinflation following independence caused 
severe socioeconomic hardship in Ukraine. While there was some stabilization 
in the economy from 2000, and even growth from 2003 to 2004 and 2006 to 
2007, the global economic downturn from 2008 severely affected the Ukrainian 
economy. Assistance from the IMF and World Bank stabilized the economy, 
but by the end of 2012 Ukraine was back in recession.
From 2008, Ukraine established much closer ties with the European Union 
(EU), and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) was 
agreed in principle in July 2012. However, this caused friction both nationally 
and internationally, as ratification of the DCFTA with the EU would close off 
the possibility of Ukraine joining the Eurasian Customs Union with Belarus, 
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Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. Protesters in Kyiv drove Ukraine’s 
then President from office in February 2014, in part because his government 
decided not to sign the DCFTA in favour of joining the Eurasian Customs 
Union. Although not supported unanimously across the country, the DCFTA 
was eventually signed by Ukraine in June 2014 in the hope of greater economic 
stability and prosperity.
In March 2014, the Russian Federation took control of the Crimean 
Autonomous Republic. In April 2014, an increasingly violent armed conflict 
began in the Donbas area of eastern Ukraine. These events have prompted 
large-scale population movements as local civilian populations have sought 
to escape conflict and the breakdown in basic services. As of January 2015, at 
least 4800 people had been killed in fighting and 1.2 million displaced. Most 
left with few belongings and are in need of shelter, food and non-food assistance, 
placing pressure on neighbouring regions. This creates particular health care 
challenges; in particular, the delivery of TB care has proved most challenging 
in the face of mass population movements. By January 2015, approximately 
5.2 million people were still living in conflict-affected areas.
Organizational overview
In 1991, Ukraine inherited an extensive and highly centralized Semashko 
health system (a hierarchical, nationally controlled system the staff of which 
were state employees), which it was not possible to maintain through the 
economic downturn that followed independence. There has been considerable 
decentralization in the system since independence; however, in most other 
respects, the system remains largely unreformed. Decentralization has largely 
meant passing functional and managerial powers to the 27 regions and the local 
level (see section 1.1). Regional and local health authorities are responsible for 
health care facilities in their territory and are functionally subordinate to the 
Ministry of Health, but managerially and financially answerable to regional 
and local government. Decentralization through privatization has been largely 
inhibited by provisions of the Constitution prohibiting the reduction of the 
existing network of publicly owned health care facilities. The private sector 
in the Ukrainian health system is small in organizational terms and consists 
mostly of pharmacies, diagnostic facilities and privately practising physicians.
Approaches to capacity planning in the Ukrainian health care sector have 
remained almost unchanged since the centralized, input-based approach 
of Soviet times, and the mechanisms in place neither reflect the health care 
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needs of the population nor take into account regional characteristics of health 
service provision. There is also little incentive for rational use of resources 
or cost control over health care facilities. An approach to planning based on 
centrally determined standards, characteristic of the Semashko model, along 
with financing based on capacity (rather than volumes or quality provided, 
or local need, for example), encourages unnecessary hospitalizations and 
excessive lengths of stay. Changing planning mechanisms in the Ukrainian 
health system is further complicated by the absence of a unified people-centred 
health information management system.
The Ministry of Health develops and approves state quality standards 
and clinical protocols. The Ministry is responsible for the organization and 
implementation of the mandatory accreditation of health care facilities and 
issuing licences to legal entities and individuals that are engaged in the 
delivery of medical services, or the production and sales of pharmaceuticals 
and medical equipment. However, the regulatory process is largely a formality 
and has no real impact on the quality of care as there is a lack of suitable 
enforcement mechanisms.
Most pharmaceuticals are purchased directly by patients, so the scope for 
influencing prescribing patterns is rather limited, and is further hampered 
by de facto liberal pharmacy dispensing procedures and the strong influence 
pharmaceutical companies have on prescribing practices.
Patient empowerment is not a significant feature of the Ukrainian health 
system. By law, all citizens have the right to access information about their 
health and services available to them, but the mechanisms for accessing such 
information are not transparent, so most rely on personal recommendations and 
informal networks when making decisions about health services. Many people 
try to exercise choice in the system by paying out of pocket for services, but this 
does not necessarily help; nearly half of all patients who self-refer to specialist 
care at hospitals do not have a condition compatible with the hospital’s level 
or profile and so are transferred to a different health facility. Patient rights in 
the Ukrainian health system are not protected systematically and there is no 
specific legal mechanism for patient complaints procedures within the health 
system. However, with the most recent attempt at reform of the system (see 
below) the public became much more active, founding non-governmental 
organizations in order to express their opinions about the changes. Most often 
this was to protest against the reforms, partially in response to the inadequate 
public communication informing people of the proposed reforms, what they 
meant and why they were necessary.
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Financing
Health expenditure as a proportion of GDP in Ukraine was 7.6% in 2012; 
this is middling in comparison with Europe as a whole, but relatively high in 
comparison with Ukraine’s neighbours and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) average of 6.3% (see section 3.1). However, only a little over half 
(54.9%) of this total health expenditure (THE) was from public sector sources in 
2012, below even the CIS average of 56.4% (see section 3.1). This has significant 
implications for equity in health system financing as private spending on health 
makes up the rest, dominated by out-of-pocket payments.
The bulk of government expenditure (46% in 2012) pays for inpatient 
medical services, with only a relatively small proportion going to outpatient 
services (around a fifth) and public health (4.3%). Private expenditure primarily 
consists of out-of-pocket payments, which are high on account of the high cost 
of pharmaceuticals, which are generally purchased at full cost price by patients. 
Although in theory vulnerable groups and inpatients should be covered by 
public provision, in practice they are often obliged to pay for their medications. 
Officially, Ukraine has a comprehensive guaranteed package of health care 
services provided free of charge at the point of use as a constitutional right; 
nevertheless, so-called charitable donations are widely levied. Government 
attempts to define a more limited benefits package have left it to the individual 
facilities to determine which services are covered by the budget and which are 
subject to user charges. This has led to a lack of transparency in the system that 
has contributed to the expansion of informal payments.
Most health financing comes from general government revenues raised 
through taxation (value added taxes, business income taxes, international trade 
and excise taxes). Personal income tax is not a significant contributor to total 
revenues. Out-of-pocket payments account for most other health expenditure; 
although there are some voluntary health insurance schemes, their impact is 
marginal, contributing less than 1% to THE. Budgetary funds are pooled at 
the national and the local level, as local governments retain a proportion of 
the taxes raised in their territories. There are also interbudgetary transfers to 
boost the resources of poorer local authorities that cannot raise as much revenue. 
However, the progressivity of the taxation system in Ukraine is undermined by 
the scale of the shadow economy (up to 40% of GDP).
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With the exception of pilot projects in four regions that moved towards 
contracting mechanisms for primary care, allocations and payments are made 
according to strict line-item budgeting procedures as under the Semashko 
system. This means that payments are related to the capacity and staffing levels 
of individual facilities rather than to the volume or quality of services provided.
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, pharmaceutical 
prices have increased considerably (by 40–70%), largely as a result of 
currency devaluation. To stabilize the situation in the pharmaceutical market, 
the government adopted a number of potential solutions to curb rising 
pharmaceutical prices, including initially by significantly expanding the list 
of pharmaceuticals subject to state price regulation to cover almost the entire 
Essential Medicines List – 903 generic drugs or 85% of all registered drugs 
in Ukraine.
Physical and human resources
Ukraine has an extensive health care infrastructure, despite substantial bed 
reductions in recent years. The repurposing of small village hospitals as primary 
care centres since the mid-1990s drastically reduced the number of hospital 
beds and the hospital stock (by 63% over 18 years), with more than half the rural 
facilities converted into physician-led primary care clinics. Although relatively 
low in comparison with countries of the CIS, at 721.01 per 100 000, the number 
of acute care hospital beds in Ukraine remains high by international standards 
(and nearly double the EU average of 385). Ukraine has also retained a large 
number of facilities in parallel health systems (for example, for railway workers).
In 2013, the routine monitoring of facilities by the Ministry of Health found 
that 37% of primary care facilities required renovation or rebuilding – 23% in 
rural areas and 46% in urban areas. Unsatisfactory sanitary conditions are most 
often found in rural health care facilities. The Ukrainian health system has also 
consistently encountered severe difficulties with the supply and maintenance 
of existing technological equipment.
Operating indicators for acute care hospitals in Ukraine show that, despite 
the large number of hospital beds, utilization remains quite high (at 91.2% 
for acute beds, well above the European region average of 78.9%) and, once 
admitted, patients on average stay for 10 days (above the European region 
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average of 7 days). The high utilization and long length of stay highlight the 
inefficiency of financing hospitals based on capacity; research has shown that 
almost a third (32.9%) of hospitalizations in Ukraine are unnecessary.
Since 1990 there has been a steady increase in the number of health workers 
per capita nationwide, but this does not reflect a growing number of doctors 
so much as a decline in the total population; the absolute number of doctors 
has been falling and Ukraine faces serious challenges with doctors leaving the 
health sector or the country itself. The key staff shortages are in rural areas 
and in primary care, which has a high turnover. The number of nurses has 
fallen due to the low wages, low status of nursing and limited opportunities for 
professional development. This is a trend witnessed throughout the CIS and one 
that runs counter to developments in EU countries.
Public health services have been recently reorganized in an effort to reduce 
administrative burdens on enterprises, although there are concerns that the 
reduced and reformed structures will not be able to ensure public health in areas 
such as food safety and immunization against vaccine-preventable diseases. A 
combination of shortages, underfunding and public concern about vaccination 
has left Ukraine with low vaccination coverage rates and a growing number of 
unvaccinated children.
Provision of services
Traditionally, primary health care in Ukraine has been provided within 
an integrated system by therapeutic specialists (district internists and 
paediatricians) employed by state polyclinics. In 2000, the transition to a new 
model of primary care based on the principles of family medicine began. Family 
doctors/general practitioners (GPs) now make up more than half (57.2%) of 
all primary care physicians; they work at family medicine polyclinics or in 
appropriate polyclinic departments. Reforms begun in 2010, which sought 
to reorient the system to prioritize primary care, were rooted in GP-led care 
with clear patient pathways and strong gatekeeping at the primary care level. 
The aim was to reduce irrational use of specialist services but unnecessary 
self-referral to hospitals (effectively bypassing primary care) has continued 
to be a major source of inefficiency in the system and gatekeeping has been 
broadly opposed by patients.
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The inpatient system is a hierarchical system organized into three levels. The 
first (lower) level is that of rural hospitals providing basic inpatient facilities. 
The second (middle) level is the true foundation of the system. Secondary 
inpatient care is provided in central district and municipal multiprofile hospitals, 
and also children’s hospitals, specialized clinics (dispensarii) and specialized 
hospitals, which are located and governed at this organizational level. The third 
(higher) level is that of regional and supraregional specialization provided by 
regional hospitals, diagnostic centres and specialized clinics, and specialized 
clinical and diagnostic centres at the national research institutes of the Ministry 
of Health and the National Academy of Medical Sciences. These were originally 
designed to provide highly specialized medical care to patients with the most 
severe and complicated conditions but there has been some blurring of the lines 
between secondary and tertiary care levels.
Health care reforms
The Ukrainian health system has preserved the fundamental features of the 
Soviet Semashko model against a background of changes that have developed 
along market economic principles. Although no fundamental reform has taken 
place, some changes in the health sector have been initiated and realized 
since independence; the most recent package of reforms was introduced from 
2010. Three phases of the reforms were to be implemented over a four-year 
period (2010–2014), and started with changes to health financing to reduce 
fragmentation and prioritize primary care. Phase two was to pilot the 
programme in four pilot areas. In phase three, the pilot areas were then due to 
deepen the reforms, but these plans were put on hold in view of the unstable 
political situation.
Strengthening primary and emergency care, rationalizing hospitals and 
transforming the model of health care financing are ambitious aims in health care 
reforms, and ones which often face strong resistance from patients and existing 
power structures. To implement these reforms at a time of severe economic 
constraint was an understandable, but bold, move. Fundamental issues such 
as numerous institutional barriers (including constitutional difficulties) that 
have hampered reform efforts in the past, re-emerged. However, conflict and 
political instability have proved the greatest barrier to reform implementation. 
More recently, governments have necessarily concentrated on more pressing 
humanitarian concerns.
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At the time of writing, the political situation was such that, although health 
system reform was nominally high on the agenda, plans remained undeveloped 
and secondary to macroeconomic concerns. This has created space for special 
interest groups to lobby for the health system to be reformed in ways that serve 
their purposes. It is hoped that greater political, social and economic stability 
will provide a conducive environment for the introduction of far-reaching 
reforms to address shortcomings in the Ukrainian health system but that these 
reforms will also draw on the best available international evidence of what 
works to promote equity, quality and efficiency.
Assessment of the health system
The core challenges for the Ukrainian health system are still the ineffective 
protection of the population from the risk of catastrophic health care costs 
and the structural inefficiency of the health system, which is sustained by an 
inefficient system of health care financing. Health system weaknesses are also 
highlighted by increasing rates of avoidable mortality.
Patients and doctors alike recognize the need for fundamental reform of 
the Ukrainian health system; however, government reform efforts to date are 
viewed negatively and popular mistrust of doctors is strikingly high. Improving 
the quality of care is necessary as this is the main popular concern but also 
because improving the quality of care would save lives. To rebuild trust in the 
system it will also be necessary to tackle the issue of informal payments in a 
way that moves beyond sloganeering about corruption to tackle the underlying 
issues of low wages and popular perceptions. Concerns about affordability are 
linked to the prevalence of informal payments and the cost of pharmaceuticals 
for treatment, and these concerns in themselves constitute a barrier to access. 
1
.
 Introd
u
ctio
n
1. Introduction
Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe and had a population of 45.5 million in 2013, which is 12% smaller than it was in 1991 when the country gained independence from the Soviet Union. While key 
population health indicators such as life expectancy and all-cause mortality 
fell after independence, there was some improvement after this with rapid 
improvements between 2008 and 2012. Nevertheless, life expectancy in 2012 
was still low by European standards (66.2 years for men and 76.2 years for 
women). Maternal and infant mortality rates (IMR) have been falling steadily, 
but so too have birth rates. High mortality rates in the general population 
are mostly attributable to cardiovascular diseases, which accounted for more 
than 60% of total mortality in 2010. However, infectious diseases are also key 
public health issues, particularly HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB), which have 
increased rapidly as a cause of disability and premature mortality in Ukraine.
Rapid marketization and hyperinflation following independence caused 
severe socioeconomic hardship in Ukraine and, while there was some 
stabilization in the economy from 2000, and even growth from 2003 to 2004 
and 2006 to 2007, the global economic downturn from 2008 severely affected 
the Ukrainian economy and the country sought assistance from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The economy has not recovered and, by 
the end of 2012, Ukraine was back in recession due to a poor harvest and lower 
than expected demand for steel, which is a key Ukrainian export.
From 2008, Ukraine established much closer ties with the European Union 
(EU) and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) was 
initialled in July 2012. However, this caused friction, both nationally and 
internationally, as ratification of the DCFTA with the EU would close off 
the possibility of Ukraine joining the Eurasian Customs Union with Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. Protesters in Kyiv drove Ukraine’s then 
President from office in February 2014, in part because his government decided 
not to sign the DCFTA in favour of joining the Eurasian Customs Union.
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Although not supported unanimously across the country, the DCFTA was 
eventually signed by Ukraine in June 2014 in the hope of greater economic 
stability and prosperity.
The year 2014 also marked a time when Ukraine entered a period of conflict. 
In March 2014, the Russian Federation took control of the Crimean Autonomous 
Republic. In April 2014, an increasingly violent armed conflict began in the 
Donbas area of eastern Ukraine. These events have prompted large-scale 
population movements as local civilian populations have sought to escape 
conflict and the breakdown in basic services. At the time of writing, at least 
4800 people had been killed in fighting and 1.2 million had been displaced. Most 
left with few belongings and are in need of shelter, food and non-food assistance, 
placing pressure on neighbouring regions. By January 2015, approximately 
5.2 million people were still living in conflict-affected areas. The conflict in 
the east of Ukraine has also had a negative impact on the economy by severing 
industrial production in the area and limiting the revenue base.
1.1 Geography and sociodemography
Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe, situated strategically at the 
crossroads of Europe and Asia. The country is bordered by Belarus in the north-
west, the Russian Federation in the east, the Republic of Moldova, Romania 
and Hungary in the south-west, and Slovakia and Poland in the west (Fig. 1.1). 
It is washed by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov in the south. The climate is 
predominantly moderate continental; however, subtropical conditions are found 
in the southern shores of the Crimean peninsula.
Ukraine is divided administratively into 27 regions: the Crimean 
Autonomous Republic, 24 oblasts (regions) and two city authorities (Kyiv and 
Sevastopol); 69% of the population live in urban areas. The eastern regions are 
the most urbanized. Heavy industry and manufacturing are concentrated in 
the east and south of the country, whereas the west is more agricultural. The 
Crimean Autonomous Republic and Sevastopol city have been under the de 
facto control of the Russian Federation since March 2014 and parts of Donetsk 
and Luhansk oblasts have been beyond the reach of the Ukrainian authorities 
due to ongoing violent conflict since April 2014.
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Fig. 1.1 
Map of Ukraine 
Source: United Nations, 2014.
The 2001 census recorded more than 130 nationalities and ethnic groups in 
Ukraine. The main ethnic groups are Ukrainians (78%) and Russians (17%). 
Since the census, the number of Ukrainians has increased by 0.3% and their 
proportion among all the groups in Ukraine has increased by 5.1% (Lekhan, 
Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). The new Ukrainian census was scheduled to 
take place in 2013, but has been postponed. Freedom of religion and relative 
tolerance allow for the coexistence of various religions as well as atheism, with 
Christianity predominating: Ukrainian Orthodox in the north, east and central 
parts (Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates, Autocephalous Church) and Catholic 
in the west (Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic). Ukrainian is the 
official state language but Russian, Romanian, Polish and Hungarian are also 
spoken and, from 2012, any language spoken by at least 10% of a region’s 
population can assume the status of a regional language.
The demographic situation in Ukraine has undergone substantial change 
since independence, with the total population falling by 6.4 million (12%) to 
45.5 million in 2013 (Table 1.1). Much of the decline in population numbers 
occurred between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s.
Feodosiya
Odesa
Izyum
Tserkva
Sevastopol' 
´
Drohobych
Reni
Berdyans'k
Korosten'
Slovians'k
Yalta
Novohrad-
Volyns'kyi
Kamianets-
Podil's'kyi
Brovary
Nikopol'
Konotop
Lubny
Kovel'
Marhanets'
Stryi
Mariupol'
Nizhyn
Dzhankoy
Pryluky
Shostka
PavlohradUman'
Melitopol'
Alchevs'k
Kremenchuk
Kerch
Pervomays'k
Nova Kakhovka
Makiyivka
Dniprodzerzhyns'k
Chornobyl'
Horlivka
Berdychiv
Starobil'sk
Bila
Lozova
Yevpatoriya
Zhovti
Vody
Izmayil
Krasnyi
Luch
Mukachevo
Romny
Kahovske 
Vdskh.
Kremenchuts'ke
Vdskh.
Smila
Kryvyi Rih
Rostov-
na-Donu
Constanta
Bati
Galati
Braila
Novocherkassk
Kursk
Przemysl
Krasnodar
Shakhty
Pinsk
Varna
Homyel'
Lublin
Novorossiysk
Belgorod
Iasi
Taganrog
Uzhhorod
L'viv
Chernihiv
Sumy
Mykolayiv
Kirovohrad
Vinnytsya
Zhytomyr
Luhans'k
Zaporizhzhya
Kherson
Cherkasy
Simferopol'
Poltava
Ivano-Frankivs'k
Rivne
Kharkiv
Ternopil'
Luts'k
Khmelnytsky
Chernivtsi
Donets'k
Dnipropetrovs'k
Chisinau
Kyiv
C A R P A T H
I A
N
  M
O
U
N
T
A
I N
S
 
Pripyats' 
B L A C K  S E A
D
nipro 
Wis
la 
San 
Danu
b e
 
Kuban' 
S E A  O F  A Z O V
V
or
sk
la
 Su
la
 
D
es
na
 
Danube Delta
Dnister 
Karkinists'ka
 Gu
lf 
P
rut 
Strait of Kerch
Pivd. Buh 
Siret 
ZAKARPATTYA
  
AUTONOMOUS
REP. OF CRIMEA
VOLYN
CHERKASY
CHERNIHIV
CHERNIVTSI DNIPROPETROVS’K
DONETS’K
IVANO-
FRANKIVS’K
KHARKIV
KHERSON
KHMELNYTSKY
KIROVOHRAD
KYIV
LUHANS’K
L’VIV
MYKOLAYIV
ODESA
POLTAVA
RIVNE SUMY
TERNOPIL’
VINNYTSYA
ZAPORIZHZHYA
ZHYTOMYR
BULGARIA
SLOVAKIA
R U S S I A N  F E D E R A T I O N
R O M A N I A
HUNGARY
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
P O L A N D
REP.  O
F
 M
O
L
D
O
V
A
 
B E L A R U S  
50
100
100 200
50
 300 km
150 200 mi
2500 150
0
UKRAINE
The boundaries and names shown and the designations 
used on this map do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section
Map No. 3773 Rev. 6    UNITED NATIONS
March 2014
UKRAINE
National capital
Airport
City, town
Railroad
Road
International boundary
Capital of Autonomous Republic
of Crimea and oblast' centre
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and oblast' boundary
50°
30°
25°
45°45°
35°
35°30°
50°
25° 40°
Health systems in transition  Ukraine4
Table 1.1 
Trends in population/demographic indicators, selected years
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013
Population, total (millions) 50 51.9 51.5 49.2 47.1 45.9 45.7 45.6 45.5
Population, female (% of total) 54.3 53.7 53.5 53.6 53.7 53.9 53.9 53.9 53.9
Population ages 0–14 
(% of total)
21.6 21.6 20.3 17.5 14.7 13.9 14.0 14.2 14.5
Population ages 65 and above 
(% of total)
11.9 12.0 13.5 13.8 15.8 15.8 15.6 15.3 15.1
Population growth (annual %) 0.4 0.2 −0.8 −1.0 −0.7 −0.4 −0.4 −0.2 −0.2
Population density (people 
per km2 of land area)
86.3 89.6 88.9 84.9 81.3 79.2 78.9 78.7 78.5
Fertility rate, total (births 
per woman)
2.0 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 –
Birth rate, crude (per 
1000 people)
15.1 12.7 9.6 7.8 9.0 10.8 11.0 11.4 –
Death rate, crude (per 
1000 people)
11.3 12.1 15.4 15.3 16.6 15.2 14.5 14.5 –
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working-age population)
50.3 50.6 51.1 45.4 43.8 42.2 42.0 41.8 41.9
Rural population (% of 
total population)
38.3 33.2 33.0 32.9 32.2 31.3 31.1 30.9 30.7
Literacy rate, adult total (% of 
people ages 15+)
99.7 – – – – – – – –
Source: World Bank, 2014b.
Part of the decline in population numbers is due to a low birth rate, dropping 
by 38% between 1990 and 1999, and although rates have increased slowly 
since, the overall birth rate has remained low, at 11.1 per 1000 population in 
2013 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2014a). At a rate of 1.5 births per 
woman, births do not outweigh the high mortality levels (see section 1.4), which, 
alongside high levels of outmigration, results in the negative population growth 
described above. The recent birth rate increase is because the last numerous 
group of women born in the 1980s have reached active reproductive age.
Since April 2014, violent conflict has affected the populations of Donetsk 
and Luhansk oblasts in the eastern part of Ukraine (see section 1.3). These 
events have prompted large-scale population movements as local civilian 
populations have sought to escape the conflict and breakdown in basic services. 
By January 2015, at least 4808 people had been killed and 10 468 injured in 
fighting, while 1.2 million had been displaced: 633 523 people were internally 
displaced in Ukraine and 593 622 had fled to neighbouring countries (OCHA, 
2015). Most left with few belongings and are in need of shelter, food and 
non-food assistance, placing pressure on neighbouring regions. Approximately 
5.2 million people were still living in conflict-affected areas as of January 2015.
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1.2 Economic context
Ukraine is considered a lower middle-income country. Following independence 
and the transition to a market economy, Ukraine was challenged by a deep 
economic crisis, with industrial output and gross domestic product (GDP) 
more than halving during the 1990s (Åslund, 2005). In the early 2000s, the 
country implemented some economic reforms and GDP growth increased to 
12.1% in 2004 (World Bank, 2014b). Average income remained low however 
and increasing dissatisfaction with the economic situation and political 
institutions helped to trigger the “Orange Revolution” at the end of 2004. This 
event amplified social expectations among the population and increased the 
government’s expenditure on social needs, which was further stimulated by 
repeated parliamentary elections in March 2006 and November 2007. Populist 
socioeconomic policies, combined with attempts to reverse the results of 
privatization, drastically lowered economic growth from 12.1% in 2004 to 2.7% 
in 2005 (World Bank, 2014b). GDP stabilized somewhat in 2006 and 2007, but 
this did not reflect an improvement in industrial output; it was primarily due 
to price increases for energy and bank loans, which caused the price of goods 
and services to spike. The 2008 global economic crisis severely affected the 
already weak Ukrainian economy and annual GDP growth fell to −14.8% in 
2009, while inflation reached 28% (World Bank, 2014b).
Following assistance from the IMF and the World Bank in late 2008, the 
economy stabilized but remained weak and by the end of 2012 Ukraine was 
back in recession due to a poor harvest and lower than expected demand for 
steel, which is a key Ukrainian export (World Bank, 2013). In 2012, GDP 
growth fell to 0.2%, while inflation almost halved from 14.4% in 2011 to 7.9% 
in 2012 (Table 1.2). However, the conflict in the east of Ukraine has hindered 
economic activity – Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are heavily industrialized 
regions usually contributing on average 16% of GDP. The conflict has cut 
industrial production and made it very difficult to collect taxes (World Bank, 
2014a). As a result, the economy has contracted sharply, reducing fiscal space, 
while spending pressures have increased, particularly with regard to energy 
debts to Russian gas suppliers. The World Bank projected that real GDP in 
Ukraine would decline by 8% on the previous year in 2014 and expected the 
fiscal deficit to increase (World Bank, 2014a). The devaluation of the local 
currency, the hryvnya (UAH), is continuing.
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Table 1.2 
Macroeconomic indicators, selected years
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP (current UAH, millions) 2 54516 170070 441452 1 082 569 1 302 079 1 411 238 1 454 931
GDP, PPP (current international 
$, millions)
353174 191236 187979 305528 353457 379140 386540 399755
GDP per capita (current UAH) 0 1058 3458 9372 23600 28488 30953 31984
GDP per capita, PPP (current 
international $)
6806 3712 3823 6486 7706 8295 8478 8788
GDP growth (annual %) −6.3 −12.2 5.9 2.7 4.2 5.2 0.2 1.9
General government final consumption 
expenditure (% GDP)
16.5 21.3 20.9 18.6 20.3 18.2 19.5 19.4
Cash surplus/deficit (% GDP) −0.6 −1.4 −6.5 −2.3 −4.0 – – –
Tax revenue (% GDP) 14.1 17.1 15.5 18.5 18.2 – – –
Central government debt, total (% GDP) 45.3 29.9 27.4 33.5 – – – –
Industry, value added (% GDP) 44.6 42.7 36.3 32.3 31.3 30.0 29.2 26.9
Agriculture, value added (% GDP) 25.6 15.4 17.1 10.4 8.3 9.9 9.3 10.4
Services, etc., value added (% GDP) 29.9 41.9 46.6 57.3 60.4 60.1 61.5 62.6
Labour force, total (millions) 25.5 24.9 23.5 23.3 23.1 23.1 23.1 –
Unemployment, total (% total 
labour force)
5.6 11.6 7.2 8.1 7.9 7.5 – –
Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty line (% population)
8.8 7.8 9.1 – – – – –
GINI index 39.3 29.0 24.8 – – – – –
Real interest rate (%) −56.8 15.0 −6.7 1.9 1.4 9.5 15.3 –
Official exchange rate (UAH per US$, 
period average)
1.5 5.4 5.1 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.0 –
Source: World Bank, 2014b.
1.3 Political context
Under the Constitution of 1996, Ukraine is a republic and the people are the 
single source of sovereignty and power, which is implemented directly and 
through state and local self-governance bodies. The people express their will 
via elections, referenda and other forms of indirect representation. State power 
is split into legislative, executive and judicial branches.
Legislative authority lies with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, a unicameral 
parliament, which acts through its laws, and is composed of people’s deputies 
elected by constituents based on equal suffrage. The right to elect and be elected 
belongs to citizens of Ukraine aged 18 and above. The Parliament has 450 seats, 
half of which are allocated to parties that gain at least 5% of the national vote 
on the basis of proportional representation and the other half of which represent 
directly elected single mandate districts. Following the parliamentary elections 
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in October 2014, the main parties and blocs now represented in the Verkhovna 
Rada are: Petro Poroshenko Bloc (132 seats); People’s Front (82); Self Reliance 
(33); Opposition Bloc (29); and there were also 96 seats held by non-partisan 
deputies. In the first month after its election, the Parliament forms a coalition of 
factions, which includes the majority of deputies, who are elected for a five-year 
term. The coalition forms the government and suggests candidates for the 
Prime Minister and ministerial posts, which the President officially submits 
for consideration to the Verkhovna Rada. Arseniy Yatsenyuk has been Prime 
Minister since February 2014, retaining his post following the October elections. 
The main health care laws in Ukraine are enacted by the Verkhovna Rada.
The President of Ukraine is the head of state and guarantor of: state 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, compliance with the constitution of Ukraine, 
and citizen freedoms and rights. The President signs laws passed by the 
Verkhovna Rada or vetoes them, thus sending them back for revision. The 
President is elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret 
ballot for a five-year term for not more than two consecutive terms. The current 
President is Petro Poroshenko (since 7 June 2014). The Cabinet of Ministers 
of Ukraine is the highest executive body and acts under the Constitution and 
laws of Ukraine as well as presidential decrees. The Cabinet of Ministers is 
headed by the Prime Minister appointed by the President with the consent of 
the Verkhovna Rada. The Cabinet of Ministers is approved by the President 
upon submission from the Prime Minister. The Cabinet of Ministers: directs 
and coordinates the work of ministries and other executive bodies; implements 
domestic and foreign policy of the state; carries out national economic, social 
and cultural policies; drafts law on the State Budget of Ukraine and enforces 
the Verkhovna Rada-enacted State Budget of Ukraine.
Judicial authority in Ukraine lies solely with courts that administer justice 
and their jurisdiction spans all legal relations in the country. The judiciary is 
based on the premises of territoriality and speciality. In addition to the general 
jurisdiction courts system, there are also specialized courts – administrative 
and commercial. The Supreme Court of Ukraine is the highest authority 
within the general jurisdiction courts system, while the legislative output of 
the Verkhovna Rada, the President and the Council of Ministers are checked 
by the Constitutional Court to ensure compliance with the Constitution.
The Constitution of Ukraine stipulates and guarantees local self-governance, 
and territorial communities of villages and their associations, settlements and 
towns elect local mayors to resolve local issues. Executive power in the regions 
and districts, and in the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol, is executed by local state 
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administrations whose heads are appointed and dismissed by the President 
on appeal from the Cabinet of Ministers. Local self-government officials in 
Ukraine are elected directly by representatives of village, rural, municipal 
and district councils. Executive bodies of village, rural and city councils are 
represented by their executive committees (AUC, 2014).
The Crimean Autonomous Republic has its own Constitution, which was 
adopted by the highest representative body of the Crimean Autonomous 
Republic, the Verkhovna Rada of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, and 
approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Its government is the Council of 
Ministers of the Crimean Autonomous Republic. Local state administrations 
ensure: compliance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, presidential 
decrees, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolutions and ordinances of other 
executive bodies; implementation of national/regional social and economic 
programmes; cultural development; and formulation and performance of 
local budgets.
With cross-party support, Ukraine established much closer ties with the 
EU and a DCFTA was initialled in July 2012; ratification was stalled by EU 
concerns over the rule of law in Ukraine including the application of selective 
justice and changes to electoral laws (Council of the European Union, 2012). 
Ratification of the DCFTA with the EU closes off the possibility of Ukraine 
joining the Eurasian Customs Union with Belarus, Kazakhstan and the 
Russian Federation and this caused friction both nationally and internationally. 
Protesters in Kyiv drove Ukraine’s then President (Viktor Yanukovych) from 
office in February 2014 in part because, in an unexpected move, his government 
decided not to sign the DCFTA in favour of joining the Eurasian Customs 
Union. The protests that preceded these events began on 21 November 2013, and 
came to be known as the EuroMaidan. These protests were not confined to the 
centre of Kyiv and security forces clashed with protesters who took control of 
local government buildings in cities around the country. On 21 February 2014, 
representatives of the EuroMaidan protesters came to an agreement with 
President Yanukovych to revert to the Constitutional amendments of 2004 from 
the Constitutional amendments of 2010 (thus shifting the balance of power away 
from the president back to the parliament) and to hold early presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2014. However, not all the protesters were appeased 
by this agreement and on 22 February 2014 Yanukovych fled to the Russian 
Federation when protesters took control of the parliamentary building in Kyiv; 
the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada assumed the role of President until new 
elections could be held in May 2014. The DCFTA was eventually signed by 
Ukraine in June 2014 in the hope of promoting greater economic stability 
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and prosperity. However, large parts of former President Yanukovych’s old 
powerbase in the south and the east of the country are not persuaded that this 
is the right course for them.
On 23 February 2014, when the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Oleksandr 
Turchynov, assumed the role of President, pro-Russian protesters rallied 
in the Crimean Autonomous Republic against the new governing bodies in 
Kyiv. In March 2014, the Russian Federation took control of the Crimean 
Autonomous Republic. In April 2014, armed groups in the Donbas region of 
eastern Ukraine – which covers most of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts – began 
to seize buildings and arms. As a result of ongoing fighting between armed 
groups and government forces, people have been forced to flee their homes 
and have become increasingly vulnerable as the conflict intensified and spread. 
Those remaining in the Donbas region, particularly in areas affected by fighting, 
face imminent security threats due to military activities by all parties to the 
conflict that are increasingly concentrated in densely populated urban areas. At 
the time of writing, the provision of basic services was disrupted, supplies were 
increasingly limited, and an upsurge in lawlessness had occurred. Ongoing 
daily hostilities also continued to be reported, despite ceasefires being agreed 
in September 2014. Indiscriminate shelling and continued insecurity were 
placing conflict-affected people and humanitarian actors at risk (OCHA, 2015).
Ukrainian membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
had been discussed but was not being pursued until recent events in the 
south and east of the country pushed potential membership to the fore. On 
23 December 2014, the Verkhovna Rada voted to abandon the country’s 
neutral non-bloc status and set a course for NATO membership. Ukraine is 
a full member of the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) since July 2008, the Council of Europe since 1995, the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and was a participant in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) until 2014 but never ratified 
membership. The country has ratified most major international treaties that have 
an impact on health, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (as of June 2006). The 
Millennium Development Goals have been adapted to the Ukrainian context 
and are being pursued in relation to poverty reduction, control of HIV/AIDS, 
improving child and maternal mortality and other areas. Ukraine scored 26 
on the 2014 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) where 100 would be a country 
with no corruption, which shows no real improvement over the past three years 
(Transparency International, 2014).
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1.4 Health status
Social, economic and political transformations following independence had 
a strong negative impact on population health in Ukraine, with average life 
expectancy at birth falling to 66.9 years (61.3 for men and 72.6 for women) in 
1995 (Table 1.3). Life expectancy recovered slightly after this, but then stagnated 
until quite recent improvements since 2008 have seen female life expectancy at 
birth rise to its highest recorded level (76.2 in 2012) and male life expectancy at 
birth approaching the relatively high levels achieved in the 1980s, which have 
been attributed to the anti-alcohol campaign introduced by the then leader of 
the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev (Meslé & Vallin, 2012).
Table 1.3 
Mortality indicators, selected years
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
Life expectancy at birth, total 69.9 70.5 66.9 67.9 67.3 70.3 71.1 71.3
Life expectancy at birth, male 65.2 65.7 61.3 62.3 61.5 65.2 66.0 66.2
Life expectancy at birth, female 74.0 75.0 72.6 73.6 73.4 75.3 76.0 76.2
Total mortality rate per 100 000, male 1 639 1 555 1 980 1 875 1 968 1 619 1 526 1 509
Total mortality rate per 100 000, female 948 878 1 043 981 995 865 811 796
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
In 2012, the major causes of mortality were: cardiovascular disease (61% 
of total mortality), followed by cancer (15%) and external causes including 
accidents and poisonings (8%); these three causes account for 84% of all deaths 
in Ukraine (Table 1.4). Cardiovascular disease is also the most common cause 
of morbidity measured as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). However, HIV/
AIDS and TB have increased rapidly as causes of disability and premature 
mortality in Ukraine (IHME, 2013). Disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE) 
was estimated to be 60 years in 2007: 55 years for men and 64 years for women 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014).
The prevalence of noncommunicable diseases (NCD) is higher in the west 
of Ukraine relative to prevalence elsewhere in the country (52.3% of the adult 
population in the west versus 34.9% in the south, 38.7% in the north/centre 
and 43.7% in the east); however, the prevalence of health risk factors such as 
hazardous alcohol use and tobacco consumption is much greater in the east 
than in the west or south, and the rates of stroke and heart attack are highest in 
the east (Menon & Frogner, 2010). This geographic variation is reflected in the 
lower life expectancy in eastern regions of the country (Murphy et al., 2013a). 
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Although there is a 10-year age gap between male and female life expectancy, 
the gap narrowed rapidly between 2008 and 2012; at its widest in 2007, women 
were living on average 12 years longer than men (WHO Regional Office for 
Europe, 2014). The key risk factors influencing health in Ukraine are tobacco 
and alcohol consumption, followed by uncontrolled hypertension and obesity. 
There is a wide gender gap in smoking rates as 44.7% of men reported being 
daily smokers versus just 5.7% of women (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 
2014); however, smoking rates may have been falling for men, as is the trend 
across the region, although they remain very high in international comparison 
(Roberts et al., 2012a).
Table 1.4 
Main causes of death, selected years
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
SDR, diseases of circulatory system, 
all ages per 100 000
751 589 780 791 827 733 683 667
SDR, ischaemic heart disease, all ages 
per 100 000
493 317 466 505 544 492 459 450
SDR, cerebrovascular diseases, all ages 
per 100 000
210 191 229 198 177 159 148 142
SDR, malignant neoplasms, all ages 
per 100 000
164 184 183 173 164 158 158 163
SDR, trachea/bronchus/lung cancer, 
all ages per 100 000
34 41 38 33 28 25 26 27
SDR, cancer of the cervix, all ages, 
per 100 000
8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7
SDR, malignant neoplasm female breast, 
all ages per 100 000
18 21 24 25 25 24 24 24
SDR, external cause injury and poison, 
all ages per 100 000
93 107 162 146 141 88 85 83
SDR, suicide and self-inflicted injury, 
all ages per 100 000
22 21 28 28 21 18 18 18
SDR, transport accidents, all ages 
per 100 000
15 27 19 14 20 12 12 12
SDR, infectious and parasitic disease, 
all ages per 100 000
15 12 20 26 36 30 29 29
SDR,bronchitis/emphysema/asthma, 
all ages per 100 000
43 48 58 46 – – – –
SDR, diseases of the digestive system, 
all ages per 100 000
32 30 43 42 62 51 48 52
SDR, diabetes, all ages, per 100 000 3 5 8 6 5 4 4 4
SDR, symptoms, signs and ill-defined 
conditions, all ages per 100 000
36 104 88 50 64 34 28 23
SDR, tuberculosis, all ages per 100 000 10 9 15 22 24 16 14 14
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014. 
Note: SDR = standardized death rate. 
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One survey found that one in three Ukrainian adults aged 18–65 years had 
elevated blood pressure levels and about one fifth of the adult population was 
obese (Menon & Frogner, 2010). One third of those classified as hypertensive 
in the survey did not know they had high blood pressure, with twice as many 
men as women being unaware (Menon & Frogner, 2010). A separate study 
found that, in 2010, 70% of those identified as having hypertension were not 
taking medication daily and that the irregular treatment of hypertension was 
a persistent problem in Ukraine as it had been similarly high in 2001 at 73% 
(Roberts et al., 2012b).
Although infant mortality rates in Ukraine are relatively high when 
compared with countries of the EU, they fell rapidly after independence, similar 
to other countries in the region (Table 1.5). The WHO definition of a live birth 
is not yet fully implemented across the country, as indicated by the gap between 
the estimated and officially reported IMR. Observed improvements in IMR 
have been attributed to better access to technologies such as incubators in 
the perinatal period since independence (Meslé & Vallin, 2012). The maternal 
mortality rate (MMR) has almost halved since independence, attributable, at 
least in part, to improved survival following termination of pregnancy. However, 
compared with countries of the EU, the MMR in Ukraine was very high at 32 
per 100 000 live births in 2010 (Table 1.5). As with the IMR, there is quite a 
gap between the officially reported rate and WHO estimates due to differences 
between national and WHO definitions of what constitutes maternal mortality 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014). The abortion rate has fallen rapidly 
as modern contraceptive methods have become more accessible; in 2007, 
contraceptive use by married women of reproductive age was 66.7%. However, 
abortion remains the main form of birth control used in Ukraine.
Overall, the major health challenges facing the population relate to NCD, 
although communicable diseases such as HIV and TB remain of serious 
concern. There is also a resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases as 
immunization rates have fallen across the country (see section 5.1). Addionally, 
there are conflict-affected populations in the south and east of the country who 
lack access to basic facilities (including health services, water and food) and 
1.2 million displaced people (see section 1.1). At the time of writing, the scale of 
this humanitarian crisis represented the most pressing health challenge facing 
the Ukrainian population. In February 2014, WHO set up a field office in the 
city of Donetsk to assist with coordination of activities and health monitoring. 
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Table 1.5 
Maternal, child and adolescent health indicators, selected years
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
Estimated infant mortality per 1000 live births 16.8 17.7 15.9 12.5 10.2 9.2 –
Infant deaths per 1000 live births 13 14.8 12 10 9.2 9 8.4
Neonatal deaths per 1000 live births 6.65 5.71 – – – – –
Postneonatal deaths per 1000 live births 5.3 4.3 – – – – –
Perinatal deaths per 1000 births 14.3 11.9 9.6 8.9 8.2 – –
Probability of dying before age 5 per 1000 
live births
16.7 19 15.5 13 11.1 10.7 10.1
Maternal deaths per 100 000 live births 32.4 32.3 24.7 17.6 23.3 16.9 12.7
Estimated maternal mortality per 100 000 
live births
49 45 35 25 32 – –
Abortions per 1000 live births 1 551 1 288 898 446 224 – –
% of all live births to mothers aged under 20 years 19.9 15.5 11.9 7.8 7.1 – –
Incidence of syphilis per 100 000 119 92 42 16 3 – –
Incidence of gonococcal infection per 100 000 89 53 39 22 7 – –
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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2. Organization and governance
In 1991, Ukraine inherited an extensive and highly centralized Semashko system (a hierarchical, nationally controlled system the staff of which were state employees), which it was not possible to maintain through the 
economic downturn that followed independence. There has been considerable 
decentralization in the system since independence; however, in most other 
respects, the system remains largely unreformed. Decentralization has mostly 
meant deconcentration of functional and managerial powers to regional and 
subregional levels. Regional and local health authorities are responsible for 
health care facilities in their territory and are functionally subordinate to the 
Ministry of Health, but managerially and financially answerable to the regional 
and local governments. Decentralization through privatization has been largely 
inhibited by provisions of the Constitution prohibiting the reduction of the 
existing network of publicly owned health care facilities. The private sector 
in the Ukrainian health system is small and consists mostly of pharmacies, 
diagnostic facilities and privately practising physicians.
Approaches to capacity planning in the Ukrainian health care sector have 
remained almost unchanged since Soviet times and the mechanisms in place 
neither reflect the health care needs of the population nor take into account 
regional characteristics of health service provision. There is also little incentive 
for rational use of resources or cost control over health care facilities. The 
norms-based approach to planning, characteristic of the Semashko model, along 
with capacity-based financing, encourages unnecessary hospitalizations and 
excessive lengths of stay. Changing planning mechanisms in the Ukrainian 
health system is further complicated by the absence of a unified people-centred 
health information management system.
The Ministry of Health develops and approves state quality standards and 
clinical protocols, and is responsible for the organization and implementation 
of the mandatory accreditation of health care facilities and issuing licences to 
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legal entities and individuals engaged in the delivery of medical services or the 
production and sales of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. However, the 
regulatory process is more of a formality and has no real impact on the quality 
of care provided, as there is a lack of suitable enforcement mechanisms. For 
pharmaceuticals, all distributors are expected to comply with good distributing 
practices and, since February 2013, it has been illegal to put on sale any 
pharmaceutical product that has not been manufactured in compliance with EU 
good manufacturing practices. Most pharmaceuticals are purchased directly by 
patients, so the scope for influencing prescribing patterns is rather limited and 
is further hampered by de facto liberal pharmacy dispensing procedures and 
the strong influence pharmaceutical companies have on prescribing practices.
Patient empowerment is not a significant feature of the Ukrainian health 
system. By law, all citizens have the right to access information about their 
health and services available to them, but the mechanisms for accessing such 
information are not transparent, so most rely on personal recommendations and 
informal networks when making decisions about health services. Most people 
try to effect choice in the system by paying out of pocket for services, either 
formally or informally. Patient rights in the Ukrainian health system are not 
protected systematically and there is no specific legal mechanism for patient 
complaints procedures within the health system. However, with the most recent 
attempt at reform of the system, the public became much more active, founding 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in order to express their opinions about 
the changes. Most often this was to protest against the reforms, partially in 
response to the inadequate public communication informing people of the 
proposed reforms, what they meant and why they were necessary.
2.1 Overview of the health system
The Ukrainian health care system is still based on the integrated Semashko 
model (see section 2.2). Although no fundamental reform has taken place, some 
changes in the health sector have been initiated and realized since independence; 
the most recent package of reforms was introduced from 2010. Three phases of 
the reforms were to be implemented over a four-year period (2010–2014), and 
started with changes to health financing to reduce fragmentation and prioritize 
primary care. Phase two was to pilot the programme in four regions (Donetsk, 
Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsya oblasts and Kyiv city). In phase three, the pilot 
regions were then due to deepen the reforms, but these plans were put on hold 
in view of the unstable political situation (see section 6.1).
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Officially the system is financed by general taxation and declaratively 
provides universal access to unlimited care that is free at the point of use in 
publicly owned health care facilities. In practice, however, patients often need 
to pay out of pocket to access services (see section 3.4).
The national Ministry of Health coordinates and governs the core statutory 
health system. Parallel systems are governed through their respective ministries. 
At the regional level, the regional health authorities are nominally accountable 
to the national Ministry of Health for the implementation of national health 
policies within their territory. They are responsible for the regional health care 
facilities, which primarily provide specialized and highly specialized services 
as well as emergency care services (since 2012) (Fig. 2.1). Most medical services 
are provided to the population in facilities that are under local government at 
the regional, district or municipal levels (Fig. 2.1). These services are generally 
financed from the budgetary resources of the relevant tier of government, 
which receives transfers at the respective government level. However, due 
to insufficient government financing of the health system, the population is 
required to pay for outpatient and inpatient pharmaceuticals as well as provide 
unofficial remuneration to medical personnel.
The private sector in the Ukrainian health system is small and consists 
mostly of pharmacies, diagnostic facilities (inpatient and outpatient), and 
privately practising physicians. These are financed mostly through direct 
payments from the population.
2.2 Historical background
A detailed history of the Soviet Ukrainian health system is available in 
earlier versions of this report (Lekhan, Rudiy & Nolte, 2004; Lekhan, Rudiy 
& Richardson, 2010). After 1991, Ukraine underwent a difficult process of 
economic restructuring that was accompanied by social instability and 
drastically reduced living standards for large parts of the population, especially 
pensioners, disabled people and other vulnerable groups, accelerating a 
worsening of key indicators of population health that had started just before 
the break-up of the Soviet Union. This increased need for health care took 
place against the background of reduced ability of the health system to respond 
adequately. This constituted a significant departure from the past, when costs 
of material and medical supplies, as well as basic services such as electricity, 
heating and others, were fixed, thus allowing the state to maintain the extensive 
network of facilities. Also, the running costs of hospitals were comparatively 
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Fig. 2.1 
Overview of the Ukrainian health system 
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low, as were the costs of pharmaceuticals because the limited range available 
from production in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was subsidized. 
The transition to a market economy has meant rapid increases in the prices of 
basic supplies, further complicating the already difficult economic situation in 
the health care sector. Against this background, Ukraine was slow to reform its 
health system and instead largely maintained the principles of the Semashko-
type system with its emphasis on hospital-based care and limited ability to 
respond adequately to population health needs, resulting ins a highly unequal 
and low-quality health system (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010).
2.3 Organization
The key players in the Ukrainian health system are the central government, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health and local governments. The 
Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) sets the goals, major objectives, priorities, budget 
guidelines and regulatory framework for the health sector, and approves the 
targeted national health programmes. The President is responsible for ensuring 
that health policy is implemented in accordance with legislation and the 
Constitution through the system of executive bodies. The Cabinet of Ministers 
coordinates the development and implementation of national programmes, 
and creates legal, economic and managerial mechanisms to support the 
health system.
The Ministry of Finance prepares the draft state budget, which is then 
submitted to the Parliament for approval. This sets out the public resources to 
be allocated to the health sector in any given year. The Ministry of Finance is 
also the body that establishes the requirements for state institutions (including 
health care facilities) in formulating and implementing budgets.
The Ministry of Health is the leading body within the executive responsible 
for implementing health policy, including policies on specific state health 
programmes, including socially significant diseases such as HIV and 
administering publicly owned health care facilities. The health system is 
managed by the Ministry of Health through the regional health authorities in the 
24 regional administrations and two city states of Sevastopol and Kyiv, where 
the departments are part of the city state administrations. At the national level, 
the Ministry of Health is responsible for developing national health policies, 
and directly managing and funding certain specialized health care institutions 
which are in state ownership, higher medical educational establishments, 
research institutes, and publicly owned medico-prophylactic facilities (Fig. 2.1). 
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The Ministry of Health provides vertical management with basic command-
and-control institutions, which provide regulatory functions for social health 
protection such as sanitary norms (see section 2.8).
The Ministry of Health is also responsible for the organizational 
management of activities in the state medical emergencies service; manages 
the undergraduate and postgraduate medical education programmes and the 
medical research system; and controls a significant proportion of the centralized 
state purchase of pharmaceuticals, medical devices and equipment for the 
relevant state programmes.
The Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Service 
and Ministry of Transport and Communications all have their own health 
care facilities for their employees and their relatives, which operate in parallel 
to the main statutory system under the Ministry of Health. The State Penal 
Jurisdiction Department is responsible for the organization of health services 
within the prison system.
The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is responsible, among other things, 
for overseeing the provision of long-term residential care for elderly people and 
people with disabilities.
The National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine provides highly 
specialized medical services. Their facilities are financed directly from the 
state budget through a separate funding stream.
Local authorities include district, city district, town and village councils 
and state administrations. Until 2011, village councils owned and cofinanced 
primary care services for their local populations, but financing was moved to 
the district level as part of the health system reform programme launched in 
2010 in order to reduce fragmentation of health system resources. However, the 
ownership of the facilities remained unchanged and the village councils had 
to decide whether to transfer ownership to the district authorities. In the four 
health reform programme pilot regions, most facilities were transferred to joint 
ownership. The government is currently evaluating this experience in order to 
see whether it should once again decentralize ownership and financing to the 
village level, despite the risk of further fragmentation.
Many NGOs (professional medical associations and patient groups) are 
active and becoming more influential. There is no self-governing of the medical 
profession in Ukraine. There are many international organizations working in 
the Ukrainian health sector, but their activities are focused quite narrowly on 
specific areas such as sexual health, HIV/AIDS and TB.
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2.4 Decentralization and centralization
In Ukraine, a highly centralized model of decision-making in the health system 
inherited from the Soviet era has gradually been replaced by a system in which 
authority has been passed to local administrations and self-governing bodies. 
The health system is a complex, multi-layered, sometimes parallel, system in 
which responsibilities in the health care sector are fragmented among central 
government (the Ministry of Health and many other ministries and public 
authorities), as well as 27 regional administrations and numerous administrative 
bodies at regional, municipal, district and community levels. Decentralization 
has meant deconcentration of functional and managerial powers at the regional 
and subregional levels. Functional deconcentration means that the system is 
managed through the health authorities of regional administrations, which are 
financially and managerially independent, while nominally it is functionally 
subordinate to the national Ministry of Health.
Deconcentration of general managerial powers at the regional and 
subregional levels means that executive functions in the regions and districts 
are exercised by the relevant local (regional or district) administrations. The 
regional administrations have to ensure that decisions by local governments, 
including those relating to the health of the population, conform to current 
legislation. They also coordinate the activities of state services. The local 
executive authorities, in turn, with the approval of the Ministry of Health, 
appoint the heads of local health authorities and their deputies who participate 
in decision-making.
Until 2011, the State Sanitary–Epidemiological Service (SES) and the State 
Pharmaceuticals Quality Control Inspectorate, each with relevant facilities at 
the different levels of administration, remained fully centralized and vertically 
subordinated to the Ministry of Health. The SES was renamed in 2011 and 
given the status of a separate central state organ directly answerable to the 
Cabinet of Ministers, albeit via the Ministry of Health, in accordance with 
Presidential Order No. 1085 of 9 December 2010, On the optimization of central 
state organs; it was then effectively disbanded in 2014. Some of its functions 
were absorbed into other state organs, such as the State Service of Ukraine 
for Issues of Food Safety and Consumer Protection and the State Service of 
Ukraine for Labour Issues (see section 5.1).
The Law on the local self-government of Ukraine (1997) delegated 
significant budgetary authority to regional and district councils, which pass 
on management functions in health care to relevant local executive authorities. 
Health systems in transition  Ukraine22
At the community level, these responsibilities are delegated to councils and 
their executive bodies, which are by law also responsible for managing the 
local health care facilities and have certain additional powers, including: the 
assurance of accessible health services that are free of charge; development 
of a network of health services; human resources planning; contracting for 
the training of specialists; provision of pharmaceuticals and medical devices 
to certain disadvantaged population groups; accreditation of health care 
facilities; and proposals for licensing individual entrepreneurial activities in 
the health care sector. Local governments face a division of accountability – 
to the Ministry of Health for compliance with norms and standards, and to 
the local administrations for funding and management. Local authorities are 
given responsibility for organizing their health services subject to strict central 
regulation. Decentralization of financing, along with differing health care 
needs of the population between regions, led to increasing inequalities between 
wealthier and poorer areas that were previously allocated resources from the 
centre. Deprived regions were affected by the lack of sustainable sources of 
income and health care became a heavy burden on local budgets. A number 
of communities found it increasingly difficult to maintain health services in 
the public sector. With the passing of the Budget Code (2001), strict rules were 
established, allowing for inter-budget transfers as of 2002. The volume of 
transfers is based on a specific formula that takes account of financial norms 
of adjusted budget allocations, the number of residents in the territory and 
an index of relative fiscal solvency. This mechanism has, to a certain degree, 
levelled differences in budget capacities among regions and territories.
In addition, the Budget Code explicitly defines the types of health care 
facilities that can be funded by budgets at various administrative levels. 
However, public health care facilities may not be financed from more than 
one budget. The most notable changes have taken place in specialized health 
care facilities. The law has facilitated centralized financing and management 
of specialized health care facilities at regional level. These provide a range 
of mental health, TB, dermato-venerological and other services, generally 
involving low technology but used by a substantial number of patients. On 
the one hand, the transfer of these facilities to the regional level has created 
some problems for regional budgets, but on the other, closing some of the 
smaller facilities was a prerequisite for the optimization of the health facility 
network. The move to strict legislative regulation of public funding of health 
care facilities led to some streamlining of resource use but created problems in 
integrating different levels of service provision.
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Decentralization through privatization has been largely inhibited by 
provisions of the Constitution prohibiting the reduction of the existing network 
of publicly owned health care facilities.
2.5 Planning
There is no central health planning agency in the Ukrainian health system 
and approaches to capacity planning have remained almost unchanged since 
Soviet times, relying on input-based measures. The mechanisms in place neither 
reflect the health care needs of the population nor take into account regional 
characteristics of health service provision. There is also little incentive for 
rational use of resources or cost control over health care facilities. For example, 
regional health authorities are responsible for establishing the total number of 
hospital beds, taking into account area-specific norms for inpatient care. The 
norm for Ukraine as a whole was set at 8 hospital beds per 1000 population. 
However, in many regions, this norm is inflated by the considerable quantity 
of unnecessary hospitalizations and excessive lengths of stay. In 2013, a 
government order was drafted for the gradual reduction of the norm for hospital 
bed numbers from 8 per 1000 population to 7.5 in 2014 and 6.5 by 2020, but 
this order was not passed. On the contrary, early in 2014, a legal moratorium 
on the closing or reorganization of health care facilities was introduced, which 
explicitly prohibited the closure of health care facilities and any reduction in 
the number of hospital beds (Law on the introduction of a moratorium on 
the liquidation and reorganization of health care facilities, No. 772-VII, 
23 February 2014).
The defined bed capacity also determines staffing levels for hospitals, which 
are set according to the number of hospital beds by specialty. Staffing levels 
for stand-alone outpatient clinics, polyclinic facilities and outpatient units are 
determined according to norms approved by the Ministry of Health. These 
norms are differentiated for two population groups (children and adults) and 
administrative type (village, district, municipal, regional). The number of 
primary care providers (district internists and paediatricians) is calculated 
based on the population in the catchment area. It is also possible to introduce 
positions for occupational health physicians in outpatient settings, as well as 
paediatricians providing services to children in preschool facilities and schools. 
Levels of nursing staff required to provide outpatient care are determined 
according to norms tied to a specified number of appropriately specialized 
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physicians. Also, there are individual norms for the number of mid-level staff 
at the feldsher–midwife [akusher] points (FAPs) providing basic health care in 
rural areas.
In summary, current practices of human resources planning and management 
of the state-run health system do not follow a coherent model. Overall, the 
current system lacks any coherent approach to ensuring appropriate levels of 
health care workers. In recent years, this approach to planning has met with 
sharp criticism, because it is not linked to meeting the needs of the population 
for different types of care and also helps to preserve the excessive capacity of 
health care facilities. In 2013, a method for norm-setting the burden on health 
workers that would take into account the volume and complexity of their work 
was being developed and trialled. The introduction of such norms should 
modernize the general approach to health workforce planning (Ministerial 
Order No. 249, 28 March 2013).
The health sector is closely involved in multisectoral disaster risk 
management through the State Medical Catastrophe Service, which consists 
of medical forces, equipment and facilities at the central and regional levels, 
which are independent of local government and are instead under the Ministry 
of Health in cooperation with the Ministry of Emergencies, the Ministry 
of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, and state administrations for the regions.
The Ukrainian health system relies on international development assistance 
for certain services (such as HIV services) and, more recently, humanitarian 
assistance (see section 3.6.2). There is no agency in the Ministry of Health 
for the coordination of international development assistance; instead this is 
managed by the Ministry’s Department of International Affairs and European 
Integration. In accordance with a Ministerial Order (No. 522, 24 July 2014), in 
2014 a strategic consulting group on health system reform was set up as an expert 
advisory organ under the leadership of the Ministry of Health. This comprises a 
range of representatives from both state and non-state structures, including the 
World Bank, WHO Country Office in Ukraine, Soros Fund, and others. One of 
the key activities for this group has been the coordination of different branches 
of government and NGOs in an international technical assistance project. The 
aim of the project is to achieve planning and organizational collaboration in 
developing a new national health care system for Ukraine. It is yet to be seen 
what will be its impact on the reform itself and its influence on the active 
coordination of donor organizations supporting the health sector.
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2.6 Intersectorality
Health is not routinely taken into account by other ministries and agencies at 
any tier of government, and health impact assessments are not a standard part 
of policy-making in order to ensure Health in All policies.
2.7 Health information management
2.7.1 Information systems
There is a unified electronic health information system for specific reporting 
from the regional level upwards, but at the municipal and community levels 
reporting is done on paper using standardized forms. There are other localized 
information systems, but these are not necessarily compatible and are for the 
management of individual facilities rather than national-level planning and 
coordination. It has also been asserted that facilities do not provide wholly 
accurate or relevant information, including financing, surveillance and 
programme data to the government in a usable fashion for sufficiently effective 
monitoring of the health system (Tarantino et al., 2011). Apart from a few 
ventures, the Ukrainian health system does not have a unified people-centred 
health information management system.
2.7.2 Health technology assessment
Health technology assessment (HTA) is not yet a feature of the system in 
Ukraine and there is no institution in the country responsible for HTA; that is, 
the systematic evaluation of the effectiveness, costs and impact of health care 
technology with the aim of informing health policy-making.
2.8 Regulation
2.8.1 Regulation and governance of third-party payers
Most health services are provided through government-owned health care 
facilities, and the relationship between purchasers and providers remains 
integrated, as it was in the Semashko system (see section 3.3.4). Different 
levels of government act as agents that ensure the maintenance of health care 
facilities within the limits of strict line-item budgets (see section 3.7). Health 
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care facilities therefore do not generally have autonomy in managerial and 
financial decision-making. Although the Law on public procurement of goods, 
works and services was passed in February 2000 to regulate the purchase 
of health services with public funds on a contractual basis from both public 
and private providers, in practice this law has not been fully implemented 
(Lekhan & Rudiy, 2007). Since 2013, as part of the health reform programme, 
contractual relations have begun to be introduced in the primary care system 
in the pilot regions; however, these agreements are still more of a formality 
than a regulatory instrument as there are inadequate mechanisms for their 
enforcement (see section 3.3.4). Elsewhere in the country, the health system 
continues to function on the basis of hierarchical relations between the state (as 
third-party payer) and directly subordinated local authorities (as state property) 
and the public providers of health services.
2.8.2 Regulation and governance of providers
The public providers, which provide most of the population’s health services, are 
budgetary institutions financed on the basis of itemized estimates of expenditure 
agreed by the higher authorities. This conditions the very limited rights of public 
providers to make independent managerial and financial decisions, as does the 
compulsory use of strict Ministry of Health normative planning structures. At 
the same time, the Ministry of Health has been trying to increase the autonomy 
of providers. The aforementioned pilot regions have trialled reimbursement 
according to just two codes (ongoing and capital expenditures), since 2013 
for primary care, and since 2014 for emergency and secondary care (see 
section 3.7.1). In one of the pilot reform regions (Kyiv) the providers have been 
changed from publicly owned health care facilities (providing both primary 
and secondary/specialist care) to communal non-commercial health enterprises.
State regulation of health care providers is concentrated at the national level, 
with few regulatory activities under the authority of local government. The 
Ministry of Health develops and approves state quality standards and clinical 
protocols, and is responsible for the organization and implementation of the 
mandatory accreditation of health care facilities and the issuing of licences to 
legal entities and individuals engaged in the delivery of medical services or 
the production and sale of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment (Lekhan 
& Rudiy, 2007). Accreditation was introduced on 15 July 1997 by Cabinet of 
Ministers Decree No. 765, On approving the procedure of state accreditation 
of a health facility, and is mandatory for all facilities regardless of their form 
of ownership. Assessment of the first stage of accreditation indicated that it has 
led to some improvement in material and technical resources, the qualification 
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of medical staff and the quality of care. At present there are 27 accreditation 
commissions in Ukraine in the regional administrations (Lekhan & Rudiy, 
2007). The accreditation process initiated the creation of preconditions for the 
realization of patients’ rights to medical care of adequate quality. However, 
the process has gradually become a formality and it has no real impact on the 
quality of care.
Public and private health care providers (individuals and legal entities) are 
licensed under the Law on licensing of specific types of economic activities, 
No. 1775-14 (2000) and a joint order of the State Committee of Ukraine for 
Regulatory Policy and Entrepreneurship and the Ministry of Health as of 
16 February 2001, No. 38/63 On licensing conditions for economic activity 
relating to medical practice (Lekhan & Rudiy, 2007). The legislation is 
designed to ensure that professional staff and providers achieve minimum 
standards of competence and meet function-specific requirements regarding 
sanitation and safety, and technical standards of equipment. The licensing 
of medical practice has not assured the quality of health care. Many health 
care facilities, especially in rural areas, face severe structural problems; many 
buildings have become dilapidated, with equipment that is outmoded and 
in poor condition. Some of the reasons behind this are the lack of modern 
standards for material and technical support, as well as a very liberal form of 
licensing for state and community health care facilities, which usually manage 
to keep their historically established range of services.
In order to deregulate commercial activities, from 2011 the process of getting 
a licence for enterprises has been gradually simplified by the introduction 
of a licence to practise medicine, as in other fields. This is reflected in the 
new licensing conditions for private medical practices. It was assumed that 
deregulation would be combined with the responsibility for the accuracy of 
the data being firmly with the licensee, but this mechanism still has problems.
2.8.3 Registration and planning of human resources
The Ministry of Health establishes the requirements for professional staff; for 
the training and development of health and pharmaceutical workers; uniform 
qualification standards for people engaged in medical or pharmaceutical 
activities; the list of medical specializations; and the classification of types of 
health care facility. Practising doctors are subject to recertification every five 
years, but there is no system of registration for doctors.
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Current practices in human resource planning and management of the 
state-run health system do not follow a coherent model or correspond to 
organizational goals. Overall, the current system lacks any coherent approach 
to ensuring appropriate levels of health care workers. Staffing levels for 
outpatient care providers are determined according to norms approved by the 
Ministry of Health (see section 2.5) and the use of rigid standards provides few 
opportunities for effective management at facility level. At the time of writing, 
the Ministry of Health was in the process of developing new approaches to 
norm-setting for the workload of health care workers, which are expected to 
fundamentally change the approach to norm-setting around both the overall 
number of healthcare workers required as well as how many are needed for 
different specialties.
2.8.4 Regulation and governance of pharmaceuticals
The main regulatory functions in pharmaceuticals are currently split between 
two bodies: the State Expert Centre (until 27 September 2010 called the State 
Pharmacological Centre) and the State Administration of Ukraine on Medicinal 
Products (SAUMP), both of which are under the Ministry of Health. The State 
Expert Centre is a specialized organization which covers: the registration and 
quality control of pharmaceutical products; preclinical, clinical and postclinical 
research; monitoring adverse drug reactions (although adverse drug reaction 
reporting by physicians is very low); developing the list of pharmaceuticals that 
may be bought over the counter and submitting it for approval to the Ministry 
of Health; authorizing the import and use of unregistered pharmaceuticals; 
and advising on the content of the National Drug Formulary. Moreover, the 
Centre has the task of standardizing medical services, including pharmaceutical 
services. The State Expert Centre is completely funded through fees and 
charges for services, with no contribution from the state budget.
According to Article 9 of the Law on medicines, drugs are permitted for 
use in Ukraine after registration by the state (No. 123/96BP, 4 April 1996). 
To ensure the quality and safety of pharmaceuticals, the registration process 
requires the presentation of preclinical examinations and clinical trial results. 
From 2008, the registration process for generics also requires proof of their 
bioequivalence to their brand-name counterpart. State registration of medicinal 
products is carried out by the State Expert Centre on the basis of a submitted 
application, which, since 2014, has included a good manufacturing practice 
(GMP) certificate along with a plethora of other specific information. Upon 
registration, the applicant receives a certificate that states the term for which 
the drug is licensed for use in Ukraine. According to the Ukraine National 
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Register of Medicines, as of 12 May 2014, there were 12 811 medicines 
registered, including 3673 domestic (29%) and 9138 foreign (71%) products. 
In the structure of retail sales by value the market is dominated by imported 
medicines but by volume domestic medicines predominate (see section 5.6).
Ukrainian law provides for intellectual property protection for the 
developers of medicines. A state registration applicant must provide a patent 
copy or a licence and letter indicating that the patentee’s rights are not violated 
by registration. Moreover, the Law on pharmaceuticals, which was passed 
when Ukraine joined the WTO (with several amendments in 2006–2007), 
prohibits the registration of generics using registration data from another 
pharmaceutical for a period of five years, regardless of the lifetime of the 
patent. In linking the registration of generics to the expiration of a patent and 
giving a five-year exclusive right to the original brand name, Ukraine undertook 
commitments that are quite stringent in comparison with the WTO and Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requirements, and 
contradictory to the Bolar Provision, which allows manufacturers of generics 
to submit their products for regulatory approval before the expiry of a patented 
intervention. Implementation of these commitments may make pharmaceuticals 
less accessible to the population and create problems for the pharmaceutical 
industry of Ukraine and therefore for the country (Polyakova, 2006; Sur, 2006).
The SAUMP (previously the State Pharmaceuticals Quality Control 
Inspectorate) is responsible for quality control once drugs are on the market 
and it has a network of 27 laboratories across the country to facilitate this; all 
have completed sector certification and comply with ISO17025. The SAUMP 
Central Laboratory has completed the WHO Prequalification Programme, is 
accredited with the European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines (EDQM) 
and included in the Europe-wide General European OMCL [official medicines 
control laboratories] Network (GEON). Moreover, since 2013, Ukraine has been 
party to the European Pharmacopoeia (as per the Law on the ratification of the 
Convention on the development of a European Pharmacopoeia as amended 
by its protocol, No. 5441-VI, 16 October 2012) and, since 2011, SAUMP has 
been a member of both the Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention and the 
Pharmaceutical Inspection Cooperation Scheme (PIC/S). GMP inspection, as 
well as the inspection of pharmacies and distributors, is also the responsibility 
of SAUMP and, as of 2009, the licensing of production, distribution and retail 
sales has also fallen under its remit. There is no difference in the legal provisions 
for the licensing of public and private pharmacies (WHO, 2013). Wholesalers 
and distributors are required to comply with good distributing practices. Since 
15 February 2013, it has been illegal to put on sale any pharmaceutical product 
that has not been manufactured in compliance with GMP.
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Ukraine’s Law on medicines was amended on 5 September 2014, adding a 
category of products subject to simplified marketing authorization procedures. 
The new procedure applies to medicinal products that are intended to treat 
TB, HIV/AIDS, cancer and rare (orphan) diseases. It authorizes fast-track 
registration for medications that have been approved by competent authorities 
of the United States of America, Swiss Confederation, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, the EU or Israel (countries with “high regulatory standards”).
The advertising of prescription medicines direct to the general public is 
prohibited, but this ban is frequently violated. There are also guidelines for 
the promotion and advertising of over-the-counter medicines. People purchase 
pharmaceuticals over the Internet, which is illegal; however, this is not 
widespread, because of relatively limited access to the Internet nationwide.
In Ukraine there is a negative list of 3430 medicines that can be sold without 
a prescription; by default, all other medicines are nominally prescription-
only. Around a third of drugs dispensed in Ukraine between 2004 and 
2013 were retail prescriptions for privileged categories (people belonging to 
disadvantaged or vulnerable populations, and people with socially significant 
or especially serious illnesses). For these beneficiaries, medicines included on 
the list approved by the government are dispensed free or with a discount. The 
costs associated with subsidized drug provision account for 3% of the total 
government expenditure on pharmaceuticals, but in practice beneficiaries often 
still need to pay out of pocket for medications they are prescribed. As most 
pharmaceuticals are purchased by either outpatients or inpatients, the scope 
for influencing prescribing patterns is rather limited and is further hampered 
by the de facto liberal pharmacy dispensing procedures (see section 5.6). A list 
of prescription-only drugs has been developed by the Ministry of Health, but 
most of these can nonetheless be bought over the counter. At the same time, 
pharmacies do maintain strict controls on the supply of psychotropic drugs 
and hormonal preparations, even though many others, such as antibiotics, can 
usually be bought without a prescription.
Clinical protocols can have some influence on prescribing patterns as long 
as they contain a very clear definition of the medical indications for the use 
of a specific drug. There is no national programme promoting generic drugs. 
Pharmaceutical companies have a significant influence on prescribing patterns: 
they operate aggressive marketing policies; actively advertise pharmaceuticals 
in the mass media; hold free seminars for medical specialists; and reward 
doctors who prescribe their products (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). 
There is a high level of over-prescription among physicians, who often prescribe 
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expensive brand-name pharmaceuticals instead of less expensive generics 
and, in certain cases, disregard rational prescribing policies in favour of more 
tailored approaches (Bazylevych, 2009). In practice, doctors only prescribe 
generic drugs from the National Essential Drugs List to patients who are 
exempted from copayments or who pay reduced prices for pharmaceuticals, 
which the patient then obtains from their local community pharmacy (see 
section 5.6). Pharmacists also offer their customers substitutes for indicated 
medications without consulting the prescribing physician and some will 
reward physicians who advise their patients to choose a particular treatment 
(Richardson, Sautenkova & Bolokhovets, 2014).
In order to improve pharmaceutical provision, a national programme was 
developed for 2004–2010, which outlined the selection of safe and efficient 
pharmaceuticals using pharmaco-economic analysis (Cabinet of Ministers 
Decree No.  1162, 25 July 2003). The programme also introduced a formulary-
based drug procurement system to improve tender procedures for state purchases 
of medications and to identify state priorities for pharmaceutical purchasing. 
The formulary-based system was designed to improve the quality of treatment 
and provide clinicians with access to information on the use of pharmaceuticals 
registered in Ukraine (their pharmacological properties, contraindications and 
distribution methods). The first National Drug Formulary of Ukraine for the 
supply of pharmaceuticals in health care facilities was published in 2009 and the 
sixth edition was published in 2014 (Ministerial Order No.  252, 8 April 2014). 
The programme also introduced the state registration of wholesale prices, 
as well as the introduction of appropriate laboratory, clinical, industrial and 
distribution practices based on such standards as GMP and good laboratory 
practice (GLP). A list of essential pharmaceuticals and medical devices was 
approved in accordance with the programme.
In 2012, the Council for National Security and Defence noted problems with 
meeting the needs of the population, government and health care facilities for 
medicines of good quality in the appropriate assortment, and the lack of any 
effective mechanism to counter the production and circulation of counterfeit 
drugs in the country (Decision of 25 May 2012, implemented by Presidential 
Order No.  526/2012 of 30 August 2012). It was therefore decided that it was 
necessary to make it mandatory for the state to: register the bioequivalence, 
therapeutic efficacy and cost–effectiveness of generic medicines; coordinate 
actions to combat fake and substandard medicines; and introduce a modern 
system of price controls using reference pricing or similar. As a result, a raft of 
legislative acts aimed at increasing the administrative and criminal penalty for 
the falsification or supply of fake medicines in the country and strengthening 
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the capacity for monitoring imports was introduced. On 20 October 2014, with 
the aim of bringing procedures for the registration of pharmaceuticals into 
line with EU standards, the government introduced amendments to the Law 
on medicines (No.  1707-VII, 20 October 2014). However, this will not bring 
legislation into full alignment with EU Directive 2001/83/EC and this could 
lead to the appearance of substandard medicines on the market in Ukraine.
Price regulation for pharmaceuticals in Ukraine is based on the Law 
on prices and price regulation. The main direct mechanism of state price 
regulation was delegated to regional authorities by government decree in 1996 
and consists of establishing maximum retail surcharges for pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices. Decentralized regulation, however, resulted in substantial 
regional differences in retail surcharges, as well as in wholesale and retail 
prices for pharmaceuticals. Sometimes the prices differ by two to three times, 
even in the same region (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). Prior to 2008, 
the list of medicines subject to state price regulation included 149 international 
nonproprietary names of medicines from various clinical and pharmacological 
groups that made up 21% of the Essential Drugs List. The Cabinet of Ministers 
Decree on amendments to certain decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers (No.  1499, 
16 November 2001) established a maximum limit of retail surcharges at the 
national level for these pharmaceuticals: 35% of the manufacturer’s wholesale 
price (customs cost) distributed through the pharmacy network; and 10% for 
products that are purchased by publicly owned health care facilities with funds 
allocated from the budget.
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, pharmaceutical 
prices have increased considerably (by 40–70%), largely as a result of 
currency devaluation. To stabilize the situation in the pharmaceutical market, 
the government adopted a number of potential solutions to curb rising 
pharmaceutical prices by significantly expanding the list of pharmaceuticals 
subject to state price regulation to cover almost the entire Essential Medicines 
List – 903 generic drugs (or 85% of all registered drugs in Ukraine). The mark-up 
limits were set at no more than 10% of wholesale prices and 25% of retail price; 
for drugs purchased through the budget the mark-up limit was set at 10% of 
wholesale and 10% of retail price, according to Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 
955 of 17 October 2008, On measures to stabilize the price of medicines. This 
approach reduced the range of medicines available in pharmacies, pushed up 
prices and, as a consequence, increased social tension. These moves were also 
met with resistance from the pharmaceutical industry, which argued that they 
faced bankruptcy. The government reacted by softening the price controls by 
taking currency fluctuations into account in Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 
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333 of 25 March 2009, On the issue of state price controls on medicines. This 
was later transformed into a mechanism for controlling the wholesale prices 
for medicines purchased through the state and local budgets by the Cabinet of 
Ministers Decree No.  1012 of 1 November 2010, On the wholesale and retail 
prices for medicines bought through national and local state budgets.
Since 2012, a pilot project which introduced state price regulation for 
essential antihypertensive medications, using reference pricing mechanisms 
and reimbursement, has been running in accordance with a Cabinet of 
Ministers Decree (No.  340, 25 April 2012). All pharmaceuticals registered as 
antihypertensives are divided into three groups: those reimbursed at 90% of the 
reference price; those reimbursed at up to 90%; and those that are not reimbursed. 
The medicines covered in this pilot project are all generics manufactured in 
compliance with GMP and are priced at or below the maximum wholesale 
price level. Under this pilot project, prescribed antihypertensive medicines are 
dispensed by health care facilities and pharmacies listed by the regional health 
authorities. The patient then pays the difference between the actual retail price 
and the reference price as approved by the Ministry of Health. The pharmacy 
sends the record of subsidized drugs dispensed in one month under the scheme 
and they are reimbursed from a subvention from the state budget, which is 
held in the local budget. However, these measures did not control retail prices, 
which have increased above the rate of inflation. In 2012, the antihypertensives 
budget was US$ 5 million and in 2013 it was US$ 24 million. The scheme did 
reduce the price of antihypertensive drugs on the market by 9.3% and increased 
consumption by 24%, primarily because it was the cheaper generics produced 
locally that were reimbursed. However, locally produced generics account for 
only 31% of those antihypertensives dispensed, which is much lower than in 
other European countries. The Parliamentary Committee on Health Care was 
highly critical of the pilot project as it did not reimburse the full cost of the drugs 
(Decision No.  04-26/4-31.3/1, On the realization of a pilot project to introduce 
state regulation of pharmaceutical prices for people with hypertension.
Prices in the pharmaceuticals market have stabilized somewhat, but the 
government system for price controls remains an inefficient aspect of the 
pharmaceuticals supply chain. There are four price control lists: the National 
List (Government Resolution of 25 March 2009, No.  333); the list of drugs 
that can be purchased through local or state budgets (Government Resolution 
of 5 September 1996, No.  1071); the mandatory minimum range of socially 
important pharmaceuticals and medical products (Order of Ministry of Health 
No.  1000 of 29 December 2011); and the list of drugs covered by the pilot project 
on hypertension (Government Resolution of 25 April 2012, No.  340). Just the 
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administration of so many lists, given that there is a significant amount of 
duplication, leads to additional resource costs to the state regulatory bodies and 
suppliers, which are then passed on through higher prices. Also, the declared 
price system (Government Resolution of 13 August 2012, No.  794), provides 
formal declaration procedures for the manufacturers/importers, but at the same 
time accurate and objective information on the prices declared by the state are 
not checked. The state control of compliance with the mandated mark-up levels 
are ineffective where as much as 76% of the cost of a medicine goes directly to 
the manufacturer/importer.
A more indirect method of price regulation was the introduction of 
certain tax privileges. For example, sales of pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices registered in Ukraine used to be exempt from value added tax (VAT). 
However, in 2014, in connection with the worsening economic situation in 
Ukraine, emergency measures introducing 7% VAT on pharmaceuticals and 
medical products were brought in (Law on preventing financial catastrophe 
and preparing the foundations for economic growth in Ukraine, No.  1166-VII, 
27 March 2014). This once again led to price increases and reduced access to 
pharmaceuticals (see section 5.6).
2.8.5 Regulation of medical devices and aids
There is no licensing system for medical equipment in Ukraine, but according 
to the Cabinet of Ministers Decree No.  1497, issued 9 November 2004, On 
approving the order of state registration of medical equipment and devices, 
as amended by Cabinet of Ministers Decree (No.  548, issued 20 June 2012), 
all domestic and imported medical equipment and devices are subject to 
mandatory state registration by SAUMP. Registration is based on a review of 
the appropriate set of documents presented by an applicant – an individual or a 
legal entity responsible for the production, safety and effectiveness of medical 
devices. The applicant takes part in choosing the appropriate agencies to review 
the documents. Based on the outcome of this review, the State Expert Centre 
may require the medical equipment to be tested before registration.
2.8.6 Regulation of capital investment
There is only minimal budgetary financing of capital costs in the state health 
system and there is a consequent lack of planning in prospective development 
(construction, renovation) of publicly owned health care facilities. Both central 
and regional authorities are responsible for capital investment decisions, but 
these decisions are made in the light of available resources, which are generally 
very limited. From 2010, there was some small-scale, relatively centralized 
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planning of capital investment in some priority areas under the health reform 
programme. Most often these investments were for the development of 
emergency, primary and perinatal care – allocations were made for the creation 
of a centralized emergency call centre, a network of perinatal centres and the 
reequipping of primary care facilities in the pilot regions. However, overall 
strategic planning of capital investment is not sufficiently developed.
Strategic development planning and investment in the private medical sector 
depend on several factors. The main factor is the profitability of potential 
investments as well as identifying problem areas in the state health system. 
Consequently, most investments are made in the capital and other large cities. 
Diagnostic services, dentistry, gynaecology and a few other fields attract the 
most investment. Another important factor in private investment planning is 
the focus of high public officials on certain areas of the health system. However, 
private medical providers remain a very small proportion of all health providers 
in Ukraine (see section 4.1).
2.9 Patient empowerment
2.9.1 Patient information
By law all citizens have the right to access information about their health and the 
services available to them, but the mechanisms for accessing such information 
are not transparent. Most patients rely on personal recommendations and 
informal networks when making decisions about accessing health services 
(Tymczuk, 2006; Stepurko et al., 2013).
2.9.2 Patient choice
Patients officially have a choice of doctor and facility, but this is difficult to 
realize due to the way in which the system is financed (see Chapter 3). Patients 
who have access to parallel services have greater choice as they are able to 
access services from the main statutory system and their occupational system. 
However, most patients effect choice by paying out of pocket for services (see 
section 3.4). The health system reform programme begun in 2010 proposed the 
gradual reorientation of the system towards the real health needs of patients. 
In 2011, for the first time, patients were given the right to freely choose the 
primary care doctor who should decide the clinical pathway for the patient 
(Law on amendments to the basic laws of Ukraine regarding the improvement 
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of health care, No.  3611-VI, 7 July 2011). The realization of this mechanism 
began in the four pilot regions (see section 5.3), but it was still in the early stages 
of development when the crisis started so has not been fully implemented.
2.9.3 Patient rights
The necessity of protecting patient rights is noted in many normative acts; for 
example, in basic legislation about health care and criteria for the accreditation 
of health care facilities. However, patient rights in the Ukrainian health system 
are not protected systematically. Another draft law about patient rights has been 
under consideration in Parliament (No.  2438 from 1 March 2013) (the previous 
one was registered in 2007; see Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010), but the 
prospects for its ratification remain similarly unclear.
2.9.4 Complaints procedures (mediation, claims)
There is no specific legal mechanism for patient complaints procedures within 
the health system. It is dealt with in general legislation regarding complaints 
(Law on citizens’ appeals 1996) and thereafter by the human rights ombudsman 
under the Parliament of Ukraine. Most patient complaints are made in the form 
of letters; the Ministry of Health alone receives around 2500 letters of complaint 
every year. This is only a small fraction of the total volume of complaints, as the 
majority are sent to and dealt with at a lower level of the health system. The main 
source of dissatisfaction in patient complaints is the quality of medical care.
2.9.5 Public participation
Although there are a number of legal provisions for public participation in the 
health sector and various patient groups, they have not yet played an active 
role in inf luencing purchasing decisions or health policies more broadly. 
Community advisory boards in health care were created under the local health 
authorities, health care facilities and independent social organizations, but 
their influence on the activities of the health sector initially proved minimal 
(Angelov, 2007). However, with the health system reform programme from 
2010, the public became much more active, founding NGOs in order to express 
their opinions about the changes. Most often this was to protest against the 
reforms, which was partially a reflection of the health workers’ own resistance 
to changing their well-established ways of working but also a response to the 
inadequate information campaign preceding the reforms, which should have 
informed people of the proposed reforms and what they meant. A considerable 
proportion of the proposals put forward were, however, constructive and had a 
real impact on the development of subsequent stages of the reform programme. 
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3. Financing
Health expenditure as a proportion of GDP in Ukraine was 7.6% in 2012; this is middling in international comparison, but relatively high in comparison with Ukraine’s neighbours. Of total health expenditure 
(THE) in Ukraine, 54.9% was from prepaid government sources in 2012, which 
is low in international comparison. This has significant implications for equity 
in health system financing as private spending on health (45.1% of THE in 2012) 
is dominated by out-of-pocket payments.
The bulk of government expenditure (52% in 2012) pays for inpatient 
medical services, with only a relatively small proportion going to outpatient 
services and public health. Private expenditure primarily consists of out-of-
pocket payments, which are high on account of the high cost of pharmaceuticals, 
which are generally purchased at full cost price by patients. Officially, Ukraine 
has a comprehensive guaranteed package of health care services, provided free 
of charge at the point of use as a constitutional right; nevertheless, so-called 
charitable donations are widely levied. Government attempts to define a more 
limited benefits package have left it to the individual facilities to determine 
which services are covered by the budget and which are subject to user charges. 
This has led to a lack of transparency in the system, which has contributed to 
the expansion of informality.
Most health financing comes from general government revenues raised 
through taxation (VAT, business income taxes, international trade and excise 
taxes). Personal income tax is not a significant contributor to total revenues. 
Out-of-pocket payments account for most other health expenditure, although 
there are some limited voluntary health insurance (VHI) schemes. Budgetary 
funds are pooled at the national and local levels, as local governments retain a 
proportion of the taxes raised in their territory. There are also interbudgetary 
transfers to boost the coffers of poorer local authorities which cannot raise as 
much revenue. With the exception of the pilot projects in four administrative 
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regions, which moved towards contracting mechanisms for primary care, 
allocations and payments are made according to strict line-item budgeting 
procedures as under the Semashko system. This means payments are related 
to the capacity and staffing levels of individual facilities rather than to the 
volume or quality of services provided.
3.1 Health expenditure
Since 2003, health expenditure data in Ukraine have been collected according 
to the global standard National Health Accounts (NHA) methodology. This 
has limited the differences between national and international data sources. 
Although this is challenging, NHA data seek to include informal payments in 
total health care expenditure; however, the rate of GDP for Ukraine is calculated 
based on official data only without the contribution from the informal sector, 
which is substantial in Ukraine, so this may underestimate the level of THE as 
a proportion of GDP (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 
Trends in health expenditure in Ukraine, selected years
1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
Total health expenditure, PPP$ per capita (WHO estimates) 247 184 358 520 528 562
Total health expenditure as % of GDP (WHO estimates) 7.7 5.6 6.4 7.8 7.3 7.6
Mean annual real growth rate in total health expenditure* 100 99.4 113.5 110.1 – –
Mean annual growth rate in GDP* 100 96.1 108.4 102.1 – –
Public sector health expenditure as % of total health 
expenditure (WHO estimates)
65.9 51.8 59.5 56.6 55.7 54.9
Private sector expenditure on health as % of total health 
expenditure (WHO estimates)
34.1 48.2 40.5 43.4 44.3 45.1
Public sector expenditure on health as % of total government 
expenditure (WHO estimates)
11.4 10.2 11.9 12.6 11.8 11.5
Public sector expenditure on health as % of GDP 
(WHO estimates)
5.1 2.9 3.8 4.4 4.1 4.2
Private households’ out-of-pocket payment on health as % of 
total health expenditure
31.4 44.1 37.5 40.5 41.5 42.3
Private households’ out-of-pocket payment on health as % of 
private sector health expenditure
92.2 91.4 92.5 93.4 93.6 93.8
VHI as % of total expenditure on health 0 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9
VHI as % of private expenditure on health 0 1.1 1.7 2 2.1 2.1
Sources: WHO, 2015; *State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2014c.
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Health expenditure as a proportion of GDP in Ukraine was 7.6% in 2012; 
this is middling in international comparison (Fig. 3.1), but relatively high 
in comparison with Ukraine’s neighbours (Fig. 3.2). Health care spending 
increased rapidly in 2000 after the prolonged economic crises of the 1990s 
(see Table 3.1 and section 1.2). This occurred partly as the Ukrainian economy 
grew, but also as a result of government policy to increase health spending. 
The average increase in THE as a proportion of GDP since 2000 has been 
higher than the average increase in GDP (113.5–110.1% compared with 108.4–
102.1%). The global financial crisis did not have an immediate impact on THE, 
but this was not the result of government policy to protect health spending but 
instead due to the impact of currency devaluation, which led to pharmaceutical 
price increases of 40–70% (Mladovsky et al., 2012). Health expenditure in US$ 
PPP (purchasing power parity) per capita follows the same trends as THE as a 
proportion of GDP, fluctuating as the economy grows and contracts, but overall 
expenditure in US$ PPP remains low in international comparison (Fig. 3.3).
Of THE in Ukraine, in 2012, 54.9% was from prepaid government sources, 
which is low in international comparison (Fig. 3.4). This has significant 
implications for equity in health system financing, as private spending on health 
(45.1% of THE in 2012) is dominated by out-of-pocket payments (see section 
3.4). The share from voluntary or private health insurance (including sickness 
funds) is negligible (Table 3.1).
Most public health care expenditure goes towards providing medical 
services, especially inpatient care (52% in 2012) (Table 3.2). At less than 1% 
in 2012, the share of public spending on medicines and medicinal devices is 
very low and has decreased over time, as the brunt of pharmaceutical costs for 
both outpatients and inpatients is born by patients. Capital expenditure and 
administrative expenses are funded primarily from public sources.
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Fig. 3.1 
Health expenditure as % of GDP in the WHO European region, 2012
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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Fig. 3.2 
Trends in health expenditure as % of GDP in selected countries, 1995–2012
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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Fig. 3.3 
Health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita in the WHO European region, 2012
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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Fig. 3.4 
Public sector expenditure as % of THE in the WHO European region, 2012
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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Table 3.2 
Public health expenditure on health by service programme, 2007–2012  
(% of public and total expenditure on health) 
Type of expenditure % of public expenditure on health % of total expenditure on health
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
 20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Health administration and 
insurance
4.9 4.8 5.9 4.3 5.7 10.4 3.3 2.8 3.2 2.4 3.2 6.0
Public health and prevention 5.5 5.7 5.4 5.4 4.9 4.3 3.6 3.3 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.4
Medical services 72.9 75.8 77.6 78.8 76.5 78.4 48.2 43.6 42.6 44.5 42.5 42.8
 – inpatient care 47.7 50.1 47.6 52.1 47 46.1 31.5 28.8 26.1 29.5 26.1 26.4
 –  outpatient/ambulatory 
physician services 
21.0 21.1 21.5 22.1 19.8 20.3 13.9 12.1 11.8 12.5 11.0 12.4
 –  outpatient/ambulatory 
dental services 
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
 – ancillary services 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.5
Medicines and medical 
devices 
1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.1
Total current health 
expenditure 
89.2 90.5 92.3 91.9 91.8 93.3 58.9 52.1 50.7 51.9 51 53.4
Capital expenditure 10.8 9.5 7.7 8.1 8.2 6.9 7.2 5.4 4.2 4.6 4.5 3.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 66.1 57.5 54.9 56.5 55.5 57.2
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2014c.
3.2 Sources of revenue and financial flows
According to national data sources, general government expenditure on health 
as a proportion of THE was 57.6% in 2012, while out-of-pocket spending was 
39.6% (Table 3.3). Nominally, the population has universal access to unlimited 
health care services, free at the point of use, as a constitutional right (see section 
3.3.1). There are no official copayments, but health care providers can charge 
for supplementary services, which can include diagnostic procedures and not 
just more luxurious accommodation (see section 3.4.1). Government attempts 
to define a more limited benefits package have left it to the individual facilities 
to determine which services are covered by the budget and which are subject 
to user charges. This has led to a lack of transparency in the system, which 
has contributed to an increase in informal payments. The role of VHI has 
been growing, but still accounts for under 1% of THE (see section 3.5). Private 
expenditure primarily consists of out-of-pocket payments, which are high due 
to the high cost of pharmaceuticals that are generally purchased at full cost 
price by patients. Significant informal payments are also levied in the system 
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and there is increasing utilization of private medical services (see section 3.4). 
Expenditure by private companies (Fig. 3.5) is for the maintenance of their own 
health care facilities and the care of their employees.
Table 3.3 
Percentage of THE according to source of revenue, selected years
1995* 2000* 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
General government 
expenditure
61.2 51.8 59.3 61.7 57.5 54.9 56.5 55.5 57.6
Government spending, 
of which
59.0 61.4 57.0 54.6 56.2 55.2 57.6 – –
 – central budget 17.5 18.6 15.6 14.0 13.8 14.8 13.9 – –
 – local budgets* 41.5 42.8 41.4 40.6 42.4 40.4 43.3 – –
Social insurance funds* 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
Private expenditure 38.8 48.2 40.4 38.1 42.2 44.9 43.3 44.2 42.2
Out-of-pocket payments 35.7 44.1 37.4 34.6 39.3* 41.9* 40.4* 41.4* 39.6*
VHI 0.0 0.5 0.68 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.87 0.92 1.0
Sickness funds 0.14 0.12 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.1 – –
Private enterprises 2.2 2.5 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.8 15.0 – –
Non-governmental 
organizations (NGO’s)
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 – –
External sources 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
Sources: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2014c; *WHO, 2015.
Most health financing comes from general government revenues raised 
through taxation (VAT, business income taxes, international trade and excise 
taxes). Personal income tax is not a significant contributor to total revenues. 
Funds are pooled at the national and local levels, as local authorities retain a 
proportion of the taxes raised in their territory. There are also interbudgetary 
transfers to boost the coffers of poorer local authorities that cannot raise as 
much revenue. With the exception of the four pilot regions included in the 
health system reform programme 2010–2014, allocations and payments are 
made according to strict line-item budgeting procedures as they were under 
the Semashko system. This means that payments are related to the capacity 
and staffing levels of individual facilities rather than to the volume or quality 
of services provided. In the four pilot regions (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, 
Vinnytsya oblasts and Kyiv city) the aim was to reduce fragmentation of pooling 
and introduce new allocation and payment mechanisms, but this health reform 
programme has been put on hold in view of the unstable political situation.
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Fig. 3.5 
Percentage of THE according to source of revenue, 2012
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2014c.
3.3 Overview of the statutory financing system
3.3.1 Coverage
Under Article 49 of the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996, Ukrainian citizens 
are entitled to a comprehensive guaranteed package of health care services, 
provided free of charge at the point of use, as a constitutional right. Under basic 
health legislation, foreign citizens, refugees and stateless persons permanently 
residing in the territory of Ukraine enjoy the same rights to health care as 
Ukrainian citizens. The rights and responsibilities of foreign citizens and 
stateless persons temporarily residing in Ukraine are determined by law and 
relevant international agreements.
However, this broad commitment to universal coverage free at the point of 
use for all citizens has not been backed by sufficient financing. The volume of 
government health care financing dropped significantly due to the economic 
downturn throughout the 1990s and this contradiction became particularly acute. 
The government has made several attempts to limit the guaranteed package of 
free health care and to balance it with the country’s real economic and fiscal 
capacity, which has led to the erosion of the principle of universal coverage and 
expanded user charges in the system. In response to citizen discontent with the 
limiting of the benefits package, the Constitutional Court examined whether 
0.4%  Social insurance funds
39.6%  OOP payments
1.1%  VHI & Sickness funds 
1.5%  Private enterprises
0.2%  International funding
43.3%  Local budget
13.9%  Central state budget 
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charging patients for services was unconstitutional and, in 2002, determined 
that in state-funded facilities care should be available to all citizens regardless 
of volume or length of stay without charges before, during or after treatment 
(Constitutional Court Decision on case No. 1-13/2002 and No. 10-rp/2002 of 
29 May 2002). At the same time, it stipulated that state health care facilities 
could mobilize additional resources using VHI mechanisms such as private 
health insurance, sickness funds and credit unions. The list of medical services 
provided for a fee was established by law as part of the Constitutional Court’s 
decision and, although this law has not been adopted to date, the government 
approved a new list of services that state health care facilities could provide 
for a fee, to be paid in full by the patient or third party (Resolution of the 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 11 July 2002, No. 989, On Amendments to 
the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 17 September 1996, 
No. 1138). Criteria for determining which services should be provided for a fee 
were not made explicit but it would seem that the treatments included are those 
that are elective and not life-threatening.
User fees are levied for the following services: infertility treatment; 
cosmetic services; anonymous examinations and treatment for addictions 
or STIs; termination of pregnancy (unless medically indicated); prosthetics 
(including dental, hearing, ophthalmic and other appliances); vision correction 
with spectacles or contact lenses; dental care provided in state practices; spa 
treatments; medical examinations for job applications, driver’s licences, the 
right to carry weapons and relevant periodic medical exams; speech therapy; 
treatment of speech impediments in adults; home care and treatments 
when feasible in an outpatient setting; diagnostic examinations and patient 
appointments without referral from a physician; parental stay at a hospital 
with children over 6 years (unless required by the child’s condition); medical 
services for sports competitions, public and cultural events; medical services 
to foreigners; and others.
Certain categories of people are entitled to benefits to pay for outpatient 
medicines. These are people belonging to so-called vulnerable groups and 
patients with socially significant or very serious diseases. In particular, 
beneficiaries include: war and labour veterans; some people with disabilities 
(subdivided into three disability categories according to severity, with Group I 
the most severe and Group III the least limiting); people disabled since childhood 
(Groups I & II); disabled children (up to age 16); pensioners receiving the 
minimum pension; children under 6 years of age; women with contraindications 
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for pregnancy (free contraception provided); victims of the Chernobyl disaster 
in 1986; children with alopecia due to toxic illness in Chernivtsi in 1988; retired 
and disabled victims of political repression; and recipients of state decorations.
In 2002, the government approved the Programme for Providing the Citizens 
of Ukraine with Free Health Care Guaranteed by the State (Cabinet of Ministers 
Resolution No. 955 of 11 July 2002). It gives a defined list of health care services 
to be provided by publicly owned health care facilities for free, as well as 
standard volumes of care. The Programme includes:
•  emergency care
•  outpatient polyclinic care
•  inpatient care for acute conditions and emergencies requiring intensive 
treatment; 24-hour medical surveillance and hospitalization
•  emergency dental care (and comprehensive care for children, disabled 
people, students, pregnant women and women with children under 3 years 
of age)
•  first aid for the rural population
•  specialized sanatoria for disabled people and children
•  medical care for children in orphanages.
The Programme introduced a principle of accountability by tying state 
commitments to the expected health budget. Thus, the norm for providing 
outpatient polyclinic care was based on the number of visits per 1000 people; 
the norm for inpatient care was based on the number of hospitalizations per 
1000 people, the number of beds per 1000 people, and average length of hospital 
stay; and the norm for emergency care was based on the number of calls per 
1000 people. However, the costings for providing care free of charge according 
to these norms were not determined (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). This 
means that while the official list of guaranteed health care services that are free 
of charge is quite comprehensive, this is not backed by meaningful funding; in 
fact, it is left up to the health care providers to decide which services will be 
provided free of charge and which ones require payment.
In March 2014, the Crimean Autonomous Republic and Sevastopol city 
came under the de facto control of the Russian Federation, and in response 
to these developments, the Verkhovna Rada issued the Law on ensuring 
the rights and freedoms of citizens and the legal regime of the temporarily 
occupied territory of Ukraine (Law No. 1207-VII, 15 April 2014) to guarantee 
the rights of people from these administrative regions under the Ukrainian 
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Constitution (1996), which includes the right to access health services free 
of charge. The related costs are covered from the state budget of Ukraine in 
accordance with a procedure established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. 
A similar situation exists in the conflict-affected areas of Donetsk and Lugansk 
regions, where central and regional governments cannot effectively manage the 
health system and provide funding for the proper functioning of health care 
facilities. In particular, the delivery of TB care has proved most challenging 
in the face of mass population movements. The delivery of material supplies 
for timely diagnosis (TB, HIV, etc.) is also hampered and most of the medical 
staff has fled.
Due to the challenging political and economic environment in 2014, and 
in response to IMF loan conditions, the government decided to cut the social 
benefits package explicitly. In particular: the retirement age was increased by 
two years for men and three years for women; changes were introduced to the 
way pension benefits for government employees are calculated (reducing the 
limit from 80% to 70% of their final salary); gas prices were raised (by 40% 
from 1 May 2015 and by 20% annually in 2016–17) as well as increases to the 
cost of other utilities.
3.3.2 Collection
The major official source for health care financing in Ukraine is taxation 
revenue, derived from national and local taxes and duties, and accounting for 
80.9% of the total budget in 2012, followed by non-taxation revenues (derived 
from property and enterprises, administrative fees and charges, financial 
sanctions and other income not related to mandatory taxes, duties or charges); 
the latter accounted for 18.2% of the total budget in 2012 (see Figure 3.6). 
Revenues from other sources such as capital transactions is negligible (Zubenko 
et al., 2013). Overall, indirect taxes account for a greater proportion of total 
budgetary revenues than direct taxes – 52.8% versus 44.4% in 2010. The share 
of revenues from direct taxes has fallen over time, because the lower standard 
of living restricts the potential contribution of direct taxes (Rusnauka, 2012). 
VAT revenues account for the greatest share from indirect taxes (fixed rate of 
17% since January 2013, 20% previously) and excise duties. VAT accounted 
for 31.2% of indirect taxation revenues and 8.6% of total budgetary revenues in 
2012. Most direct taxation revenues come from personal income tax (on average 
15% of salary) and corporate taxes (a fixed rate of 16% from January 2014, 
down from 19% in 2013, 21% in 2012 and 23% previously). Corporate taxes 
accounted for 12.5% of total budgetary revenues in 2012. There are no taxes 
specifically earmarked for health financing and there is no system of tax relief 
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for the purchase of health cover. National tax rates are set in accordance with 
taxation laws as determined by the Verkhovna Rada. Local administrations set 
the rates for local taxes and dues.
The collection and administration of tax revenue takes place at different 
levels depending on the source. Revenues for the national budget include: 50% 
of personal income tax revenues; corporate income tax; VAT; excise taxes and 
a number of other state taxes and fees, import and export duties; and a share of 
the net profits of state unitary enterprises and dividends accrued on company 
shares which are owned by the state. Other revenues are split equally between 
national and local budgets including: the fee for special use of forest resources; 
the fee for the special use of water; royalties from mining of national importance, 
etc. Of revenues from the sale of non-agricultural land (or the rights to such) 
10% go to the national level and 90% remain at the regional level. Funds are 
transferred to the national budget from the local level. Revenues retained at the 
local level are taken into account when the level of intergovernmental transfers 
is determined. However, some locally generated revenues are not considered 
in this process, including: land tax; tax on corporate income and communally 
owned financial institutions; royalties for mining of local importance; local 
small business taxes, etc.
The State Tax Administration of Ukraine, together with the regional and 
municipal tax authorities, are responsible for enforcing the tax laws, ensuring 
the correct amounts are collected in a timely manner. The Tax Administration 
coordinates its activities with fiscal authorities and the State Treasury. It reports 
all taxes received, as well as other charges and fees.
In Ukraine, the financing of social spending, including health care, is 
a national function and it is implemented via the state budget, although its 
implementation is mostly delegated to the regional and municipal/district levels. 
Therefore, most of the local health budget comes from national budget funds, 
which are transferred to the local regional/district/municipal levels on the basis 
of subsidiarity to perform delegated national powers. Local councils, which, on 
behalf of local communities, manage the health care facilities in their territory, 
are also able to increase the local health budget using additional resources 
collected at the local level, forming a second basket of local revenues. However, 
this additional financing is not mandatory, fully depends on the political will of 
local councils and usually only happens in relatively wealthy areas.
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Fig. 3.6 
Financial flows in the Ukrainian health system
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 As financial resources are collected through a system of general taxation, 
this should mean health care funding is relatively progressive (Mossialos & 
Dixon, 2002). However, the progressivity of the taxation system in Ukraine 
is undermined by the scale of the shadow economy (up to 40% of GDP). 
This reduces funds available to finance health care for the population, but 
particularly challenges progressivity as the wealthier citizens are also the ones 
best able to evade taxes so pay proportionately less (Tishchuk, Kharazishvili 
& Ivanov, 2011).
3.3.3 Pooling of funds
Pooling of funds for health care is part of the budgetary process defined by the 
Budget Code of Ukraine. The Budget Code (2001) authorizes the financing of 
the health system assigned to different levels of the budget system. The historical 
incrementalism approach remains the primary strategy for determining 
health care budgets for different levels. A targeted programme approach is 
used to address acute health problems. The national government and local 
governments at all levels are responsible for pooling funds: the Ministry of 
Health and other ministries, regional and municipal health authorities, and rural 
local governments.
As noted above, finances for social spending from the state budget transfers 
are allocated to regional budgets, which then pass a portion of this money to the 
local authorities to fund health care at that level. Interbudgetary transfers are 
designed to finance all duties of the state, including public administration and 
social needs. Within the total volume of transfers, there are no specifications 
for resource allocation for separate state commitments such as health care, so 
health care spending is not ring-fenced. Regional administrations and local 
governments have the right to determine the structure of their expenditure 
and therefore decide independently how to use the transferred resources. A 
particular local authority might decide to allocate more resources to the 
education system, for example, and cut financing for the health system. The 
rights of local authorities are limited by decisions passed at the national level, for 
example, to raise the salaries of budget system workers, as well as obligations 
imposed by the Budget Code to pass down part of the transfer. In practice, the 
planned expenditure does not always match the figures calculated during the 
transfer of subnational budgets.
Estimates of the volume of health care spending in regional and local 
budgets are determined using special formulae approved by the Cabinet of 
Ministers which take into account, among other things, the population structure 
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in terms of age and gender (Resolution No. 1195 of 5 September 2001, amended 
14 September 2005). In recent years, as part of a health reform programme 
launched in 2010, there have been some changes which have seen a consolidation 
of funding at the regional level for emergency care (nationwide) and secondary 
care (in four pilot regions only) (see section 6.1). Until 2010, the budget system 
was divided into four levels: (1) state/national budget; (2) regional budgets; (3) 
district and municipal budgets; (4) small settlement/village budgets. With the 
introduction of a new Budget Code in 2010, fragmentation has been somewhat 
reduced as the four-tier system has given way to a three-tier system as the 
small settlement/village level has been removed and resources for health care 
provision in rural areas are now concentrated at the district level.
The extensive parallel health systems are another remaining source of 
fragmentation in the pooling of funds for health care (see section 3.6.1). Of 
the total central budget allocation to health, in accordance with the Law on 
State Budget, the Ministry of Health receives only a share, with the remainder 
allocated to other ministries who oversee their own health care facilities for 
employees and their relatives, which operate in parallel to the statutory system 
for the general population (see section 3.6.1). In 2010, the Ministry of Health 
received 60.1% of the central budget allocation to health and 58.4% in 2011.
This fragmentation of the health system challenges equitable financing (see 
section 7.2).
The 27 regional health administrations finance the health care facilities 
under their jurisdiction. Local health authorities or local administrations (if 
they have no separate health authorities in their structure) finance health care 
facilities under their jurisdiction from the relevant municipal and district health 
budgets. Under the new Budget Code (2010), there is very limited possibility for 
the transfer of funds between budgets at different levels of the system, leading 
to a fragmented system of service delivery at different administrative tiers, as 
well as duplication of services within a given level while creating barriers to 
the optimal use of hospital infrastructure. This approach also undermines the 
patient’s formal right to choose a doctor and health care facility. In addition, 
the funding pools at different levels, which are used to maintain the network of 
health care facilities at each level, partially overlap. Fragmented pooling is one 
of the main sources of inefficiency in the Ukrainian health system.
The health reform programme starting in 2010 sought to address these 
shortcomings through the creation in the four pilot regions (Dnipropetrovsk, 
Donetsk, Vinnytsya oblasts and Kyiv city) of a new fund pooling mechanism 
from 2012, which combined the financial f lows for primary care at the 
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municipal/district level and secondary, tertiary and emergency care at the 
regional level. From 2013, with the adoption of the Law on emergency medical 
care, funding for these services has been consolidated at the regional level 
across the country. The preliminary findings obtained in the Dnipropetrovsk 
region indicated that the pooling of funds for the provision of secondary care 
at the regional level improved access to these services because it permitted 
residents outside the catchment area to access services and because it reduced 
the amount inpatients had to pay out of pocket for medications and food when 
receiving care (Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration, 2014).
These reforms to consolidate pooling also necessitated the transfer of 
ownership from the local to the regional level of all secondary, tertiary and 
emergency care facilities, as all funds – for both capital and ongoing expenditure 
had to flow through regional budgets. This caused strong resistance in local 
governments, which did not want to lose control of these financial flows. A 
number of draft laws were subsequently registered in the Parliament, which 
proposed this change be cancelled. It is not yet clear whether changes to pooling 
arrangements will be made as part of broader reforms of health care financing 
(see section 6.2).
3.3.4 Purchasing and purchaser–provider relations
The organizational relationship between purchasers and providers is based on an 
integrated model as health care facilities (the providers) in the statutory system 
are under the administrative jurisdiction of their owners – the corresponding 
level of government (the purchasers).
In financing health care from the budget, payments are made by the 
state authorities, which are also established in the Budget Code as the chief 
administrators of budgetary resources. The chief health administrators of 
budgetary resources are the Ministry of Health and the National Academy 
of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, as well as a number of other ministries and 
departments. Each of these authorities finances the health care facilities and 
programmes under its jurisdiction (see section 3.6.1).
The Ministry of Health finances: higher medical education institutions; 
the State Agency for Medicinal Products and related local inspections; 
approximately 50 national-level medical agencies under its control that provide 
everything from primary to tertiary care; 38 rehabilitation facilities; 20 research 
institute clinics; and a range of state, interagency, and integrated programmes 
and measures related to health that are financed from the state budget. There 
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are also certain centralized procedures through which the Ministry of Health 
purchases pharmaceuticals, medical devices, immunobiological medicines, 
expensive medical equipment, and hospital vehicles.
At the regional level, the chief administrators of budgetary resources for 
health are the regional health authorities, which finance health care facilities 
under their control. Regional health budgets finance facilities at the regional level 
and regional health programmes as well as any highly specialized ‘monoprofile’ 
tertiary care facilities, which serve the population of an administrative region. 
At the municipal level, the chief administrators of budgetary resources are the 
health authorities within the municipal government. The district authorities 
fulfil the role of the chief administrator of budgetary resources at the district 
and now also community level.
The Ministry of Finance and local fiscal authorities give the Ministry of 
Health, local health authorities and local governments the maximum health 
expenditure from the draft budget for the following year. The Ministry of 
Health, local health authorities and local governments then determine the 
maximum expenditure for the health care facilities funded by them, and the 
facilities produce cost estimates for the next fiscal year. The Ministry of Health, 
local health authorities and local governments then examine these estimates 
to ensure they include accurate projected income and expenses figures, 
justification for planned expenditure, and that they comply with established 
wages, norms, prices, limits and other indicators in accordance with the law. 
They then create the draft budgets. Based on the draft estimates, the Ministry 
of Health, local health authorities and local governments draft budget requests 
and submit them to the financial authorities to be included into the appropriate 
draft budget. Once the draft budgets are drawn up, the Ministry of Health, local 
health authorities and local governments make any necessary corrections to the 
volume of budget funding to the facilities, before approving the drafts.
The primary and mandatory responsibility of government-financed 
facilities is to provide budget resources for salaries, pharmaceuticals, food and 
the maintenance of facilities. Thus, the purchase of equipment, renovations 
and other expenditure not considered to be a priority can receive financing 
only if the primary requirements are covered and there are no other debts. 
Salary expenditure accounts for more than two thirds (70.8% in 2008) of 
territorial health care expenditure, followed by pharmaceutical expenditure 
and catering (19.8%), utilities (8.3%) and other expenditure (1.1%) (Lekhan, 
Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). The allocation of budgetary funds is based on a 
list of permitted line items, which in turn is based on norms set by the Ministry 
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of Health defining inputs such as staff, salaries, pharmaceuticals, catering 
and so on. The majority of these norms depend on the capacity of a health 
facility (number of beds in hospitals or number of visits in polyclinics). Many 
of these norms do not reflect real expenditure, for example, on pharmaceuticals 
or hospital food. Facilities must spend resources exactly as allocated. They 
are not permitted to reallocate resources from one line item to another. Any 
changes in the facility’s income and expense estimates must be approved by 
the chief administrators of budgetary resources and by the appropriate fiscal 
authorities if the changes involve adjustments to the consolidated level of 
budgetary expenditure. If there are any unspent funds at the end of the year, 
the fiscal authorities will cut the facility’s budget estimates for the next year 
by the same amount.
There are a number of vertical targeted state health programmes and 
centralized health activities covering a wide range of health problems in Ukraine, 
including: immunization, TB prevention and treatment, HIV prevention and 
treatment, reproductive health, prevention and treatment of cardiovascular 
and cerebrovascular diseases, prevention and treatment of cancer, etc. These 
programmes are usually approved by law. The Ministry of Health is the 
purchaser, manager and coordinator of these programmes. As well as these 
state programmes, the Ministry of Health is also responsible for centralized 
purchasing of some pharmaceuticals. When approving these programmes and 
centralized purchasing, the government instructs the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade to make provisions for their 
implementation in the state budget and the State Programme of Economic and 
Social Development of Ukraine for the given period. At the same time, the 
regional executive authorities give recommendations for the development and 
approval of the relevant regional programmes, which should take into account 
the direction and activities identified in the corresponding national-level 
programme. The regional authorities also give recommendations for attracting 
the resources for the implementation of these regional programmes from the 
local budget or other legal means.
During the financial crisis in 2009–2010, spending through state programmes 
and centralized purchasing fell by 31%, and only recovered in 2011, increasing 
through to 2013. The increase in spending has been driven by greater spending 
on high-cost pharmaceuticals and equipment for the treatment of children with 
cancer, for paediatric dialysis, and for the treatment of Gaucher’s disease. Funds 
were also allocated in new directions for state support, such as the treatment of 
mucopolysaccharidosis, juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, viral hepatitis and others.
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Laws were adopted for the implementation of the economic reform 
programme for 2010–2014 that allowed for the transition to contract-based 
relations between purchasers and providers of medical services. In 2013, 
contracting was put in place in the pilot regions (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, 
Vinnytsya oblasts and Kyiv city) between the chief managers of budgetary 
funds in the local authorities and primary care providers. However, while these 
agreements had a formal character, they were highly prescriptive, detailing 
the obligations of both parties. At the same time, preparatory work in the pilot 
regions was initiated to introduce the programme-target method of funding 
for contracts (as regulated by the 2010 Budget Code), based on the demand 
for certain types of medical service. The essence of the programme-target 
method was that a direct link between the provision of resources and the 
performance of health care facilities should be created. The focus was therefore 
not on developing or maintaining the existing network and content of state 
facilities but on programme performance. A set of indicators was developed 
by which to assess the use of funds in order to determine the effectiveness of 
programmes. The main component of the programme-target method in health 
care was budget programmes for the provision of different kinds of medical 
care: primary, secondary, tertiary, emergency, etc. The outcome indicators for 
budget programmes included both quantitative and qualitative indicators which 
should be confirmed by official state statistical, financial or other reporting 
and should show: the degree to which the target was met; whether the budget 
programme was completed; and how this was achieved. The basic list of output 
indicators was set at the state level, while their values and, where necessary, 
additional indicators were set at the regional level by the chief managers of 
financial assets.
The procedure for executing the budget programme in these pilot 
regions should have been that the purchasers defined who was responsible 
for implementing the budget programme (i.e. the provider) by the level/type 
of medical care and then entered into a contract with them for the fiscal 
year. Financing for the budget programme should have been carried out in 
accordance with the procedures for treasury services of local budgets on the 
basis of agreements on the implementation of the budget programme and 
its budget programme passport, as well as estimates (for state facilities) or 
plans (for communal non-profit enterprises) for the use of budget funds. The 
resources would have been received by providers as agreed and could only 
be used in the provision of medical services. If savings were made, financing 
from the budget programme would not be reduced, but the savings could 
only have been used for the development of health care facilities. Under the 
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budget programme for the provision of primary care, the purchasers of health 
services were the district administrations and the municipal health authorities; 
under the budget programme for the provision of secondary, tertiary and 
emergency care, the purchasers were regional health authorities. The health 
care facilities or individuals (usually private contractors) were responsible for 
the implementation of budget programmes.
The use of the programme-target method for financing health care should 
have provided greater transparency in budget spending, as it should make it 
possible to trace the appropriateness of spending, allocative efficiency and the 
quality of services (Shcherbina, 2007; Slabkii, Shevchenko & Zaglada, 2011; 
Shevchenko et al., 2012; Zubenko et al., 2013). The legal basis for testing the 
programme-target method in the pilot regions was being developed early in 
2014. A joint order from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance 
approved the list of budget programmes, four groups of results indicators (cost, 
productivity, efficiency and quality) and the methods for comparative analysis 
of the efficiency of different budget programmes had been developed. However, 
the pilot scheme was overtaken by wider political, social and economic events.
3.4 Out-of-pocket payments
Out-of-pocket payments grew through the 1990s against a background of 
chronic underfunding of health services (see section 3.3.1). Out-of-pocket 
payments constitute a considerable proportion of THE in Ukraine, reaching 
42.3% in 2012 (Table 3.1). From 2003–2012, out-of-pocket payments increased 
5.5 times, although the proportion of THE has fluctuated between 35.1% and 
42.4%, with a slight upward trend. Out-of-pocket payments are increasing in 
all main forms of spending: official service charges, medicines and medical 
product purchases, and informal payments. The highest level so far was in 2000 
when 44.1% of THE was out of pocket (Table 3.1). However, direct payments for 
medicines dominate out-of-pocket spending in Ukraine; in 2011, 30% of THE 
was in the form of out-of-pocket payments for pharmaceuticals. This constitutes 
one of the main challenges to equity in the Ukrainian health system (Murphy 
et al., 2013b; Footman et al., 2014) (see section 7.2).
The share of informal payments in THE can be estimated only from 2003, 
when NHA began to be used; from 2003 to 2005 informal payments accounted 
for 8–10% of THE (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). User charges 
constituted a relatively small proportion (7.3–8.6%) of THE, or 19.7–22.5% of 
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out-of-pocket payments for health care. Fees-for-service in public and private 
health care facilities account for only 2.9–3.1% of THE (Lekhan, Rudiy & 
Richardson, 2010).
3.4.1 Cost sharing (user charges)
The government has attempted to regulate payments for health care services. 
The Cabinet of Ministers Resolution of 1996 introduced official user charges 
for health services and allowed local and regional governments to establish 
their own fees for health services provided at state and community facilities. 
The Resolution applies to those paid services that health care facilities provide 
in accordance with the approved services list and does not apply to those 
services that are required to be provided to the population for free. In reality, 
however, there is no clear line between free and paid medical services. As 
a result, the government does not regulate prices for those services that are 
provided for a fee in real life, but which are not yet included in the official 
list of paid services approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. Additionally, there 
is no official method of determining the full costs of medical services. Many 
of the user charges are levied in the form of charitable donations, which are 
formally allowed and a receipt is given (Stepurko et al., 2013). Cost sharing is 
less formally implemented through the expectation that inpatients will bring 
many of the medicines, dressings and other disposables with them on admission. 
A survey conducted in 2011 found that 78% of health service users in the past 
30 months were required to purchase essential medicines and 58% brought 
hospital supplies for their own treatment, around half of whom did so on their 
own initiative (Stepurko, 2013).
3.4.2 Direct payments
Direct payments are mainly for the purchase of medicines and medical 
supplies (19.7–21.8% of THE and 55.4–58.4% of the total volume of out-of-
pocket payments between 2003 and 2005) (Gotsadze et al., 2006). Out-of-pocket 
payments on pharmaceuticals and medical supplies at pharmacies accounted 
for 1.3–1.4% of GDP in 2006, but 2.1–2.2% in 2008, a significant increase from 
0.8% of GDP in 1996 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2010). According 
to household surveys performed by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
in 2008–2009, 89.0–90.4% of inpatients had to pay for their pharmaceuticals 
themselves, and in 2012, this figure was 90.7%. The share of direct private 
expenditure on dental care is also quite large (32.9%), as is rehabilitation 
care (19.3% of total expenditure on these types of services), but the greatest 
expenditure remains pharmaceuticals (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). 
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Out-of-pocket spending on outpatient pharmaceuticals imposes a particularly 
high burden on those with long-term conditions and, in Ukraine, it has resulted 
in catastrophic spending by households (Murphy et al., 2013b). In June 2012, 
the government initiated a pilot project to control the price of antihypertensive 
medications through reference pricing mechanisms alongside partial 
reimbursement from local and national budgets (see section 3.7.1).
3.4.3 Informal payments
According to NHA data, the volume of informal payments is almost equal 
to the volume of formal payments for services, that is, 8–10% of THE and 
22% of household expenditure. But it is likely that the amount of informal 
payments is underestimated (Gotsadze et al., 2006). Informal payments existed 
in Soviet times, but their presence was on a very small scale. Most informal 
payments were in the form of gratuities for a service received (such as produce 
in rural areas, for example, or cognac and chocolates elsewhere). As a result 
of the economic downturn in the 1990s with the constant problem of wage 
arrears, personnel in health care facilities have levied informal payments in 
order to provide an acceptable wage for themselves that is in keeping with 
their professional standing (Bazylevych, 2009). These payments are mostly 
monetary and are made before the service is provided. Often, the necessity of 
such payments is indirectly initiated by medical staff with patients telling each 
other about their necessity and the amounts required. For additional payment, 
doctors offer different drugs and services, which they claim are more modern 
and efficient (or faster access to both). Payments in kind (gifts, produce) are still 
present in rural areas. Where informal payments have become an established 
part of the care package, such as in obstetric care, informal payments are 
expected by both patients and doctors, and lump sum payments are shared 
among the whole care team (Stepurko et al., 2013).
It is extremely difficult to gauge the true extent of informal payments in 
the total income of medical staff. According to the limited NHA data available, 
informal payments account for roughly 20% of the total salary funds. Their 
distribution is highly uneven as well, depending on location (rates are higher in 
the city than in the country); type of care (inpatient care is much more expensive 
than outpatient); the doctor’s qualifications (specialists receive higher payments 
than family doctors/general practitioners (GPs) and gynaecologists receive more 
than neurologists, for example); case complexity; and so on (Stepurko, 2013). 
Patients make informal payments as a way of trying to ensure better quality 
or more attentive care, which is why they are willing to pay out of pocket for 
services that should be free of charge (Tymczuk, 2006; Danyliv et al., 2013). 
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Survey data from 2011 found that 57% of outpatients and 70% of inpatients had 
paid out of pocket when accessing care, and a significant proportion had paid 
twice – informally directly to doctors and formally through charitable donations 
to the hospital (Stepurko, 2013).
Informal payments persist for several reasons, including low pay for medical 
staff and the weak regulation in facilities, especially doctors and professionals 
involved in decision-making. Further, the government is not ready to admit that 
it does not provide universal free health care, which breeds tolerance towards 
informal payments, despite regular loud campaigns against corruption. Given 
their share of THE, it is likely that informal payments do impact on equity in 
the system, but it is important to note that there is little evidence of patients 
actually being denied treatment if they cannot pay informally (Bazylevych, 
2009); rather, informal payments give patients a sense of greater choice within 
the system (Danyliv et al., 2013), and it would seem that patients are prepared to 
delay treatment or go into debt to exercise such choice (Tambor et al., 2013). This 
perceived need to pay, whether or not it is entirely accurate, acts as a significant 
barrier to care. A household survey conducted in 2009–2010 found that: 59% of 
respondents believed that people are only able to get good health care through 
bribes and connections; 55% felt that payments to doctors prevented them from 
using health care facilities; and 28% would use state health care facilities more 
often if there were no need to pay informally (Luck et al., 2014). At the same 
time, 36% of respondents said they never offered an informal gift, while 48.1% 
offered one sometimes or rarely and only 14.3% did so often or always (Luck 
et al., 2014). Among respondents who had visited a state facility in the past 30 
days, 26% reported giving a gift (average value = US$ 8.24) to the physician 
(8% to other staff) and most (78%) were not requested by the physician (Luck 
et al., 2014).
3.5 Voluntary health insurance
3.5.1 Market role and size
VHI does not play a significant role and in recent years its share of THE has 
remained at about 0.9%, with sickness funds providing health insurance 
accounting for around 1% of THE (Lekhan, 2015), and 2% of private health 
expenditure (WHO, 2015). The proportion of the population covered by VHI 
varies from zero in some regions to 15.6% of the population in Zhitomir oblast, 
but overall between 2.4% and 3.3% of the population were covered under VHI in 
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2013 (Lekhan, 2014). Employers buy VHI policies on behalf of their employees 
as part of the social benefits package, in order to promote loyalty and the health 
of personnel. Individual VHI policies are usually bought by people who have 
existing health problems in order to reduce the cost of treatment relative to 
direct payments for medical services; to get a higher level of comfort when 
being treated; or to avoid waiting lists for services where demand outstrips 
supply. Sickness funds also provide a form of VHI, seeking to reduce out-of-
pocket spending on pharmaceuticals for their members, but in 2013 sickness 
funds provided cover to just 1.4% of the population.
VHI plays two roles in Ukraine. On the one hand, VHI is complementary 
in as much as it covers payments for pharmaceuticals and access to different 
services, which are de facto (due to inadequate public financing) not financed 
by the state health system. However, formally these services are not excluded 
from the package of state guarantees. On the other hand, VHI is supplementary 
in as much as it provides greater choice of provider; insured patients have the 
right to treatment in the most exclusive facilities (publicly owned and private) 
and traditionally they are guaranteed a higher level of comfort and quicker 
access to diagnostic and curative services. However, while facilities are keen 
to attract the extra revenues that come from treating patients under VHI, the 
medical staff are less incentivized as they are not assured a share of this extra 
revenue and VHI patients seem less inclined to pay informally.
3.5.2 Market structure
More than 90% of people with VHI are corporate clients – enterprises and 
organizations that include VHI cover for their employees or separate professional 
groups, or sometimes their pensioners. In financial terms, their holding accounts 
for up to 80% of VHI premiums (Lekhan, 2014). The proportion of individuals 
that have corporate VHI policies is small and no greater than 10% of all people 
with VHI. Among individual clients, citizens with higher incomes are usually 
those who use medical insurance. Insurers providing VHI are private for-profit 
insurance companies and none are specialized medical insurance providers, but 
all are licensed to provide this type of financial service.
The major player in the VHI market, covering almost 40% of the client base, 
is the multiprofile insurance company Naftagazstrakh; its main corporate client 
is the State Administration of Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznitsya), which 
covers the six state railways in Ukraine. In Ukrzaliznitsya, 270 000 railway 
workers (82% of their total workforce) and 180 000 pensioners who used to 
work in the sector are covered by VHI. Insurance premiums in this company 
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are among the lowest at 600 hryvnya or US$ 75 per year in 2011. Moreover, 
due to the large number of people insured, the annual insured sum guaranteed 
is 20 000 hryvnya (US$ 2500) per year. The insurance contribution is taken 
directly from the railway workers’ wages for their cover, but half the sum is paid 
by the administration of Ukrzaliznitsya in order to help meet the cost of health 
insurance cover. For those with insurance, the programme covers expenditure 
for outpatient and inpatient care in general and specialized facilities, with no 
limit on the number of cases.
Sickness funds, which are registered as charitable noncommercial 
organizations and managed in the general interests of providing medical 
services to their members, functionally provide VHI on a noncommercial basis. 
There were 196 sickness funds in Ukraine in 2013. Voluntary contributions to 
sickness funds are usually made by individual citizens and, to a lesser extent 
(around 2% of the total receipts), by work collectives, enterprises, facilities and 
organizations paying contributions for their workers. Among sickness funds, 
the biggest is the Zhitomir oblast Sickness Fund, which was registered in 2000. 
At the beginning of 2013, it had around 200 000 members (15.6% of the oblast’s 
total population). Monthly contributions from members were 25 hryvnya ($3.1 
or $37 per year). Fund members were guaranteed unlimited cover for medicines 
(irrespective of price or the number of prescriptions) on the Essential Medicines 
List and full or partial cover for necessary laboratory or instrumental diagnostic 
tests as envisaged by local clinical protocols. In 2012, sickness fund revenues 
reached 38.7 million hryvnya ($4.7 million).
3.5.3 Market conduct
Eligibility criteria and the level of premiums are developed by the private 
insurance companies themselves and generally those aged over 60–70 years 
are excluded, as are those registered as severely disabled or those defined as 
high risk due to a pre-existing condition such as cancer, TB, diabetes, those 
with chronic kidney failure in need of dialysis, mental health issues, alcoholism, 
drug addiction, people living with HIV (PLHIV) and others. Insurers usually 
differentiate the purchase of insurance policies by category of employee – top 
managers get the most expensive VIP-level policies (Lux), middle managers get 
the slightly cheaper Elite cover, and regular workers have the standard, basic 
package at the Classic or Standard level, or a more limited package of benefits.
Usually, private insurers are not integrated with providers. To provide VHI, 
the insurers should have agreements with health care facilities (either private 
or publicly owned), which have successfully gone through state registration 
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and accreditation. Separate insurers set up their own health care facilities to 
serve their own clients. Insurance tariffs are based on agreements between 
insurance companies and health care facilities. Benefits are thereby provided 
in kind rather than in cash.
Sickness funds determine their packages of benefits independently, but 
most often packages for the working population differ from those offered to 
the non-working population. Different sickness funds enter into agreements 
with health care facilities, which determine the drug regime for sickness fund 
members and the quality control systems for the diagnostic and treatment 
processes. Some sickness funds pay pharmacies directly for the supply of 
medications as requested by the health care facility; others buy the medications 
directly from the pharmacy for their members without any agreements with 
health care providers. According to the Ministry of Health, most sickness 
funds have no effective mechanisms in place for monitoring the use of funds 
to purchase medicines, so these resources are open to abuse by sickness 
fund leaders.
3.5.4 Public policy
There is no specific public policy around VHI in Ukraine, and VHI is regulated 
under the Law on insurance (1996), which covers only the general conditions 
for insurance such as insurance risks, exclusions to insurance claims, the 
limitations on insurance, etc. Specific conditions for insurance, particularly 
insurance premiums, the term and conditions for reimbursement, are agreed in 
the individual insurance contract. Other issues for VHI are regulated through 
other general purpose normative acts. In particular, the Law on financial 
services and state regulation of the financial services market (2001) is the 
general legal basis for providing financial services (including insurance) and 
defines the regulatory and monitoring functions for the provision of financial 
services; the State Commission for the Regulation of the Financial Services 
Market in Ukraine issues the licences for insurance activities.
With the preparation of a new Tax Code, adopted in 2010, a package of 
amendments was proposed which would look at a range of tax incentives 
designed to increase demand for VHI, in particular, giving enterprises the right 
to reduce the level of social tax they paid on the payroll if they provided all their 
employees with VHI cover. However, these amendments were not included in 
the final version of the law. The insurance industry has been pushing hard for 
tax breaks for VHI premiums to be brought into law.
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The field of activities under VHI is not clearly defined. VHI in the Ukrainian 
health system is encroaching on the statutory health system; it significantly 
duplicates the state benefits package, so that the border between free and 
charged care has become blurred. Those insured under VHI are paying money 
for cover that is already in law guaranteed by the state, and in addition for the 
right to be treated in the most exclusive facilities.
The introduction of mandatory social health insurance has been widely 
discussed since the 1990s. Politicians and the general public understand that 
this would require a clearly defined package of benefits and an increase in the 
volume of budgetary funding for health and the private insurers expect a clearly 
defined role for VHI in the health system. However, although several draft laws 
on social health insurance have been put before Parliament, consensus on this 
issue has not been achieved and a decision has not been made (see Chapter 
6). The government in power since 2014 stated that it wanted to accelerate the 
development of VHI in Ukraine, but the realism of such plans in a deep political 
and economic crisis is questionable.
3.6 Other financing
3.6.1 Parallel health systems
Many ministries and other government bodies have separate parallel health 
systems for their workers. Some of the largest of these are in the Ministry of 
Infrastructure, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of Education and Science, and the State 
Administration. These parallel systems are funded from the national budget; 
almost 42% of health expenditure from the national budget is spent on parallel 
health care facilities and more than 11% of total public health expenditure. 
In 2012, 32 600 beds, or 8.8% of the total bed stock, were in parallel health 
systems. The National Academy of Medical Sciences also has its own funding 
stream for its network of clinical research institutes, which provide highly 
specialized tertiary care, although the volume and structure of its activities are 
planned in isolation from the main health system. The biggest parallel system 
is under the Ministry of Infrastructure (previously Transport), which has over 
90 health care facilities, but the National Academy of Medical Sciences has 
more than 30 clinical research institutes. State budget resources are allocated 
to health care in accordance with the Law on the state budget and approved by 
Parliament. Each of these agencies is responsible for financing the health care 
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facilities and programmes allocated to them. As a result, the Ministry of Health 
is only responsible for just over half of the resources allocated to health from 
the state budget (see section 3.3.3).
This fragmentation is inequitable because when determining the size of 
intergovernmental transfers, the local budget is determined by the total resident 
population minus those that can access parallel health structures. However, the 
majority of parallel networks do not provide a full health care package to their 
workers. Workers in these ministries and other bodies also have the right to seek 
care in their local statutory health care facilities. Therefore, funding designed to 
finance parallel networks partially intersects with the regional financing pool. 
Citizens benefiting from access to parallel networks as well as mainstream 
health care facilities use a portion of the finances allocated to provide care to 
other people in the same region.
The Budget Code adopted in 2010, applies to the whole country and this 
required the transfer of all parallel health care facilities to the main health 
system for the creation of hospital districts in order to avoid the duplication of 
financial flows, but this has not yet been realized.
3.6.2 External sources of funds
It is difficult to estimate the impact of external sources of financing in 
Ukraine. Overall donor activity has contributed very little to financing of the 
health sector; according to NHA, their contribution accounts for less than 
1% of THE (0.2–0.3% in 2005–2011). Donors to the health sector include 
international organizations (United Nations agencies, the EU, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), World Bank, the Global 
Fund) as well as governments of individual countries (Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland, United States and others). Donations are used mostly to provide 
technical assistance.
The most significant role external funding has played is in fighting 
infectious diseases such as TB and HIV, and supporting maternal and infant 
health programmes (see section 5.3). In 2006, Ukraine managed to secure a 
US$ 151 million grant from the Global Fund to fund the HIV-AIDS Prevention, 
Treatment, and Care for the Most Vulnerable Populations in Ukraine, 2007–2011 
programme. The resources were granted directly to the Ukrainian government, 
but this was followed by a scandal over an increase in the price of medication. 
As a result, the Global Fund had to suspend financing, citing concerns over 
slow progress and management problems. A statement issued by the Global 
Fund said it had taken the decision because of implementation bottlenecks, and 
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management and governance issues. Financing resumed after the International 
HIV/AIDS Alliance, an NGO, was put in charge of the project. In 2012, a 
further grant of US$ 305 million was awarded to run from 2012–2016 to build 
a sustainable system of comprehensive services for HIV prevention, treatment 
and care for the most at-risk populations and PLHIV.
Ukraine applied three times to the Global Fund from 2006 for help with 
TB control, but was refused, citing opaque procedures and a general distrust 
in the country of both directly observed treatment, short-course (DOTS) and 
grants from external sources. A US$ 94.9 million grant was finally awarded 
in 2010, to run from 2011–2015 working in four areas: improving diagnosis by 
upgrading laboratory facilities in the health system and in the prison system; 
improving access to quality services for marginalized groups; health system 
strengthening through improved management (governance, monitoring and 
evaluation; human resources development); and improving access to quality 
services by raising awareness, and reducing stigma and discrimination.
3.6.3 Other sources of financing
The Ukrainian government mandates that it is the responsibility of the owners 
and administrators of enterprises, agencies and institutions to protect the health 
of their workers. Employers must therefore provide their own resources to fund 
compliance with safety techniques, sanitation in the workplace, recruitment and 
periodic medical exams for certain categories of workers in labour-intensive, 
unhealthy or dangerous jobs. They are likewise responsible for providing 
thorough medical examinations and rehabilitation for workers with potential 
professional or occupational diseases, and prophylactic medical examinations 
for groups of workers at risk of developing occupational diseases. In accordance 
with the Law on mandatory social insurance covering temporary disability, 
occupational accidents and occupational diseases, the Social Insurance 
Fund against Occupational Accidents and Occupational Diseases uses its 
own resources to take measures against occupational accidents, to remove 
work-related threats to workers’ health and so on. In 2013, the fund treated 
28 193 occupational health patients and provided medicines and supplies to 
27 435; spa treatment to 13 933 patients disabled in workplace incidents; 5969 
prostheses; mobility aids to 592; and special medical care to 1074 people 
disabled in workplace incidents or through occupational diseases (Social 
Insurance Fund, 2014).
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The Ukrainian Red Cross Society plays an important role in providing health 
and social care services to vulnerable groups and has been working across 
Ukraine since 1961. It has 100 sociomedical centres, 359 rooms, 4 hospitals, 3 
hospices, 15 day care wards and 294 inpatient wards, and there are 838 Red 
Cross first aid centres in remote rural areas. It has 3200 volunteers and workers, 
who provide both moral and material support to 340 000 vulnerable people in 
their care. Material support is given to 1.1 million people by Red Cross Ukraine 
annually, and the Red Cross mobilized 43.5 million hryvnya in 2010.
Other charitable and philanthropic organizations are also highly active in the 
health system and their impact is becoming more visible. The most high profile 
include the Rinat Akhmetov charity, Development of Ukraine (established 
2005), the Olena Pinchuk Foundation (established in 2003, and partnered with 
the Elton John AIDS Foundation and the William J. Clinton Foundation) and 
the International Renaissance Foundation (an Open Society Foundation). The 
main initiatives of these organizations are media campaigns to attract the 
best international experience to fight HIV in Ukraine, and direct assistance, 
including advocacy, for PLHIV.
3.7 Payment mechanisms
3.7.1 Paying for health services
Payment mechanisms in the Ukrainian health system are prospective. The 
overwhelming majority of public health care facilities are officially financed 
by the government from the national or relevant local budget. There is strict 
allocation of resources between the budgets and any given facility can receive 
financing from one budget only. The real level of resource allocations to 
government-financed facilities is based on historical line-item budgeting, 
adjusted for inflation and any budgetary increases, but the amount of funding is 
not directly related to the intensity or complexity of the work performed. Budget 
allocations do not cover all health care expenditure in publicly owned health 
care facilities as the line items in the budget do not reflect the real cost of these 
inputs. Some items listed are protected so need to be paid first, such as salaries, 
medicines and food. The cost of purchasing equipment or renovating buildings 
is not considered a high priority, so can be paid for only once the protected items 
have been covered. Facilities must spend the funds strictly for their intended use 
and have no independent right to reallocate them among different categories of 
expenditure (see section 3.3.3). In reality, there are many payment methods, both 
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formal and informal (see section 3.4). Direct payments (charitable contributions) 
are funnelled into special accounts (so-called commission accounts) and can 
be used to supplement allocations according to line-item budgets as specified; 
informal payments go directly to the medical staff involved.
Line-item budgeting is very straightforward for the fiscal authorities in 
planning expenditures and controlling the targeted usage of allocated resources. 
However, this approach has a number of drawbacks: (1) input-based financing 
encourages health care facilities to maintain excess capacity; (2) allocating 
resources for the maintenance of health care facilities, rather than the volume 
of work, does not provide incentives to improve productivity – instead it 
incentivizes increased infrastructure; (3) line-item budgeting limits the authority 
and responsibility of the management in health care facilities and does not 
provide incentives to look for more efficient ways to use resources, for example, 
any savings in a particular area would lead to funding cuts in the budget for the 
following year. Therefore, resource allocations based on expenditure estimates 
are not linked to the workload of those who receive the resources. There are no 
incentives for health care facilities to use their resources more rationally, and 
this creates a cost-based type of management. Consequently, even a significant 
increase in resource allocations to health care facilities does not guarantee 
greater fulfilment of the government’s social commitments.
Centralized purchasing is done by the chief administrators of budgetary 
funds for facilities under their jurisdiction. Centralized purchasing includes 
items such as: vaccines; pharmaceuticals to fight TB, for the prevention and 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, and for treating cancer; pacemakers; implants and 
other medical devices; expensive medical equipment; ambulances for rural 
health care facilities; and other items for fulfilling the measures outlined in 
state programmes. Centralized purchasing is conducted through tendering 
procedures by enterprises under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health 
(Ukrvaccine, Politechmed, Ukrmedsnab). The purchased pharmaceuticals 
and equipment are then distributed to the regions. The quantity, quality and 
assortment of purchased pharmaceuticals and medical devices often fail to meet 
the needs of health care facilities.
There have been several experiments in Ukraine involving the introduction 
of new financing mechanisms, such as a global budgeting and payments on a 
per capita basis. These experiments are typically the result of local initiatives 
and supported by technical assistance projects run by international donor 
organizations (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). The 2010–2014 reform 
programme was similarly a pilot project, which sought to introduce new 
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payment mechanisms and thereby encourage more flexibility in the health 
system using a combination of weighted capitation for primary care, a mix of 
diagnosis related-groups (DRGs) and global budgets for secondary/tertiary care, 
and global budgets for emergency care (see section 6.1).
3.7.2 Paying health workers
Workers in government-financed agencies and institutions (including health 
care facilities) are paid according to the laws and regulations of Ukraine, and 
according to general, departmental and regional agreements, and collective 
contracts between proprietors and work unions, within the limits of budget 
allocations and non-budgetary income. Since 2002, the remuneration of 
workers in publicly owned facilities has been based on unified tariff categories 
with wage coefficients, as per Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 1298 of 
30 August 2002. Official salaries/wage rates are determined by multiplying 
the employee’s salary for their tariff level by the corresponding coefficient. 
Terms of payment for workers in publicly owned facilities are drawn up by the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. Professional 
salaries for the majority of medical personnel (medical doctors, mid-level health 
staff, pharmacists) are set in accordance with their qualifications and reflect 
the worker’s professional level (no category, first category, second category 
and highest category). Professional salaries (tariff rates) are the government’s 
guaranteed minimum wage to certain groups of health workers with professional 
qualifications. Managers at publicly owned health care facilities have the right 
to raise salaries within the salary fund provided by the line-item budgets.
In an attempt to reduce turnover in emergency care and outpatient care, 
doctors and mid-level medical personnel in these sectors are paid bonuses for 
length of service. The largest bonuses for continuity of service are provided for 
emergency care doctors (up to 60%) and doctors practising in rural areas (up 
to 40%). Primary care physicians in cities can receive up to 30% of base salary. 
Moreover, like other specialists, these specialists can receive an additional 
bonus of up to 50% base salary for increasing the area served, substituting for 
a missing worker (which is important in understaffed facilities) and for a larger 
workload. There are no significant differences between inpatient health workers 
and other personnel, except for surgeons and anaesthetists, whose salaries can 
be increased by up to 40% for performing specific surgeries. In all health care 
facilities with hazardous or difficult work conditions, all types of personnel are 
paid higher salaries, including doctors as well as nurses and other medical staff.
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Under health system reforms since 2011, one-off bonus payments equivalent 
to five times the national minimum wage have been made to medical graduates 
who agree to work for at least three years as primary care doctors or in remote 
rural areas. In 2013, emergency care staff were given a bonus payment the 
equivalent of 20% of the basic salary in recognition of their challenging working 
conditions. In 2011, TB doctors saw their salaries increased by 30% and to 60% 
for continuity of service. These large bonuses increased the average monthly 
wage for health workers, which in 2013 was US$ 397 for doctors and US$ 273 
for nurses. However, it should be noted that these salaries still lag behind those 
in other sectors of the economy. Low salaries have continued to be a problem 
in the Ukrainian health system, particularly as they have contributed to the 
persistence of informal payments, which have negatively affected the general 
equity and accessibility of medical care, and also encourage the migration of 
health workers either away from the health system or out of the country (see 
section 4.2.2).
The methods of remuneration give some flexibility in salaries for medical 
personnel at publicly owned health care facilities. However, this has not proved 
a sufficient incentive to increase the volume or quality of services provided. 
In the majority of cases, the remuneration of labour in health care facilities 
is related only to the hours of work, without real consideration of the volume, 
quality or efficiency of work. Bonuses and additional payments (except for 
mandatory payments for substituting a missing worker, length of service or a 
qualification category) are extremely rare due to the chronic lack of funding in 
the system. In cases where additional payments are awarded, the criteria are 
not transparent. Bonuses are given not necessarily to the best workers from 
a professional perspective, but to those who, for whatever reason, are more 
pleasing to the facility’s administration. The lack of transparent bonus criteria 
removes any incentive to increase the efficiency or quality of work (Lekhan, 
Slabkii & Shevchenko, 2009).
Linking pay to the intensity and quality of work, based on clear and 
transparent criteria, was therefore one of the most important components of 
the health financing reforms piloted in 2012. In 2012, with subsequent revision 
in 2013, the government decided to test a new pay system for primary care 
workers in the four pilot regions, which included bonuses for doctors and nurses 
based on the amount and quality of work done. The volume indicator was 
the differential bonus for serving an enrolled population above the normative 
level, adjusted for age and gender. Quality-related bonuses were measured 
using several indicators: achieving screening targets for women at high risk of 
cervical or breast cancer; achieving targets for fluorography of TB in at-risk 
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groups; achieving immunization coverage targets; reducing hospitalization 
and referrals to secondary care; and reducing the number of emergency care 
calls. Volume-related salary bonuses were put in place from 2012 and, in 2013, 
quality-related bonuses were introduced. Implementation of the new pay system 
increased the average salary of primary care workers in the pilot regions by 
50–60% compared with 2011 levels (Yashchenko & Kotuza, 2013). Moreover, 
in order to motivate primary care workers in the pilot regions, a local incentives 
programme was approved, which included the provision of health workers with 
housing, free public transport, mobile phones for work, and the payment of 
so-called municipal allowances.
The plan was to extend this mechanism across the country from October 2014, 
but in the face of the humanitarian crisis and severe economic constraints in 
2014, the government necessarily undertook a series of unpopular measures to 
cut public spending. This included capping the maximum salary (including all 
bonuses) for state-sector workers (Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 65 of 
1 March 2014, On conserving state funds and preventing budget losses). 
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4. Physical and human resources
Ukraine has an extensive health care infrastructure despite a rapid reduction in the number of beds in 1995–1998 in response to severe fiscal crisis. Reductions in the number of hospitals were achieved 
largely by closing rural facilities rather than rationalization of provision in urban 
areas. Ukraine has also retained a large number of facilities in parallel health 
systems. Although relatively low in comparison with countries of the CIS, the 
number of acute care hospital beds in Ukraine is high by international standards.
In 2013, the routine monitoring of facilities by the Ministry of Health found 
that 37% of primary care facilities required renovation or rebuilding: 23% in 
rural areas and 46% in urban areas. Unsatisfactory sanitary conditions are found 
most often in rural health care facilities. The Ukrainian health system has also 
consistently encountered severe difficulties with the supply and maintenance 
of existing technological equipment.
Operating indicators for acute care hospitals in Ukraine show that, despite 
the large number of hospital beds, utilization remains quite high and, once 
admitted, patients on average stay for 10 days. The high utilization and long 
length of stay highlight the inefficiency of financing hospitals based on capacity. 
Research has shown that almost a third (32.9%) of hospitalizations in Ukraine 
are unnecessary. Consequently, operating indicators remain high despite the 
development of day care and other schemes that could potentially substitute 
inpatient care.
Since 1990, there has been a steady increase in the number of health workers 
per capita nationwide, but this does not reflect a growing number of doctors so 
much as a decline in the total population; the absolute number of doctors has 
been falling. The medical workforce is also ageing rapidly as new graduates 
choose to work outside the state health system or seek out opportunities abroad. 
The key staff shortages are in rural areas and in primary care, which has a 
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high turnover. The number of nurses has fallen much more rapidly due to the 
low wages and low status of nursing, as well as the limited opportunities for 
professional development. This is a trend witnessed throughout the region and 
one that runs counter to developments in EU countries.
4.1 Physical resources
4.1.1 Capital stock and investments
Current capital stock
Ukraine has an extensive health care infrastructure, despite the repurposing 
of small village hospitals as primary care centres since the mid-1990s; this 
drastically reduced the number of hospital beds and the hospital stock: from 
3754 in 1994 to 2369 in 2012, or by 63% over 18 years (WHO Regional Office 
for Europe, 2014). However, the increase in the rural primary care centres has 
been offset by a decrease in the number of hospital outpatient departments 
and the number of FAPs. Hospital outpatient departments have closed as 
various multiprofile hospitals have merged. With the introduction of family 
medicine/general practice in 2000, more than half of the rural clinics and FAPs 
for remote rural areas were converted into physician-led primary care clinics 
(Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). Recent reforms have sought to strengthen 
primary care provision and invest in primary care infrastructure (see sections 
5.3 and 6.1).
Ukraine has retained a large number of facilities in parallel health systems. 
In 2012, there were 233 inpatient facilities (10.9% of the hospital stock), 173 
primary care facilities and five dental clinics. Most of these facilities are 
under the Ministry of Infrastructure (75), which includes the railway workers’ 
facilities (73 of 75); the Ministry of Internal Affairs (33), the Ministry of 
Defence (23), the prison system (64) and the National Academy of Medical 
Sciences (29) (UISS, 2013). There was also a total of 1785 privately owned 
facilities, including 94 hospitals (4.4% of the hospital stock), 964 primary care 
facilities and 5500 private clinics, of which 3800 are dental clinics. Private 
provision is dominated by dental care (54% of the private medicine market) but 
the market for diagnostics is expanding rapidly due to patient demand for such 
services given the technological base in publicly owned facilities (Ikramova 
& Solovei, 2011).
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In 2013, the routine monitoring of facilities by the Ministry of Health found 
that 37% of primary care facilities required renovation or rebuilding: 23% in 
rural areas and 46% in urban areas. Unsatisfactory sanitary conditions are 
found most often in rural health care facilities. The lack of systematic updates 
on the condition of health care facilities and the minimal financing of capital 
costs in the state health system are the two main reasons for the lack of planning 
in prospective development (construction, renovation) of publicly owned health 
care facilities.
Investment funding
The total volume of investments in the health system has increased in recent 
years but is still small. Investments in the public sector are primarily used to 
purchase equipment (see section 4.1.3). The remainder goes into the private 
sector for construction and equipment. No separate data exist for each sector, 
nor for the volume of investments for construction and equipment in each 
sector. With economic growth in Ukraine, despite the general difficulties 
facing foreign investors (political instability, lack of transparency in the legal 
system and taxation, bureaucracy and corruption), there was significant growth 
in foreign investment in the health sector (Makarenkov, 2007). However, the 
global financial crisis and general economic volatility in Ukraine after this has 
had a negative impact on private investment in the health sector.
Strategic development planning and investment in the private medical 
sector depend on several factors. The main factor is the profitability of 
potential investments as well as identifying gaps in the state health system. 
Consequently, most investments are made in the capital city and several other 
large cities. Diagnostic services, dentistry, ophthalmology, gynaecology and 
a few other fields attract the most investment. Another important factor in 
investment planning is the focus of high public officials on certain areas of the 
health system, for example, presidential attention to cancer problems created a 
lucrative field for investment in oncology (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010).
In 2011, two public–private partnerships for investment in capital facilities 
were launched. The first was a project called “New Life – new quality mother 
and child health protection”, which sought to create a network of regional 
perinatal centres (tertiary care level providing obstetric and neonatal care), 
equipped with the latest technology and equipment. The memorandum of 
understanding was signed on 20 October 2011 with the project cofinanced from 
the state budget (US$ 94.3 million) and private investors (US$ 12.5 million) 
to provide for the commissioning phase for 10 centres and the investment 
phase for 17 perinatal centres. The second national project was called “Timely 
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care” and sought to establish unified regional dispatcher control rooms using 
global position satellite (GPS) technology for emergency care centres; this was 
financed by private investors.
4.1.2 Infrastructure
Between 1990 and 2012, the total number of acute care hospital beds per capita 
fell by almost a third (from 10.6 to 7.3 per 1000 population; Fig. 4.1). The main 
reduction in the number of hospital beds took place in 1995–1998 and was 
caused by the severe fiscal crisis. It became impossible to maintain the massive 
overcapacity of the inpatient sector. The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 640 of 
28 June 1997, On introducing area-specific maximum norms for inpatient care, 
set a rate of 8 beds per 1000 population as the norm, thus requiring regions 
to adjust their bed numbers accordingly. As a result, more than 150 000 beds 
in facilities under the Ministry of Health were cut between 1996 and 1998. 
Further contraction in the hospital bed stock has progressed at a slower rate. The 
downsizing mainly affected rural hospitals, which were converted into rural 
outpatient clinics, and municipal hospitals, most of which were reorganized into 
polyclinics. However, the decrease in bed numbers was only in facilities under 
the Ministry of Health; elsewhere the number of beds has actually increased.
Fig. 4.1 
Mix of beds in acute hospitals, psychiatric hospitals and long-term care institutions in 
Ukraine, 1990 to latest available year
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is responsible for the number 
of beds in long-term care facilities and these beds are not included in bed 
number calculations made by the State Statistics Service or the Ministry of 
Health, which are used as the basis for data included in the Health for All (HFA) 
database. However, although this underestimates the number of beds in the 
system, their number is still insufficient as demand for nursing care is growing, 
due to population ageing.
Although relatively low in comparison with countries of the CIS, the 
number of acute care hospital beds in Ukraine is still high by European 
standards (Fig. 4.2). HFA data show the sum of all hospital beds minus beds 
in TB and psychiatric hospitals. In Ukraine, there is no strict differentiation 
of beds according to the intensity of treatment and care. Thus, the majority of 
inpatient facilities treat both acute patients and chronic patients who require 
long-term care, as well as sociomedical patients in need of care for social rather 
than clinical reasons (such as vulnerable older people during winter months). 
There are very few so-called emergency care facilities providing care to acute 
patients only (12 facilities located in 10 out of 24 regions). Plans to rationalize 
the hospital stock and differentiate hospital beds according to the intensity of 
treatment are detailed in section 6.1.
Fig. 4.2 
Acute care hospital beds in Ukraine and selected other countries, 1990 to latest 
available year
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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There is considerable capacity in the parallel health system, which accounts 
for 8% of the total hospital bed stock in Ukraine – 2.2% of the total stock 
of hospital beds is under the Ministry of Infrastructure (which includes the 
network of facilities for railway workers); 1.9% is under the National Academy 
of Sciences; 1.4% is under the Department of Justice; 1.2% is under the Ministry 
of Defence; and 0.9% is under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Only 0.5% of 
beds are in private hospitals (UISS, 2013).
Operating indicators for acute care hospitals in Ukraine show that, despite the 
large number of hospital beds, utilization remains quite high and, once admitted, 
patients on average stay for 10 days (Figs 4.3a and 4.3b). The high utilization 
and long length of stay highlight the inefficiency of financing hospitals based 
on capacity. This stimulates facilities to maintain a large number of beds and 
hospitalize patients, irrespective of their medical needs; research has shown 
that a third (32.9%) of hospitalizations are unnecessary. This number fluctuates 
widely depending on the unit’s profile: cardiology departments for heart attack 
patients have 11–14% of unnecessary hospitalizations, while pulmonology 
and gastroenterology departments have 55–73% (Lekhan & Volchek, 2007). 
Consequently, operating indicators remain high despite the development of day 
care and other approaches that could potentially substitute inpatient care (see 
section 5.4.1).
Fig. 4.3a 
Operating indicators for acute care hospitals in Ukraine and selected other countries, 
1990 to latest available year: bed occupancy rate
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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Fig. 4.3b 
Operating indicators for acute care hospitals in Ukraine and selected other countries, 
1990 to latest available year: average length of stay
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014. 
4.1.3 Medical equipment
The Ukrainian health system has continually encountered severe difficulties 
with the technological supply and maintenance of existing equipment (Lekhan, 
Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). Most equipment has been in use for 20 to 25 years, 
far exceeding its technological lifespan and the replacement of worn-out and 
obsolete equipment takes place at a very slow rate. For this reason, recent 
targeted programmes have sought to improve the material-technical base of the 
health system by re-equipping facilities in priority areas, such as mammography 
screening and ultrasound diagnostics; and primary and emergency care 
facilities in pilot regions have also been re-equipped.
Overall, about 20% of purchases are made through centralized procedures 
under the Ministry of Health as part of targeted state programmes. However, 
the price is often higher than if the equipment were bought independently and 
there is a lack of transparency in the purchasing process. Medical equipment 
is not always used to its maximum effect, for example, some facilities operate 
expensive diagnostic equipment for only one shift. Such equipment is used to 
its full capacity only in specialized centres, while the usage is three to four 
times lower in multispecialty facilities (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). 
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In 2013, an inventory of expensive equipment in Ukraine was made by the 
Ministry of Health and, according to this, on 1 November 2013, of the total 
sum of equipment, 8.1% of equipment which cost 0.9 billion hryvnya is not 
regularly used; some of the equipment which cost 211 billion hryvnya has never 
been used due to the lack of consumables and/or trained staff. This inventory 
has formed the basis for a new register of expensive equipment, its distribution 
across the regions and in different types of facility.
4.1.4 Information technology
In 2013, 41.8% of the population in Ukraine had access to the Internet. This is 
relatively low for countries of the region and around half the average level for 
countries of the EU (75.5% in 2013) (World Bank, 2014b).
There is a unified electronic health information system for reporting health 
data from the regional level upwards, but at the municipal and community 
levels reporting is done on paper using standardized forms. There are other 
localized information systems, but these are not necessarily compatible and 
they are for the management of individual facilities rather than national-level 
planning and coordination. Information technology is therefore not integrated 
into primary care and the use of electronic appointment booking systems or 
electronic medical records are not systemic.
There was no specific government strategy for the development of IT systems 
in the health sector, although in many regions local networks and telemedicine 
projects have developed. In 2012, the Concept on the computerization of the 
health sector in Ukraine for 2013–18 agreed a number of priority directions 
for computerization in the health sector, including the introduction of: 
standards for computerization; electronic patient records; information systems 
for health care management; electronic prescription systems; telemedicine 
systems; and a national centre for data analysis. However, the Concept has 
not been implemented. At the same time, the Ministry of Health has sought 
to continue working on the computerization of the health sector. From 
2015, a new investment was planned as part of the World Bank project on 
reforming the regional-level health system to monitor the effective functioning 
of health care facilities at all levels, population health and epidemiological 
inspection indicators, and the coordination of governance in the health sector 
(Ministerial Order No. 901 of 22 October 2013, On the organization, design and 
implementation of health system reform in Ukraine using grants and investment 
loans from the World Bank).
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In 2012, the government did decide to create an electronic patient record 
system, which obliged all health care facilities (under any form of ownership) to 
update patient records using agreed medical forms with details of care provided, 
including any drugs administered or prescribed. Electronic patient records were 
trialled in those pilot regions where broader health system reforms were being 
tested (see section 6.1), initially in primary care centres, and 90% of patients 
registered with these providers were entered into the database. However, due 
to the lack of adequate security in the system to protect the privacy of patients, 
it cannot be used even to share data within individual primary care centres.
4.2 Human resources
4.2.1 Health workforce trends
Since 1990 there has been a steady increase in the number of doctors per capita 
nationwide (Table 4.1), but this does not reflect a growing number of doctors so 
much as a decline in the total population; the absolute number of doctors has 
been falling. The medical workforce is also ageing rapidly. According to data 
collected by the Medical Statistics Centre at the Ministry of Health, in 2012 
a quarter (24.7%) of active physicians were of retirement age (compared with 
16.1% in 1994; 19.5% in 2002; 22.5% in 2007).
Table 4.1 
Health workers in Ukraine per 1000 population, selected years
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013
Doctors, total 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.8 –
Public health specialists (Sanepid) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.04 –
Doctors practising clinical medicine, 
of which:
… 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 –
 – Primary care physicians … … 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 – Medical scientists … 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 –
Mid-level health personnel 11.8 11.7 11.0 10.6 10.2 10.1 9.7 –
Nurses (including midwives 
and feldshers)
8.4* 8.4* 7.9* 7.9* 8.5 8.4 8.5 –
Dentists 0.4* 0.5* 0.5* 0.5* 0.6 0.7 0.7 –
Dental technicians 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 –
Management staff 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 – – – –
Sources: Previously unpublished data from the Medical Statistics Centre at the Ministry of Health, 2014; *Gruzeva & Galienko, 2009.
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Nurses, feldshers and midwives provide both preventive and medical 
services. Feldshers represent a special category of mid-level health workers. 
Unlike nurses, who in Ukraine work as assistants to physicians, feldshers are 
sufficiently independent in their work, performing a broad range of preventive, 
diagnostic and therapeutic tasks, prescribing some drugs, performing 
administrative functions and, in certain circumstances, conducting expert 
examinations to establish a patient’s capacity to work. The total number of 
nurses and feldshers fell through the 1990s because the declining wages and 
status of medical staff made it a less popular career choice (Fig. 4.5). The 
increase in the number of nurses in 2008–2009 was purely the result of changes 
in the way the statistics were collected, meaning that all facilities (including 
private providers and parallel systems) were obliged to report the number of 
medical workers at all levels on the payroll. Nurses leave health care for other 
sectors of the economy, primarily due to the low wages and lack of possibilities 
for professional development. This is a trend witnessed throughout the CIS but 
one that runs counter to developments in countries of the EU (Fig. 4.6).
The official number of dentists appears quite low until 2008 because the 
figures did not include dentists working in the private sector, although most 
dental services are provided privately (see section 5.12). As with nurses, from 
2008 the figures include all active dentists working in the country in both public 
and private facilities, although private dentists are still not included in the data 
for many countries of the CIS (Fig. 4.7).
Since 1990, the number of pharmaceutical chemists (pharmacists with 
a higher education degree) working under the Ministry of Health and other 
departments has decreased by 20%. There are no exact data regarding the 
number of pharmaceutical chemists including those working for private 
companies. However, according to the Ministry of Health, the real number of 
these specialists is double that given by the State Statistics Service. Practically 
all pharmaceutical chemists work in pharmacies. Large hospitals with a 
capacity of 300 or more beds should have a clinical pharmaceutical chemist 
with responsibility for advising patients and doctors on the most effective 
medicines available on staff; in reality, there are only 10 employed in a few 
hospitals. Excluding private-sector specialists, the supply of pharmacists is low 
in Ukraine (Fig. 4.8). However, including those working in the private sector, 
the supply of pharmacists in Ukraine is actually closer to the average for the 
EU countries.
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Fig. 4.4 
Number of physicians per 100 000 population in Ukraine and selected countries, 
1990 to latest available year
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014. 
Fig. 4.5 
Number of nurses per 100 000 population in Ukraine and selected countries, 
1990 to latest available year
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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Fig. 4.6 
Number of physicians and nurses per 100 000 population in the WHO European region, 
latest available year
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014.
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Fig. 4.7 
Number of dentists per 100 000 population in Ukraine and selected countries,  
1990 to latest available year
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014. 
Fig. 4.8 
Number of pharmacists per 100 000 population in Ukraine and selected countries, 
1990 to latest available year
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014. 
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4.2.2 Professional mobility of health workers
The Ministry of Health has acknowledged that there is a growing crisis in 
human resources for health care in Ukraine. In June 2008, a special board of 
the Ministry of Health identified the main reasons for such developments as 
the natural loss of human resources through ageing and migration (Bernik, 
2008). There has been an alarming increase in the number of rural primary 
care health care facilities in which every post is vacant; in 2006, this was 
the case in 273 rural outpatient clinics and 386 FAPs and, by 2012, 374 rural 
outpatient clinics were unstaffed, as were 504 FAPs. Graduates from university-
level medical institutions often prefer positions in pharmaceutical companies 
to medical practice, or leave the health sector altogether. The available data on 
human resources in the health sector do not allow the volume of emigration to 
be measured, but data from border regions show that a significant number of 
doctors are seeking work abroad. The main “push” factors are low wages, poor 
social conditions, poor infrastructure in rural areas and the low status of the 
medical profession. Ukraine is a signatory to the Bologna Declaration, which 
provides for the free movement of medical personnel within Europe, although 
Ukrainian clinical qualifications are not yet recognized within the EU.
It is now essential that the international migration of health care workers 
be monitored but, to reduce the scale of outmigration, it will be necessary to 
address the following: restructuring the medical services market in Ukraine; 
genuinely tackling the shadow economy in the labour market; increasing the 
quality of medical education; introducing economic stimuli to retain medical 
specialists within Ukraine; implementing a strategy to develop the medical 
labour market to deal with its feminization; and the increasing number of 
doctors working beyond their pension age (Kaminskaya, 2012).
4.2.3 Training of health care personnel
The system of higher medical education for physicians consists of two stages: 
undergraduate and postgraduate training. At present, training is provided 
by 18 state university-level medical schools and faculties, including three 
postgraduate medical schools. The institutions are funded by the Ministry of 
Health and are supervised by both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of 
Education. In addition, there are four medical faculties within multispecialty 
universities supervised and funded by the Ministry of Education. During the 
1990s, there were also six nongovernmental institutes offering higher medical 
education. However, five of these institutes have now lost their licence and 
were closed due to the poor quality of training provided. Therefore, only one 
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private higher medical educational institution remains: the Medical Institute 
of the Ukrainian Association of Folk Medicine. Higher medical educational 
establishments are evenly distributed around the country.
Undergraduate medical education provides training in two main streams: 
medicine (general medicine, paediatrics, disease prevention and dentistry) and 
pharmacy. All medical specialties are taught courses; correspondence education 
is permitted only for pharmacy students. Training usually lasts for six years, 
but general dentistry and pharmacy courses take five years, or five and a half 
years for pharmacy by correspondence.
Admittance to higher educational medical institutions has fluctuated over 
the years, but overall it is growing. A financial deficit in 1996 prompted the 
Ministry of Health to reduce the number of university places for training 
specialists allocated by the state. Thus, the number of students trained at the 
expense of the state budget fell by 40% between 1995 and 2007. At the same 
time, in an attempt to mobilize additional sources of funding, higher medical 
education institutes were permitted to introduce tuition fees. Correspondingly, 
the number of fee-paying students entering higher medical education increased 
rapidly, which allowed for the retention of staff and the strengthening and 
upgrading of the material base and equipment in institutions. However, these 
policies created many problems for the health system as well. On the one hand, a 
large proportion of fee-paying students tend to choose particular specializations, 
which aggravates existing imbalances in the supply of human resources in the 
health system as there are no caps on the number of students allowed to enter 
different specializations. On the other hand, some legislative issues remained 
unresolved, which allowed the Ministry of Health unofficially to limit the 
employability of graduates at publicly owned health care facilities. Moreover, 
low wages have prompted fee-paying students to seek employment outside the 
health care sector.
Postgraduate medical training is based on the principle of continuing 
professional development and involves a main specialization, further 
specialization and the advanced professional training of physicians. Main 
specialization is by an internship, which combines intra- and extramural forms 
of training. Medical schools usually do not have their own clinical centre, thus 
the taught part of the internship takes place within medical schools, while the 
practical part is undertaken within health care facilities. The internship can be 
completed in 29 specialties, 22 of which are clinical. The remainder are disease 
prevention, dentistry, pharmacy and so on. The length of internship training 
currently varies between one and three years, depending on specialty. The 
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number of internship places available for each specialty is determined according 
to the needs identified by regional health authorities. Fee-paying interns choose 
their future specialty themselves. Training in specialties not covered by the 
internship programme, or the retraining of specialists, is offered at postgraduate 
medical faculties after completing an internship in the main specialty.
On completing an internship and specialist medical training, doctors are 
given a certificate and awarded the title of “specialist doctor” in a particular 
field. Physicians who have completed formal medical training are required 
to continue professional development in order to maintain knowledge and 
skills, with the necessary programmes being provided at postgraduate medical 
faculties. All practising physicians are subject to regular reaccreditation at 
least every five years. Eligible physicians are required to have completed 
a preaccreditation cycle within one year before the official accreditation, 
performed by committees at the Ministry of Health or regional health bodies. 
The main criterion for appraisal is length of professional record. There are no 
clear appraisal criteria for the quality of a doctor’s performance, however, and 
decision-making has therefore been rather subjective. One major drawback of 
the existing accreditation system is that it is largely a tool for increasing the 
specialist’s salary. Thus, a specialist who fails to verify their qualification level 
will only lose out on a higher salary, while their right to practise will not be 
affected. The Ministry of Health is planning to pass over the responsibility for 
accreditation of health workers to the Doctors’ Association.
The training of medical staff is based on educational standards. The 
development of standards for higher medical and pharmaceutical education is 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education. The 
Ministry of Health supervises the content, level and number of state educational 
standards; develops and approves syllabuses and qualification requirements 
for specialist training; and monitors the quality of basic medicobiological and 
professional training at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. The ministries 
develop and approve syllabuses and model curricula. To safeguard compliance 
with state educational standards and the achievement of a minimum level of 
professional competence within the higher medical education system, Ukraine 
has introduced state integrated licensing examinations. These examinations 
are performed in all higher medical educational establishments by the 
Centre for Testing Professional Skills of Health Workers, an independent unit 
established under the Ministry of Health. Medical students must complete 
two state licensing examinations during their undergraduate training, after 
studying basic disciplines (Step 1) and after completing the full training 
course (Step 2). In 2004, state licensing examinations for internship training 
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were introduced, which is equivalent to Step 3 in the current system of higher 
medical education. Medicine, paediatrics and public health graduates have 
an examination in general medicine, while dentistry graduates must pass an 
examination in dentistry. Educational standards are mandatory for all medical 
and pharmaceutical educational establishments. However, the model curricula 
and syllabuses can be changed for not more than 15% of the total number of 
hours. Thus, within the allowed limits of standards modifications, the single 
private university-level medical school – the Folk Medicine Institute – offers a 
number of courses on folk and non-traditional medicine, including phytotherapy, 
homeopathy, manual therapy, bio-energy therapy and iridology.
Health care managers must have a higher education degree in medicine and a 
specialization in health care organization and management, in compliance with 
qualification requirements. Specialization training is conducted at postgraduate 
medical schools and covers six modules, covering social medicine, basics of 
health care management, economic and legal foundations of management, and 
management culture. However, neither the duration (two months) nor the content 
of the training ensures high quality. Insufficient training has often compelled 
medical students, and especially young managers, to take a second higher 
education degree in management. In order to supply the ever-growing demand 
for modern managerial skills, some higher education establishments have 
started taking fee-paying students to train as health care managers. However, 
health care management has not been officially recognized as a medical 
specialty so there are no corresponding positions at health care facilities, thus 
limiting employment opportunities after graduation. Active managers, who 
return to their posts after training, do not gain any career advantage over their 
less qualified colleagues. Consequently, many graduates seek employment with 
international programmes related to health care.
The lack of well-trained managerial staff is a serious obstacle to the 
implementation of health care reforms. There are constant debates about the 
creation of a modern system of health care management. Following an order 
from the Ministry of Health, experts of the EU project Support to Secondary 
Health Care Reform in Ukraine, together with specialists from the National 
Academy for Postgraduate Education (Kyiv), developed the qualification 
requirements and a postgraduate programme to prepare health facility 
managers for the specialization of health care management. The Ministers of 
Health planned to retrain health care managers and the managers of large health 
care facilities over the course of five years, and in 10 years to have retrained 
all managers working in the health system. Since 2011, a new postgraduate 
training programme for managers has been developed, which is broadly in 
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line with the standards of the World Federation for Medical Education. The 
course lasts 18 months, with the last 12.5 months by distance learning, even 
though this is not currently a widespread format in higher education. Distance 
learning was necessary in order to include the managers of tertiary care level 
facilities. However, the plan did not resolve the issue of differential salaries 
or responsibilities for those who have undertaken the 18-month course rather 
than the previous 2-month course. The new plan also does not elaborate on the 
timescale for retraining hospital managers at all levels of the system.
Mid-level staff are trained at more than 100 vocational medical schools, 
which are evenly distributed among the regions, and only three of which are 
private. These schools have medical education certification and hold the status 
of higher educational establishments at accreditation levels I–II, which allows 
them to train mid-level specialists (nurses, feldshers, etc.). Some of these schools 
and several higher medical educational establishments at accreditation levels 
III–IV train nurses to degree level. Mid-level specialists are trained in such 
specialties as general medical nurse, midwifery nurse, disease prevention nurse, 
dental nursing, orthopaedic dental nursing, pharmacy, laboratory work and so 
on. Mid-level specialists at the undergraduate level study nursing, pharmacy, 
laboratory diagnostics and so on. Training takes up to three years for students 
who have a general secondary education, and up to four years for students who 
have just a basic secondary education. Mid-level medical graduates are required 
to continue their education and attend advanced training courses at medical 
vocational schools, colleges and specialized advanced training vocational 
schools. Like practising physicians, all mid-level medical workers are subject 
to a regular process of accreditation at least every five years. Accreditation is 
conducted by accreditation committees in health care facilities and by regional 
accreditation committees in regional health administration facilities. There are 
three categories of mid-level medical specialists. However, as for physicians, 
the main criterion for increasing one’s grade is length of professional record.
Nurses occupy a special place among mid-level medical personnel. In 
the past 10 years, their training has been transformed. Nurses are trained in 
one of three areas: nursing, therapeutics or midwifery, with further narrow 
specialization. The training involves a two-year basic course, which now also 
includes disciplines such as the theoretical foundations of nursing, interpersonal 
communication, evaluation of patients’ health, clinical nursing and public 
health. Graduates may then enter advanced training at degree level, which lasts 
for two years full-time (or three years part-time). Advanced training offers a 
deeper education in family medicine nursing, surgery, midwifery, management 
and so on. While, in theory, nurses trained to degree level qualify for positions 
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as chief or senior nurses, or as a deputy chief physician for managing nursing 
staff, this is rarely the case as there is no appropriate regulatory framework for 
such posts. Qualified professional nurses continue to work in positions similar 
to junior nurses and holding a degree does not affect their salary level. The 
Ministry of Health is planning to continue restructuring the nurse training 
system to establish nursing as a separate profession, with nurses working in 
health promotion, disease prevention and patient care – all activities traditionally 
performed by doctors in Ukraine.
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5. Provision of services
Traditionally, primary health care in Ukraine has been provided within an integrated system by therapeutic specialists – district internists and paediatricians employed by state polyclinics. In 2000, the transition 
to a new model of primary care based on the principles of family medicine 
began. Family doctors/GPs now make up more than half (57.2%) of all primary 
care physicians; they work at family medicine polyclinics or in appropriate 
polyclinic departments. Reforms begun in 2010, which sought to reorient 
the system to prioritize primary care, were rooted in GP-led care with clear 
patient pathways and strong gatekeeping at the primary care level. The aim 
was to reduce irrational use of specialist services, but unnecessary self-referral 
to hospitals (effectively bypassing primary care) has continued to be a major 
source of inefficiency in the system and gatekeeping has been broadly opposed 
by patients.
The inpatient system is hierarchical, organized in three levels. The first 
(lower) level is that of rural hospitals providing basic inpatient facilities. The 
second (middle) level is the true foundation of the system. Secondary inpatient 
care is provided in central district and municipal multiprofile hospitals and 
also in children’s hospitals, specialized clinics (dispensarii) and specialized 
hospitals, which are located and governed at this organizational level. The third 
(higher) level is that of regional and supraregional specialization provided by 
regional hospitals, diagnostic centres and specialized clinics, and specialized 
clinical and diagnostic centres at the national research institutes of the Ministry 
of Health and the National Academy of Medical Sciences. These were originally 
designed to provide highly specialized medical care to patients with the most 
severe and complicated conditions but there has been some blurring of the lines 
between secondary and tertiary care levels.
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5.1 Public health
Until recently, the State SES was the main structure in Ukraine that was legally 
responsible for public health protection and monitoring. In 2011, the SES 
(along with the Medicines Service) acquired the status of an individual central 
executive body directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers through 
the Ministry of Health (Presidential Decree No. 1085 of 9 December 2010, On 
the optimization of central bodies of executive power, and Presidential Decree 
No. 400/2011 of 6 April 2011, On the regulation of the State Sanitary and 
Epidemiological Service of Ukraine). The structure of the SES was radically 
altered and, at the end of 2013, the sanitary epidemiological stations that had 
previously formed the backbone of the SES (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 
2010) were liquidated. In September 2014, as part of the process to optimize 
the system of central executive authorities, it was decided to eliminate the 
SES as per Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 442 of 10 September 2014, 
On the optimization of central executive bodies. The State Agency for Food 
Safety and Consumer Protection was created through the reorganization of the 
pre-existing State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service and the incorporation 
of the State Inspectorate for Consumer Protection and the SES. This newly 
created service was assigned functions previously performed by the bodies 
that had been disbanded, with the exception of the implementation of state 
policy in the field of occupational health and radiation safety in the workplace 
and employee exposure, which were transferred to the newly established State 
Service for Labour.
One aim of the initial reforms was to reduce the bureaucratic burden on 
small and medium-sized enterprises through the introduction of a risk-oriented 
approach. This means that economic activities are now grouped according to 
three criteria – high, medium and low public health risk with corresponding 
inspection schedules (once a year, every three years and every five years, 
instead of the previous quarterly, annual and three-yearly inspections) (Cabinet 
of Ministers Resolution No. 1405 of 30 November 2011). In parallel with this 
reduction in the administrative burden, a series of measures was introduced to 
increase the legal responsibilities of enterprises; so the main responsibility for 
ensuring food safety now rests with manufacturers. As a result of these reforms, 
the number of planned inspections fell dramatically and the procedures were 
greatly simplified – for example, the number of necessary permissions granted 
by the SES inspectors reduced from 29 to 8. However, there was serious 
concern about the ability of the reformed SES to fulfil its functions and to 
ensure food safety given that, as part of the reforms, food quality and food 
safety functions were given to the State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service 
(Nekrassova et al., 2013).
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In 2014, the SES was merged with the State Veterinary and Phytosanitary 
Service and the State Inspectorate. This reorganization also caused some 
concern among specialists as it appeared that the functions of the SES had 
been distributed among different structures, and the monitoring of the 
epidemiological well-being of the population (in particular the surveillance 
and prevention of infectious diseases) had been released from state oversight. 
This was particularly worrying given the low vaccination coverage in the 
country and the limited availability of vaccines, as well as the conflict-affected 
populations in the south and east of the country and the emergence of new 
global pressures such as the Ebola virus.
Immunization is the main preventive service provided by the health system. 
The registration of children eligible for immunizations and the planning of 
vaccination campaigns are the responsibility of local paediatric services 
or primary care providers. The immunization of children is organized and 
performed by special units in children’s polyclinics or family doctors/GPs, 
the polyclinic departments of hospitals, rural health care facilities, as well as 
nurseries and schools. For many years, the SES monitored the organization 
and regular administration of vaccines, but since the SES stations were closed, 
this responsibility has passed to the local health authorities. Significant gaps in 
coverage for vaccine-preventable diseases occurred through the 1990s, largely 
due to shortages and substandard supplies of vaccines. Immunization rates 
subsequently recovered, but a cohort of older children was left unprotected. 
In 1994–1996, there was a diphtheria outbreak across the CIS. There were 
646 deaths from diphtheria between 1992 and 1997 in Ukraine. It was a 
revaccination campaign targeting adults that brought the diphtheria epidemic 
under control (Nekrassova et al., 2000). However, measles and pertussis rates 
were not controlled and a state immunization programme was developed for 
the period 2007–2015 (ratified by Law No. 1658-VI of 21 October 2009). The 
programme aimed to raise vaccination coverage and revaccination for children 
in order to create a post-vaccination immunity that can contain an epidemic 
spread. However, by this time the public had wavering trust in vaccination 
programmes and this lack of public confidence has been fuelled by media 
panics (Bazylevych, 2011); the programme was halted and not relaunched. In 
2012, 79.2% of Ukrainian children were vaccinated against measles (up from 
67% in 2011), 75.5% were vaccinated against diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis 
(up from 50% in 2011), 73.5% against polio (up from 67% in 2011) and 95.1% 
against TB (up from 90% in 2011) (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014). 
This situation highlights the chronic underfunding of centralized vaccination 
procurement (in 2013, around 70% of total demand for vaccines) that has 
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contributed to, on the one hand, low vaccination coverage rates, and on the 
other, the growing number of unvaccinated children (Dudina, Golubchikov & 
Tereshchenko, 2013).
Recent reforms of family planning services have sought to integrate 
the vertical family planning programme into the core health system as per 
Ministerial Order No. 1030/102 of 29 November 2013, On the improvement of 
family planning and reproductive health in Ukraine. Family planning services 
are now organized at three levels, but with the bulk of the services provided 
in primary care, where family planning services are provided by GP/family 
doctors, midwives and feldshers who have undertaken special training in family 
planning. The range of services at the primary care level includes guidance 
on contraception choices, and identification of low-income and socially 
disadvantaged families in need of essential contraception. At the secondary 
level, family planning services are provided by obstetrician–gynaecologist 
clinics in local district and city hospitals, women’s clinics, polyclinics and 
obstetrics–gynaecology hospitals and youth-friendly clinics where there are 
no suitably trained primary care staff. This level also provides guidance to 
those working at the primary care level. The tertiary care level provides highly 
specialized family planning services for high-risk categories of women at 
regional or city family planning centres by obstetrician–gynaecologists and 
other relevant specialists.
The introduction of this organizational model for family planning services 
is still in the early phase of implementation due to the shortage of GP/family 
doctors and the lack of a system for their special training in family planning (see 
section 5.4). A United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-
funded programme called “Healthy women of Ukraine” is in place to support 
the integration of family planning services into primary care and was due to 
run from 2011–2016. In 2012, the frequency of contraceptive use among women 
of reproductive age was 52%, which has changed little since 2007, when it 
was 50.9%. Nevertheless, although the abortion rate is still high by European 
standards, there has been a significant reduction in the use of abortion as the 
main method of family planning (see section 1.4).
Ukraine regulates mandatory preliminary and routine medical examinations 
for certain categories of workers, including workers involved in public 
services which could lead to the spread of communicable diseases or cause 
food poisoning (food workers in community or children’s facilities and school 
teachers), and employees who do heavy labour or work in hazardous conditions. 
The responsibility for arranging and conducting the routine mandatory medical 
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examinations of employees lies with the owners of enterprises, facilities and 
institutions. Since the mid-1980s, during the Soviet era, there have also been 
universal health examinations to provide dynamic monitoring of public health. 
Preventive screenings took place in accordance with certain programmes, the 
contents of which differed according to the age of target population groups. 
Decreased health care financing curtailed the preventive work of health care 
facilities, particularly concerning screenings for the adult population, which 
became largely declaratory.
Currently, only certain groups undergo compulsory medical screenings: 
children (weekly in the first month, then monthly during the first year, twice 
a year during the second, once at the age of three, then annually from ages 6 
to 17 as part of the education process); pregnant women; teenagers; students; 
emergency services workers; and victims of the Chernobyl disaster. The local 
authority area is traditionally in charge of community health monitoring. 
Screenings involve the range of narrow medical specialists available at 
polyclinics (otorhinolaryngologist, ophthalmologist, surgeon, neurologist, 
dentist and others depending on indications), laboratory work and diagnostic 
tests. Unfortunately, this clumsy and expensive model of compulsory mass 
health screenings by a group of professionals without any proof that these 
screenings are necessary or effective has persisted.
Along with mass health screenings in Ukraine, there are also targeted 
preventive screenings aimed at the early detection of certain conditions and 
diseases. For example, the state oncology programme (Cabinet of Ministers 
Decree No. 392, issued 29 March 2002) provides for a number of screening 
programmes: detection of cervical cancer (yearly cytological screenings 
of women aged 18–60 and colposcopy for women in risk groups); breast 
cancer (mammogram screenings for women aged 40–65 and early palpation 
examinations for women starting age 15); and colon and prostate cancer (annual 
examinations for people over 50). There is no special financing provided for 
screening programmes; they are financed primarily from local budgets from 
general resources allocated to health care. The lack of earmarked financing 
prevents these programmes from acquiring sufficient equipment and there is a 
catastrophic shortage of mammographs in the country. The cytological service 
is rather small, which has a negative impact on cervical cancer screening. There 
are organizational problems as well, with no coordinated system of preventive 
screenings for women, which interferes with planning and evaluating the true 
scale of screening coverage. As a result, screening programmes are not overly 
effective. The mortality rate for cervical and breast cancer at all ages has been 
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high since 2002, and the premature (aged under 65 years) mortality rate for 
breast cancer is one of the highest in the European region (WHO Regional 
Office for Europe, 2014).
Antenatal services are provided by family doctors/GPs and obstetricians–
gynaecologists at specialized outpatient clinics called women’s consultation 
clinics. These clinics provide dynamic monitoring of women’s health during 
the antenatal period from 12 weeks of pregnancy, and provide health education 
and maternal care during the postnatal period. There are a number of screening 
programmes for pregnant women, including early detection of congenital 
defects and tests for syphilis and HIV. The latter is particularly important as 
the rate of HIV-infected pregnant women in Ukraine is one of the highest in 
Europe, growing from 1873 in 2001 to 6688 in 2009 (Belogortseva et al., 2011). 
However, Ukraine has had significant success in lowering the rate of mother-
to-child transmission from 27.8% in 2001 to 2% in 2011; in 2011, 95.5% of 
all HIV-infected pregnant women received antiretroviral treatment to prevent 
vertical transmission (UNAIDS, 2014).
In 2006, Parliament ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control. In 2008, amendments to the Law on advertising were issued, banning 
tobacco and alcohol advertising (No. 145-VI, effective 23 March 2008). Thus, 
from January 2009, there has been a ban on tobacco, alcohol and low-alcoholic 
beverages in external advertisements inside and outside of city limits. Further, 
the advertising or promotion of alcoholic beverages is banned on television. 
From 1 January 2010, it has been forbidden to advertise alcohol and tobacco 
in all printed media except for specialist titles. The passing and implementing 
of these measures have the potential to have a substantial public health impact 
given the burden of NCDs (see section 1.4).
5.2 Patient pathways
In Ukraine, a patient can see a doctor of any specialty at a polyclinic. Where 
patients self-refer to the wrong specialist, they are redirected to another specialist 
as necessary. However, the majority of patients circumvent their primary care 
physicians to see medical specialists and self-refer to hospitals directly and this 
is a significant source of inefficiency in the system. Every third patient who 
seeks secondary care directly makes a mistake in their choice of a specialist and 
is redirected elsewhere; nearly half of all patients who self-refer to specialist 
care at hospitals do not have a condition compatible with the hospital’s level 
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or profile and are transferred to a different health facility. Some self-referring 
patients are hospitalized unnecessarily if there are empty beds that need to be 
filled (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010).
Problems in the organization of patient pathways sometimes lead to 
unjustified complications. Some pathways have loops in them, whereby patients 
return several times to the same specialist or to the same facility at different 
stages of their treatment. For example, it is typical for an arterial hypertension 
patient who goes to see a cardiologist at a specialized clinic to be redirected 
to his district internist, who refers him back to the cardiologist. The main 
reason behind such chaotic patient movement is the lack of coordination of 
patient pathways by primary care physicians. Moreover, there is no distribution 
mechanism to move patients to different levels of medical care, and there are 
 Box 5.1 
 Example of a patient pathway
In Ukraine, for a woman in need of a new hip because of osteoarthritis, formally the patient 
pathway would be as follows:
•  The patient would first visit their primary care doctor at the local polyclinic where they are 
registered. The visit would be nominally free of charge. The primary care doctor makes 
an initial assessment of the problem and sends the patient for any necessary tests (many of 
which would be chargeable).
•  Where there is an appropriate narrow specialist working in the polyclinic (such as a 
surgeon) the primary care doctor refers the patient to them for further investigation or 
arranges for the patient to see the polyclinic specialist. However, frequently a patient will 
self-refer direct to the relevant narrow specialist.
•  After performing any necessary tests, either the primary care doctor or the narrow specialist 
can refer the patient to hospital. However, frequently the primary care level is bypassed 
entirely and the patient self-refers to hospital.  The choice of hospital is most likely to be 
determined through personal recommendations.
•  Patients referred to hospital for care wait in a queue to see the specialist, but patients are 
able to jump the queue by paying out of pocket.
•  Although all consultations, the operation itself and any aftercare should all be free of 
charge, in practice additional costs are incurred. Before admission to hospital, patients are 
frequently given lists of disposables and pharmaceuticals to bring with them for their stay. 
Much of the nursing care often also falls to family members, such as providing meals and 
laundering bed linen. Patients can also choose to use more expensive prostheses, but they 
pay out of pocket for these.
•  Once discharged from hospital, aftercare is the responsibility of either the relevant 
outpatient department (in urban areas) or the primary care doctor (in rural areas).
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concerns about the quality of primary care services (see section 5.3). The 
convoluted system of patient pathways leads to the irrational use of limited 
resources, compromises the quality of medical health and has a negative impact 
on population health. Adequate referral mechanisms could prevent a significant 
portion of patients from developing more serious conditions or complications. 
For this reason, it has been a major focus of health system reforms since 2010 
(see sections 6.1 and 5.3).
Changes to patient pathways since 2010 have been most effectively realized 
in maternity services where mothers are referred to the appropriate level of care 
according to the degree of perinatal risk so that low-risk births are concentrated 
in secondary care centres while high-risk births are referred to the highly 
specialized tertiary care level perinatal centres.
5.3 Primary/ambulatory care
Traditionally, primary care in Ukraine has been provided within an integrated 
system by district internists and paediatricians employed by public polyclinics. 
From 2000, family medicine/GP models have also been a feature of the system, 
but since 2010, there has been a large-scale reform programme to move over 
to a model of primary care based on family medicine/general practice, which 
was due to be completed by 2020. The revised model of primary care includes: 
a legal and structural division between primary and secondary care; creating 
a separate and adequately equipped primary care infrastructure; stronger 
referral systems (gatekeeping) to optimize patient pathways; a free choice of 
primary care physician; per capita financing of primary care facilities from city 
and district budgets; contracting between the main purchasers and providers 
(primary care centres); and staff remuneration based on the volume and quality 
of care provided (Lekhan, et al., 2012; Lekhan et al., 2014).
In the pilot regions, strengthening primary care was central to the reforms 
aimed at rationalizing primary and secondary care, and this was to be achieved 
through structural, legal and financial division of primary and secondary care, 
and the creation of a developed network subdivided to improve the accessibility 
of primary care. As part of these reforms, the basic primary care unit was 
to be the primary care centre, which would be a structural subdivision that 
would include outpatient clinics (ambulatorii) and polyclinics in urban areas 
and outpatient clinics in rural areas, which would include reorganized rural 
hospitals (silski dil’nychni likarni) and FAPs. The process of reorganizing rural 
district hospitals as outpatient clinics for primary care began early in the reform 
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programme with the closure of a number of rural district hospitals. However, 
many rural communities are not happy with the changes, particularly those 
people who are vulnerable or low income. In some regions, problems were 
resolved by handing over the inpatient capacity to the social welfare sector so 
that they could provide residential social care services predominantly to the 
elderly who do not need inpatient treatment, but do have serious social needs.
The primary care centres were to be created in each rural district or town 
with a population of at least 100 000. In 2012, primary care centres were 
established in the four pilot regions (Donetsk, Vinnytsya, Dnipropetrovsk 
oblasts and Kyiv city), which covered 27% of the country’s population, and 
from 2013 the programme was to be rolled out to the rest of the country. At the 
end of 2013, 85% of the planned primary care centres had been established (662 
centres in total), and in 14 regions all primary care is delivered through primary 
care centres. As a result of the reorganization, the number of facilities providing 
primary care contracted (from 9000 in 2010 to 8300 in 2012), although the 
number of outpatient clinics has expanded, albeit at a modest pace (from 1.2 per 
10 000 population in 2010 to 1.4 in 2013), which should have improved physical 
access to primary care. The supply of outpatient clinics for urban populations 
is necessarily lower than it is for rural populations (1 per 10 000 population 
in urban areas compared with 3.1 in rural) (Ministry of Health, 2014). Those 
towns outside the pilot regions have preserved the original polyclinic system.
From the beginning of the health system reforms in the pilot regions, 
long-term plans for the development of health care facilities were developed, 
particularly for primary care. The realization of these plans was the 
responsibility of local authorities but, with the worsening economic situation 
in the country, fulfilling these plans has stalled.
Since 2010, with support from the United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), Ukraine has sought to implement the Integrated Management of 
Childhood Illnesses (IMCI), which is founded on the involvement of parents 
in the process of identifying illness or health problems in their children (an 
outpatient, syndrome-based approach for parents of children aged under 
5 years). It is also particularly relevant for shifting the primary care system to 
a model of GP/family medicine (Dudina, Golubchikov & Tereshchenko, 2013).
Officially, family doctors/GPs working under the Ministry of Health make 
up more than half (57.2%) of all primary care physicians. Most family doctor/
GP facilities are located in rural areas (59% in 2013). According to routine 
monitoring data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Health, overall, in 2013, 47.5% 
of the population were officially registered with family doctor/GPs: 38.3% of 
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the urban population and 85.4% of the rural, but the development of general 
practice has remained marginal and is concentrated in reform regions. The 
number of privately practising family doctors/GPs is relatively small. The 
majority of privately practising physicians work with insurance companies 
(Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010).
District internists provide general medical care to the assigned adult 
population living in their catchment area (dilnytsia) in outpatient clinics or 
during home visits. They are responsible for preventive work among the 
population, perform dynamic monitoring of patients with chronic diseases, 
provide health education and immunization, and make referrals to medical 
specialists and hospitals. Primary care nurses perform mostly auxiliary 
functions: under doctors’ supervision, they prepare and fill out medical forms 
(except for the primary document, an outpatient’s medical record), perform 
certain tests during a visit (take temperature, blood pressure, etc.), and explain 
the preparatory steps for diagnostic examinations to patients. The organization 
of primary care delivery is based on the territorial-district principle by which 
the area served by a particular primary care unit is divided into catchment 
areas including a certain number of residents. Ukrainians have nominally been 
granted free choice of primary care physician; however, this was not widely 
implemented because, while a patient has the option to change their primary 
care provider, this was usually blocked by the receiving physician since it 
would stretch the territorial boundaries of their catchment area and complicate 
home visits.
In 2011, as part of the wider health care reform programme (see Chapter 6), 
patients were again given the legal right to choose their primary care provider, 
and also some choice of provider in referrals to secondary care (Law on 
Amendments to the basic laws of Ukraine regarding the improvement of health 
care, No. 3611-VI, 7 July 2011). The new law also regulates those instances 
when a patient can self-refer, including: access to emergency care services; 
some specialist services provided by obstetrician–gynaecologists, dental 
surgeons and paediatricians; and care for certain chronic conditions where the 
patient was already registered with a specialist outpatient clinic. The flexibility 
of this approach, which has so many exceptions, was to try to appease patients 
who were accustomed to self-referral for a changeover period. The realization 
of the right to a free choice of primary care physician began in 2013 in some 
pilot regions. However, the campaign to promote the free choice of physician 
was not particularly proactive as a result of the weak promotion work aimed 
at patients and the apathy of medical personnel. Consequently, only 1.7% of 
the population in Donetsk oblast changed their primary care doctor and in 
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Dnepropetrovsk oblast it was 0.5%. Alongside the free choice of doctor in 
these pilot regions, rational patient pathways, which used a referral system from 
primary care doctors to secondary and tertiary care level services, were also 
developed (Shevchenko, 2014).
Depending on their qualifications, family doctors/GPs are responsible 
for providing general medical outpatient care to an assigned population 
(children and adults), including prevention, diagnosis, treatment and after-care/
rehabilitation for common diseases. As with other primary care physicians, 
family doctors/GPs organize referrals to specialists and hospitalizations for their 
patients; provide immunization services according to the vaccination calendar; 
conduct examinations for temporary work incapacity; issue documents and 
verify results; and promote healthy lifestyles and health education for patients. 
However, they can also perform basic surgical treatment of wounds and the 
immobilization of fractures, as well as antenatal and postnatal care for women 
with low-risk pregnancies. Family doctors/GPs work together with family 
medicine/general practice nurses. However, people are reluctant to bring very 
young children to family doctors/GPs who are retrained adult district internists 
rather than retrained primary care paediatricians, particularly in urban areas. 
Sometimes children are already 7 or even 12 years old before their first visit. 
The retraining programme of six months (shortened to four months as part 
of recent reforms in order rapidly to meet the demand for family doctors in 
primary care) is viewed as inadequate and, unlike in rural areas where district 
internists and district paediatricians had been de facto working as family 
doctors/GPs prior to retraining, a former district internist in an urban polyclinic 
may have had very little contact with children. Consequently, in some areas, 
family doctors/GPs only work with children older than 3 or 7 years of age.
At the first stage of reforming the primary care system the negative attitude 
of the population, particularly the urban population’s attitude towards children 
being served by family doctors, became radicalized. There was a protest 
campaign across different information platforms including the mass media. 
However, by mid-2013, the situation had already stabilized and attitude surveys 
undertaken in the pilot regions found that the situation was showing signs of 
improvement. Among respondents with children who were under the care of a 
family doctor, most (60%) were satisfied with their doctor’s work and only one 
third (34%) were unsatisfied. Nevertheless, the problem of weak professional 
training for family doctors and retraining for active district internists and 
paediatricians remains. For this reason the Ministry of Health is moving to 
a new way of training family doctors via a two-year postgraduate internship.
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Currently, the composition of doctors working in primary care across the 
country is a patchy mix of GPs/family doctors, district internists and district 
paediatricians. The attempt to provide primary care for a transitional period 
using teams of district internists, district paediatricians and obstetrician–
gynaecologists did not prove successful. At the same time, in a number of 
ambulatories, mainly in urban areas, there is also a range of narrow specialists 
and often these medical professionals most strongly oppose structural and 
financial reforms of the sector. Primary care is still most often provided in 
polyclinics. The full conversion of the primary care model to one based on 
general practice/family medicine is planned for completion by 1 January 2020.
The optimum number of patients is set at 1700 adults per internist and 800 
children per paediatrician. For family doctors/GPs it is set at 1200 adults and 
children in rural areas and 1500 in urban areas. However, the real workload 
of all primary care doctors is much higher than the set norm. According to 
Ministry of Health monitoring data, on average, a primary care doctor working 
in an urban area serves 1840 patients, with a range of 920 in Lviv oblast to 
2600 in Volyn oblast, and 2369 patients in a rural area, with a range of 1572 
in Cherkasy oblast to 5070 in Chernihiv oblast. Data for the pilot regions for 
the primary care reform programme found that district internists served on 
average 2700 adults (with a regional range of 1750 to 3180) in urban areas and 
in rural areas (range: 1812 to 3977); district paediatricians serve around 1050 
children in urban areas (range: 861 to 1174) and 1130 in rural areas (range: 710 
to 1390). In these pilot regions, family doctors serve on average 1960 people in 
urban areas (range: 1560 to 2190) and around 2100 in rural areas (range: 2060 
to 2180) (Shevchenko, 2014).
Although FAPs provide primary care services as well, the shortage of 
medical staff in rural areas causes a number of problems with the accessibility 
and quality of medical care. In some areas this is further aggravated by a low 
population density of 30–70 people per km2. About 12.7% of rural communities 
have outpatient clinics and hospitals with outpatient departments covering a 
catchment area of between 2.5 and 9.5 km2; 53% of rural communities have 
FAPs. About a third of rural communities have no health care facilities in their 
territory. Experts are sceptical about the prospects for FAPs at their current 
level and believe that their numbers should be reduced by 45% (from 12 800 
to 7000, from the most remote and inaccessible territories). In parallel, the 
medical and social infrastructure of rural areas requires development (the 
primary care network, roads, social and medical transport, communications, 
etc.) (Kondratyuk et al., 2012). In some rural facilities there are no staff and 
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the number of such facilities is growing. Nevertheless, the total number of 
outpatient contacts per citizen per year is high in Ukraine and significantly 
higher than in EU countries (Fig. 5.1).
The large number of visits per capita is a result of the Ukrainian method of 
paying for services based on capacity measures (see section 3.7.1). Of the total 
number of outpatient contacts, visits to medical specialists account for 75%, 
while home visits account for about 9%. More than a third of visits (36.7%) to 
an outpatient clinic or a polyclinic are for a range of compulsory preventive 
checks (see section 5.1). The number of outpatient visits in rural areas remains 
significantly lower than in urban areas and the majority of them (61%) are visits 
to mid-level medical specialists (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). More 
recent data from pilot sites showed that these trends have remained strong; in 
2013, 60.3% of visits were to a specialist, 9.1% were home visits, and 32% were 
compulsory preventive checks. The only real change was in the proportion of 
outpatient visits to mid-level specialists, which fell markedly to 19%. Until 
recently, access to secondary care was not regulated as there was no strict 
distinction between primary and secondary care in Ukraine. However, as part 
of reform efforts since 2010, a financial, structural and functional delineation 
has been made between primary and secondary care in the pilot regions and 
this has been actively rolled out to other regions to support the introduction of 
referrals from primary care as standard (see section 5.2).
5.4 Specialized ambulatory care/inpatient care
Secondary outpatient care is provided within the integrated model, primarily by 
specialized departments of regional polyclinics and the polyclinic departments 
of city hospitals, children’s hospitals, central district hospitals and the 
polyclinic departments of specialized clinics (dispensarii). The average urban 
multispecialty polyclinic serving a catchment area of 25 000 residents will have 
six or seven narrow specialists, such as surgeons, orthopaedists, traumatologists, 
neurologists, ophthalmologists and otolaryngologists, whereas larger polyclinics 
may also have cardiologists, rheumatologists, gastroenterologists, urologists and 
others. As noted above, the delineation of primary and secondary care levels 
is ongoing in Ukraine, but currently, with the exception of the pilot regions, 
specialists in municipal polyclinics provide services to patients referred to them 
by primary care physicians and those who self-refer directly. The organization 
of secondary outpatient care is based on a territorial principle, with each 
polyclinic being assigned a defined catchment area. Residents of that catchment 
Health systems in transition  Ukraine106
Fig. 5.1 
Outpatient contacts per person per year in the WHO European Region,  
latest available year
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014. 
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area are entitled to full diagnostic services and treatment as appropriate, and 
may be referred to the tertiary level when necessary. As part of the reform 
programme, the strict territorial boundaries for patients have formally been 
erased in order to concentrate resources for hospital care at the regional level. 
Under this system, a patient can use their referral to access necessary services 
at any hospital in their region (oblast). This was operational in the pilot sites 
and was to be rolled out nationwide.
The inpatient system used to be hierarchical and organized into three levels 
(rural hospitals, municipal/district hospitals and regional hospitals) but has 
been reorganized into two levels (see section 6.1). Rural hospitals have been 
reorganized as outpatient clinics en masse and the proportion of beds in rural 
hospitals at the end of 2013 was just 0.5%. Secondary inpatient care is provided 
in cities by inpatient wards in multiprofile hospitals, children’s hospitals, 
specialized clinics and hospitals (for communicable diseases, maternity care 
and so on). In rural areas, it is provided by the inpatient departments of district 
and central district hospitals. These facilities have up to 90% of the total number 
of beds, and most are in multiprofile hospitals. Due to a general reduction in 
hospital beds, their capacity is gradually decreasing. Hospitals offer several 
specialties, usually in 7 to 12 units (general medicine, surgical, infectious 
diseases, maternity services, etc.), although the range of specialties covered is 
not regulated. In large cities there are also specialized clinics (most often for 
communicable diseases), maternity hospitals and highly specialized centres 
(for example, a burns centre or neonatal centre) based at multiprofile hospitals. 
In addition, municipal specialized clinics provide inpatient care for some 
socially significant diseases, such as TB, sexually transmitted infecions (STIs), 
psychiatric illness, endocrine conditions and others. Reform of the secondary 
care level is still under discussion.
The plans for the second phase of the reforms involved the differentiation 
of inpatient facilities by the intensity of care they provide, and the founding 
of so-called hospital districts (hospital’nyi okrug’). Forming hospital districts 
would involve the merging of facilities in a few rural districts or towns and 
districts, depending on the density and profile of the local population. Local 
transport conditions, the technical and human resources capacity of hospitals, 
their profile, and the structure of medical services would also be taken into 
account in planning. Hospital districts were conceived with the aim of creating 
the conditions for secondary (specialist) care providers to ensure the quality 
and timeliness of services provided, and to optimize the network of facilities to 
make the most effective use of technology, human resources and finance. The 
hospital districts include: multiprofile hospitals providing intensive care (level 
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1 serving 350 000 population or level 2 for providing secondary care for rare 
diseases or more complex cases); hospitals for routine treatment (to serve the 
population of one rural district or 50 000 urban population); a rehabilitation 
hospital (to serve 350 000 or more population); and hospices, as per Cabinet of 
Ministers Decree No. 1113 of 24 October 2012, On approval of the creation of 
hospital districts in Vinnytsya, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk regions and in Kyiv 
city. Hospital districts are not structural units but are a form of organizing 
and providing secondary care, overcoming duplication of publicly owned 
facilities owned by different local authorities and improving access to and the 
quality of secondary (specialized) care, as well as improving the efficiency 
of resource use in secondary care (Lekhan, Slabkii & Shevchenko, 2009). In 
the pilot regions, a preliminary long-term plan for the development of existing 
health care facilities was developed, which also included the merging of several 
smaller health care facilities.
The huge quantity of hospital beds in health care facilities hides the fact 
that, in 2012, almost 33 500 beds (or 9% of the beds opened up) were not 
functional. Currently, the possibility of changing earlier norms around inpatient 
care capacity are being examined. A government order was drafted which 
would reduce the norm from 75 beds per 10 000 population at 1 January 2014 
to 65 per 10 000 population by 1 January 2020. However, the passing of this 
document was stalled for political reasons.
The third level is that of regional and supraregional specialization provided 
by regional hospitals and specialized clinics, and specialized clinical and 
diagnostic centres at the national research institutes of the Ministry of Health 
and the Academy of Medical Sciences. These facilities hold over 10% of the 
total number of hospital beds. They were originally designed to provide highly 
specialized medical care to patients with the most severe and complicated 
conditions. There are also highly specialized single-profile centres which 
provide care at the regional level, e.g. regional TB/psychiatric/STI facilities 
(among others). However, the boundaries between secondary and tertiary 
inpatient care have become blurred. It has been reported that about one third 
of patients admitted to regional hospitals should, in fact, have been treated 
in secondary level hospitals. There are very few private inpatient facilities 
and most of them are specialized, highly equipped centres for oncology and 
cardiology patients, among others.
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5.4.1 Day care
In Ukraine there have been intensive efforts to try and develop capacity for 
both day care and home care services to replace inpatient care. The number of 
beds in day care facilities increased from 0.1 per 1000 population in 1990 to 1.6 
in 2013; however, increased utilization of day care services has not displaced 
inpatient care but has instead been supplementary. This is primarily because 
the excess volume of hospital beds has not fallen significantly as hospitals have 
sought to retain larger bed numbers to ensure concomitant financing.
5.5 Emergency care
Emergency care in Ukraine is defined as medical assistance in health- or 
life-threatening conditions at the scene of an accident, en route to or at a 
hospital. All medical workers and facilities are required to provide emergency 
care. In urgent cases, when medical help is unavailable, emergency care must 
be provided by civil defence forces, the police, fire and rescue services, public 
transport drivers and others. In such cases, citizens and organizations are 
obliged to provide vehicles to transport victims to the appropriate medical 
facility. In the case of a life-threatening emergency, medical workers have 
the right to use any vehicle to reach victims or to get to hospital. In reality, 
the primary component in emergency care is the emergency care service of 
physicians and paramedics ( feldshers).
As part of the wider programme of health system reform, emergency care 
(along with primary care) has received particular attention. On the passing of 
the Law on emergency medical care (No. 5081-VI, 5 July 2012) the emergency 
care system began a process of fundamental change. Previously, emergency 
services were subdivided by administrative territories (towns and districts), 
subordinate to the local health authorities and financed from the local budget. 
Now, administrative and financial responsibility for emergency care has been 
given to emergency care and disaster centres at the regional level. According 
to the law, as far as possible, emergency care facilities should be autonomous 
institutions subordinated to the emergency care and disaster centre for their 
region. To ensure the accessibility of emergency services, permanent as well 
as temporary emergency care stations or departments for emergency care 
teams were envisaged. Moreover, reform of the system differentiated between 
emergency care and urgent care that can be provided at the primary care level. 
The key role in the function of the new emergency care system should be played 
by the coordinating dispatcher service with a reliable telecommunications 
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network, with digital, technical and other resources to process emergency care 
calls round-the-clock for the whole region. Their work would focus on passing 
all the necessary information on to the appropriate station with the emergency 
care team as well as the receiving medical facility.
When the new law was introduced, emergency care and disaster centres 
were created in all regions, to be financed from the regional budget, which 
would also cover extraterritorial calls as necessary to reduce response times and 
optimize patient pathways. For the first time since independence there was also 
a plan to comprehensively renew the ambulance fleet (1400 new ambulances 
were purchased) and re-equip emergency care teams.
In the four pilot regions where the emergency care reforms were trialled 
from 2012, a further 250 ambulance stations were set up (the most were in 
Donetsk oblast – 99, with the fewest in Kyiv – 29). The ambulances were fitted 
with GPS navigation systems and all the ambulance teams were equipped with 
radio and mobile telephone links (Shevchenko, 2014). At the same time, the 
Ministry of Health renewed its attention on emergency care by supporting 
its national project called “Timely care”, which sought to create centralized 
dispatcher services for the regional centres. Although work on this should 
have been completed by November 2013, not one regional dispatcher service 
at an emergency care and disaster centre was operational at the time of writing 
(Bogatyreva, 2013; Ministry of Health, 2014).
In 2013, there were 472 operational emergency care stations/departments, 
of which 75 were stand-alone facilities and the others were subordinated to 
emergency care and disaster centres. Even though the Law was only introduced 
relatively recently, there has already been a significant increase in the number 
of ambulance teams – to 3407 (0.75 per 10 000 population). The proportion 
of general doctor teams is unchanged at 34%, but the share of specialized 
teams has fallen to 6.4% and the share of paramedic teams has grown to 60%. 
The number of calls has fallen by 20% since 2007, from 297 to 238 per 1000 
population in 2013. This may be due to the redefinition of urgent and emergency 
care, and the improvements in the primary care system in dealing with urgent 
care, particularly as, according to data from the Medical Statistics Centre of 
the Ministry of Health, the share of emergency calls for patients with chronic 
conditions has fallen, as has the frequency of calls for acute diseases (from 
206.9 per 1000 population in 2007 to 176.5 in 2013).
Currently in Ukraine there are different norms for call-out times in 
emergency care depending on location – 10 minutes in urban areas and 20 
minutes in rural areas. According to official statistics, on average, these targets 
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were met in 90.8% of urban locations and 87.6% of rural locations. The problem 
of geographical access to timely emergency care for rural populations is often 
tackled by having a network of emergency care team points, which are either 
permanent or part-time/temporary. However, the reliability of these indicators is 
not certain. Real data can only be collected after the introduction of centralized 
dispatcher services where the call-out time can be measured without room for 
human error.
In emergencies caused by natural, man-made or social catastrophes, initial 
emergency care at the scene is provided by special rescue units. Subsequent 
care outside of the rescue zone is provided by the State Medical Emergencies 
Service. This service was created in 1997 and comprises the Republican 
Scientific and Practical Centre, as well as 27 territorial centres of emergency 
care and catastrophic medicine, a mobile hospital, specialized mobile teams and 
brigades, and more than 780 teams of the regular emergency care service. The 
catastrophic medicine service also includes 12 emergency care hospitals and 
77 other health care facilities, and the capacity can expand, if needed, to 15 000 
beds. State and local budgets reserve funds to reimburse expenses that may 
arise from the provision of medical care to the victims of emergency situations.
5.6 Pharmaceutical care
In 2011, there were 126 licensed pharmaceutical manufacturers in Ukraine, 
five of which produce 60–70% of domestic pharmaceuticals; the country has 
the largest pharmaceutical production capacity among the countries of the 
former Soviet Union (WHO, 2013). All pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
privately owned. Domestic producers accounted for 27.2% of pharmaceutical 
consumption by value, but 67% by volume, because most domestic 
production is of low-cost generics (Pharmexpert, 2013). In 2013, of the 10 
leading pharmaceutical manufacturers on the Ukrainian market, four were 
domestic producers. In order to compete with imported drugs, large domestic 
manufacturers have initiated a transition to manufacturing pharmaceuticals in 
compliance with GMP (see section 2.8.4).
According to the State Medicines Service, in 2013, there were 15 831 
licensed pharmacies in Ukraine. There are also a number of pharmacy kiosks, 
which are permitted to sell only non-prescription drugs. Only 1.5% of all 
pharmacies are publicly owned; the rest are private or collectively owned. 
Rural areas have only 26% of all pharmacy facilities (pharmacies and pharmacy 
kiosks), although 33% of the population lives in rural areas. Rural populations 
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were underserved until 2009 when large numbers of pharmacy facilities were 
opened; between 2009 and 2013 the number of outlets increased by 62.5%. A 
new norm was introduced with the aim of supplying the rural population with 
pharmaceuticals: if there is a shortage of outlets in an area, then FAPs and 
other primary care facilities are allowed to sell medicines to meet local demand 
(Ministerial Order No. 723 of 31 October 2011). All pharmacies are served by 
465 wholesale units – pharmaceutical warehouses. Only 6% of these belong to 
the state or community. The number of wholesale distributors is decreasing 
rapidly as the sector consolidates. Just five companies deliver 80% of goods 
to the pharmacies and these wholesalers are also developing pharmacy chains 
as retail distribution is more profitable than wholesale. Retail pharmacies 
distribute 79% of all pharmaceuticals directly to the population, while 21% are 
dispensed through hospitals.
Even under the Soviet Semashko system, outpatients were obliged to pay for 
drugs out of pocket (with the exception of certain groups entitled to benefits). 
Since independence, severe shortages in health care financing have forced 
patients to pay out of pocket even for inpatient drugs (see section 3.4). Certain 
population groups are entitled to some benefits in receiving medical services 
and pharmaceuticals. Vulnerable population groups and patients with socially 
significant and very serious diseases, such as TB, cancer and so on, receive 
medical services either free of charge or with significant discounts. These 
benefits mostly include outpatient drugs. Drugs prescribed for outpatients that 
are on the government-approved list must be provided free or with discounts. 
Benefits-related pharmaceutical costs are meant to be covered by state budget 
allocations to health care. However, poor health care financing limits their 
availability. In reality, even vulnerable population groups have to pay for their 
medications out of pocket most of the time. Since 2012, a pilot project on the 
state regulation of pharmaceutical prices has been in place, to control the 
prices of drugs to treat hypertension using a system of reference pricing and 
reimbursement (see section 3.7.1). There are plans to extend the use of reference 
pricing to other groups of drugs (see section 2.8.4).
In 2009, total pharmaceutical expenditure was US$ 62.5 per capita and it 
accounted for 31.4% of THE (WHO, 2013). However, financial instability and 
the weakness of the national currency has increased the cost of pharmaceuticals 
in Ukraine; in 2010, total pharmaceutical expenditure per capita was US$ 65.6, 
but this grew 16% in just one year, reaching US$ 76.1 in 2011 (Pharmexpert, 
2013). Even the prices of domestically produced pharmaceuticals are vulnerable 
to price shocks as most active ingredients are imported rather than manufactured 
locally. Weak control over prescribing and dispensing practices means that it 
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is not possible to assess prescription or pharmaceutical consumption patterns 
(see section 2.8.4). In 2012, retail pharmaceutical expenditure (both outpatient 
and inpatient) was US$ 92 per capita, and it accounted for 30.7% of THE but, 
including centralized pharmaceutical purchasing from the state budget, total 
pharmaceutical expenditure was US$ 100.6 per capita and accounted for 33.6% 
of THE (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2014c). In 2014, the devaluation of 
the hryvnya (see section 1.2) and the introduction of VAT on pharmaceutical 
sales (which were previously exempt) caused pharmaceutical prices to leap, 
particularly for imported products (see section 2.8.4). In the first half of 2014 
there was a decline in the sale of drugs in all price segments, with a higher 
attrition rate for medicines in the lower cost niche. The weighted average cost 
of a standard pack for the first half of 2014 grew 33.4% for imported drugs and 
21.2% for domestically produced drugs.
5.7 Rehabilitation/intermediate care
In 2006, the government approved a model state programme on the rehabilitation 
of disabled people, which provides a list of rehabilitation services and medical 
devices that the government should provide free of charge, regardless of age, 
gender or type of disability (Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 1686, issued 
8 December 2006). The model state programme serves as the framework for an 
individual rehabilitation programme, which defines the types, forms, quantity 
and timeliness of rehabilitation, aimed at the restoration of or compensation 
for disabilities or lost bodily functions and capabilities, as well as determining 
when and where rehabilitation should take place. The government has assumed 
responsibility for developing a rehabilitation policy, which is delegated to 
central authorities (the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Education and Science, and Ministry for Family, Youth and Sport) 
as well as local authorities. Local authorities should work in partnership with 
public organizations for disabled people to develop and implement programmes 
for the prevention of disability and to provide for the alleviation or treatment of 
disabling conditions. Disabled adults and children are treated through medical, 
psychopedagogical, psychological and professional means, as well as with 
physical therapies, sporting activities and social rehabilitation.
Medical–social expert commissions are responsible for assessing the degree 
of disability, determining a disabled adult’s occupational capacity, potential 
for rehabilitation and developing individual rehabilitation programmes. These 
commissions act as independent centres within the regional health authorities. 
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In 2013, there were 429 medical–social expert commissions, including 62 oblast 
and city commissions and 367 inter-regional commissions, of which 163 had 
a specialist profile. By law, the rehabilitation sector in Ukraine is comprised 
of executive authorities, local self-governments and various institutions such 
as: rehabilitation facilities for disabled people; special and sanatorium-type 
preschools and schools for children requiring long-term treatment for physical 
and/or developmental problems; prosthetic and orthopaedic enterprises; 
sanatoria and health resorts for labour unions; social protection agencies; cultural 
activities agencies; and public organizations for disabled people. Rehabilitation 
facilities are comprised primarily of social rehabilitation centres for disabled 
children, professional rehabilitation centres to restore functional capacity and 
prepare people for work, and medico-social rehabilitation subdivisions in social 
care centres for elderly people and single disabled people.
These rehabilitation centres function as national and local specialized 
facilities financed from national or local budgets, or as nongovernmental, 
non-profit-making organizations that receive financing from extra budgetary 
sources. Each centre’s structure is determined by its specialization and can 
contain occupational and social rehabilitation treatment rooms, laboratories, 
workshops, classrooms and so on. These centres are staffed by both medical 
and psychological assistants. Currently, there are more than 270 rehabilitation 
centres for children in the network, 72 professional rehabilitation centres, and 
more than 270 medico-social rehabilitation departments within territorial social 
care centres for elderly people. The Ministry of Social Policy is responsible 
for the majority of rehabilitation facilities, and the Ministry of Education and 
the Ministry for Family, Youth and Sport are responsible for the remainder. 
Despite the fact that the model rehabilitation programme outlines the basic 
medical rehabilitation services to be provided to disabled individuals, there are 
no health care facilities attached to organizations engaged in rehabilitation. To 
provide these services, the programme refers patients to appropriate specialized 
departments of health care facilities, research institute clinics and sanatoria.
Health care facilities are not differentiated according to the intensity of care 
or treatment provided. Restorative treatments and medical rehabilitation are 
therefore performed at practically all levels of health facility, but there are 
some specialized facilities including a hospital for medical rehabilitation, a 
physical therapy clinic and a centre for children with impaired nervous systems. 
However, rehabilitation services are limited, not many patients are served and 
the system does not address the full spectrum of problems in rehabilitating 
and reintegrating people with limited physical abilities or psychological and 
developmental problems. Under Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 716, issued 
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12 July 2007 on rehabilitation for disabled children, there was meant to be a 
medical–social rehabilitation centre for children with neurological disorders to 
provide integrated care across medical, social, psychological and educational 
rehabilitation (Dudina, Golubchikov & Tereshchenko, 2013). By 2012, there 
were 55 such centres, including three nongovernment organizations. However, 
the demand for such services has not yet been fully met.
At the same time, there has been an ongoing reorganization of children’s 
residential care homes (to increase the use of fostering) as medical–social centres 
for the rehabilitation of newborns and their families. The medical and teaching 
human resources, as well as the technical equipment in children’s homes, are 
being reoriented towards the achievement of life skills and communication 
skills by children with neurological disorders (Ustinov, 2012).
An intersectoral programme to address some of the problems of medical 
rehabilitation was developed but never implemented. The reforms since 2010 
have therefore addressed medical rehabilitation for the first time in health care 
legislation (Law on amendments to the basic laws of Ukraine regarding the 
improvement of health care, No. 3611-VI, 7 July 2011). Rehabilitation services 
will be provided in secondary care level rehabilitation therapy hospitals. These 
hospitals will be both inpatient and day care facilities and located within 
existing general hospitals.
5.8 Long-term care
Long-term care in Ukraine is provided by facilities in the social care system 
(under the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy) that provide medico-social 
care to certain population groups. Nursing homes are inpatient facilities, which 
provide long-term care for elderly people, war veterans and disabled adults 
who need medical services and assistance with daily living. These facilities 
accept individuals without relatives. If there are vacancies, however, they can 
accept patients with able-bodied relatives when all financial costs are paid in 
full. Relatives are generally required by law to care for or make provision for 
those who need long-term care. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy, as of 2012, there are 324 residential homes for long-term care, of which 
268 are nursing homes for the elderly and disabled; almost 50 200 older people 
with disabilities are living in such homes. There are also 732 territorial centres 
which give everyday and medical–social assistance to 1 525 000 citizens for 
long-term and temporary assisted living.
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Homes for children are medico-social facilities designed to provide assisted 
living, education and medical services for children aged between 4 and 18 
with physical and learning disabilities. They are divided into four groups: (1) 
children of preschool and school age with normal intellectual development 
whose physical impairment severely limits their movement; (2) children with 
severe learning disabilities who can move freely and attend to their own 
needs; (3) children with severe learning disabilities who can move freely but 
cannot attend to their own needs; (4) children with various levels of learning 
disabilities and complex physical needs who cannot move freely or attend to 
their own needs. As of 2012, there are 55 homes with more than 7000 children. 
The capacity of these long-term residential facilities (internaty) fully covers 
demand, but their material and technical resources do not meet modern 
requirements. The deinstitutionalization of these children and the prevention 
of their institutionalization have not as yet received serious attention from 
policy-makers. Mental institutions are inpatient medico–social facilities that 
provide assisted living for patients with learning disabilities who need medical 
services and assistance with daily living. These institutions accept patients of 
retirement age and disabled people over the age of 18 with learning disabilities 
or debilitating psychiatric illnesses, regardless of whether they have relatives.
Nursing homes and mental institutions receive their funding from local 
budgets, primarily through interbudgetary transfers from the state budget, social 
insurance funds and through patients’ pensions. However, with little funding 
available, these facilities are unable to provide adequate care. Many of these 
facilities are situated in old buildings, poorly equipped and in poor condition. 
The quality of care is low. Moreover, these facilities do not have enough 
beds so there are waiting lists. The types of medical staff employed at these 
facilities are determined by their areas of expertise. Thus, in nursing homes for 
elderly people, care is provided by geriatric and psychiatric specialists, while 
psychiatrists provide the care in mental institutions. Social workers provide 
social support and every facility is required to have a dentist.
5.9 Services for informal carers
In Ukraine, many people use and participate in providing informal care services. 
There is no political or financial support from the government for this type 
of care, and there are no data available on the number of people involved in 
providing it.
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5.10 Palliative care
In 2006, the All-Ukrainian Association of Palliative Care was created, along 
with the Inter-Departmental Work Group for Improvement of the Legal Basis of 
Palliative Care. In April 2008, in accordance with an order from the Ministry of 
Health on the national programme of palliative care development in Ukraine for 
2010–2014, the Coordination Council on Palliative and Hospice Care was created. 
The Council is comprised of government members and public organizations. A 
programme was drafted that provides for the development and improvement 
of the legal basis for using opiates in pain relief, the development of a hospice 
network, the creation of palliative care delivery standards, and the formation of 
a national system of medical and social staff training in palliative care.
Palliative care was also included in the reform programme, which has been 
developing since 2010. A specific statute on palliative care was included in the 
new health reform law On amendments to the basic laws of Ukraine regarding 
the improvement of health care (No. 3611-VI, 7 July 2011) and this was followed 
by ministerial orders detailing how palliative care should be provided from 
both a clinical and an organizational perspective (Ministerial Order No. 733 of 
31 October 2011, On organization of palliative and hospice care in Ukraine; 
Ministerial Order No. 229/22761 of 7 February 2013, On the organization of 
palliative care in Ukraine). In accordance with these, palliative care should 
be provided at home or in specialized facilities by multidisciplinary teams 
of: medical workers specifically trained in palliative care; psychologists; 
social workers; specialists in providing spiritual support; volunteers; relatives 
or legal guardians of patients; and other specialists as necessary. Palliative 
care provided in the home is a service provided at the primary care level; 
inpatient care is provided in hospices or the palliative care departments of 
general hospitals. In 2013, the long-awaited registration of oral morphine took 
place and it is now manufactured domestically (in Odesa) which required a 
change in the narcotics regulations (Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 333 
of 15 May 2013, On procedure for the acquisition, transportation, storage, 
release, use and destruction of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and 
precursors in health care). Human Rights Watch called this decision one of 
the most important steps towards improving the quality of care for patients at 
the end of their life. However, palliative care in Ukraine is still just beginning. 
The resources devoted to palliative care (with the exception of outpatient care 
delivered through primary care facilities) is practically unchanged.
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In 2013, there were five hospices in Ukraine under the Ministry of Health, 
along with 13 palliative care departments, which had a total of 521 beds. The 
HIV/AIDS prevention centres have 50 beds for end-of-life care for PLHIV. 
There are also three hospices that are charities working in partnership with 
local health authorities (65 beds). In these facilities patients receive medical 
care with elements of psychological and spiritual support. However, most 
patients still do not have access to comprehensive palliative care services when 
they need them (Association of Palliative and Hospice Care, 2014). To ensure 
full access to palliative care services requires much greater investment in the 
network of facilities, but also professional training as well as a large amount of 
organizational work.
5.11 Mental health care
The mental health care system in Ukraine consists of psychiatric hospitals and 
outpatient clinics, and the psychiatric departments of multiprofile hospitals that 
operate under the Ministry of Health. There are also low-capacity psychiatric 
agencies that work under the jurisdiction of the security services, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the 
Ministry of Defence, providing services directly to the employees of these 
departments and their families. There are a small number of private health care 
facilities providing psychiatric, psychotherapeutic and drug treatment services. 
In 2013, there were 89 psychiatric and narcological hospitals in Ukraine, which 
had a total of 44 224 beds (9.8 per 1000 population); there were also 28 specialist 
psychoneurological clinics as well as 660 psychiatric and 141 psychotherapeutic 
clinics. The mental health workforce under the Ministry of Health consists of 
5271 psychiatrists (11.6 per 100 000 population), including 1522 addictions 
specialists (narcologists) (3.4 per 100 000 population), and 227 general doctors 
working in psychiatry (0.5 per 100 000). There are also 611 psychologists (1.3 
per 100 000 population) and 13 063 nurses (28.6 per 100 000) working in mental 
health. Depending on the region, the supply of psychiatrists varies significantly: 
some regions have twice as many psychiatrists as others; most are concentrated 
in the eastern part of the country, with very few working in the west. According 
to staffing standards, every psychiatric hospital department and every mental 
health clinic is required to have at least one psychologist. In reality, the numbers 
are much lower. Staffing standards do not provide for social workers in health 
care facilities and social care nurses are responsible for providing services to 
psychiatric patients (1 nurse per 150 beds). Each department for compulsory 
psychiatric treatment is required to have a social care nurse on staff as well.
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Mental health receives about 2.5% of total health care expenditure. It has 
been estimated that 89% of all resources are used on inpatient psychiatric 
care, while outpatient services receive only 11%. Psychiatric patients have to 
purchase their own medications in an outpatient setting, but also frequently 
need to contribute to pharmaceutical costs as inpatients. A study conducted 
in Lviv in 2010–2011 found that one month’s supply of modern neuroleptic 
medication for the treatment of schizophrenia (a disabling, chronic condition 
requiring long-term treatment) would cost €100, the equivalent of 44% of the 
average monthly wage (Zaprutko et al., 2014). This constitutes a significant 
barrier to care and encourages the use of older neuroleptics, which have more 
pronounced side-effects. The lack of a national system for supplying medication 
to psychiatric patients creates a heavy burden for the patients’ families, reduces 
access to treatment, hampers compliance, and decreases its efficacy.
The organizational problems that specialists working in mental health 
face in Ukraine include: the virtual absence of community care for mental 
health patients and the inflated network of large psychiatric hospitals that 
leads to excessive hospitalization and to the unnecessary use of inpatient beds 
for long-term care (see section 5.8); the insufficient use of psychologists and 
psychotherapists in the system, and the virtual absence of social workers in 
the system (Pinchuk et al., 2013). The Ministry of Health started developing a 
plan for the development of mental health services to the year 2020. The plan 
covered a range of measures to overcome the trend for institutionalization of 
people with mental health issues, but also to create an integrated system of 
psychiatric care facilities in which, alongside specialized services, a greater 
emphasis is placed on primary care services (Ustinov, 2013).
In 2013, as part of wider health care reforms in Ukraine, the Ministry of 
Health worked with the Association of Psychiatrists and mental health service 
user groups to develop a concept for the reform of child and adolescent mental 
health services, which was endorsed by UNICEF. The concept considered a raft 
of changes in the way services would be provided to children and adolescents 
that would be revolutionary for Ukraine. These changes would include: moving 
psychiatric services closer to where the young people live; the separation of 
adult and child psychiatric services; and providing services in outpatient 
facilities or existing multiprofile children’s hospitals. An important aspect 
of these changes would be the removal of many features of psychiatric care 
services that actually infringe the rights of the child. In particular, changes 
should support the inclusion of children with developmental disabilities and 
special needs in mainstream education and vocational training, and an end to 
the abuse of psychiatry in children’s homes under the Ministry of Education and 
Health systems in transition  Ukraine120
Science and the Ministry of Social Policy. For the first time since independence, 
the measures also ensured access to medicines for children with psychiatric 
illness, the effectiveness of which has been determined on the basis of evidence-
based medicine. In 2013, the first purchase of drugs from the state budget 
was made for the treatment of children on the autistic spectrum. The greatest 
difficulty in implementing the concept has been the separation of adult and 
child psychiatric services. Solving this problem has come up against numerous 
difficulties of a structural, financial and psychological nature. But the most 
significant issue has been the shortage of specialists in child psychiatry; the 
total number of paediatric psychiatrists is 424, or 5.3 per 100 000 children aged 
0–18 years and the extremely limited number of psychologists.
5.12 Dental care
Currently, most dental health services are commercial. Patients must pay out 
of pocket for diagnostic tests, filling materials and so on, not only in private 
dental facilities – the number of which is growing rapidly in Ukraine – but 
also in publicly owned facilities. State regulation of dental care prices is 
insignificant; the market plays the primary role in setting prices, although 
dental care for children and dental prosthetics for certain population groups 
remain free. There is limited quality control of dental services (Lekhan, Rudiy 
& Richardson, 2010). Dental equipment is in fairly poor condition in publicly 
owned facilities, especially in children’s dental polyclinics, departments and 
practices. Also, techniques in use are incompatible with modern dental health 
care and treatment standards. The disintegration of the national system of 
primary and secondary prevention has played a role, as has the downsizing 
of the network of dental practices in preschools and schools. Moreover, there 
is a lack of coordination between state and private dental sectors, and a lack 
of proper quality control for dental hygiene devices on the national market 
(Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010).
In 2013, there were 270 independent dental polyclinics and 4336 dental clinics 
in multiprofile health care facilities and also five private dental polyclinics and 
3830 private dental clinics. Most private dental clinics are in urban areas, and 
there is a wide disparity of access to and quality of dental care in rural and 
urban areas; there are very few fully qualified dentists serving rural areas 
(Bindi et al., 2012). There are 21 680 dentists working in state facilities (0.5 per 
1000 population), most of whom (69%) are narrow specialists (dental surgeons, 
orthodontists, general dentists, etc.) rather than general dental surgeons (Falko, 
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2013). There are also 6518 dentists in private practice (0.1 per 1000 population). 
The rate of decayed, missing or filled teeth at age 12 was 2.8 in 2008, which 
is relatively high in the WHO European region (WHO Regional Office for 
Europe, 2014).
Dental care reforms are under public discussion and have been for many 
years. The most recent draft concept proposes the definition of a package of 
benefits for dental care provided free at the point of use and the transformation of 
publicly owned dental facilities into lease-holding, local or national companies, 
reorganizing the service model by providing equal conditions for facilities of 
different forms of ownership. But these have not been implemented anywhere 
in the country. In Lviv and Odesa, economic pressures on the system have led 
to some restructuring to increase the volume of commercial activities in dental 
care facilities.
5.13 Complementary and alternative medicine
Since the 1990s, Ukraine has been going through a social crisis, accompanied 
by a decline in the prestige of science and education. Combined with the 
compromised quality and accessibility of mainstream medical care, there was an 
explosion in alternative healing. A large number of fraudulent healers appeared 
and, during the 1990s, these so-called healers managed to obtain licences or 
similar documents from the Ministry of Health, alongside legitimate specialists 
who use holistic approaches. As the massive uncontrolled spread of these healing 
practices began to negatively affect the population’s health, the government 
began to react. In 1998, the President issued a special decree to bring this 
activity under public control (Presidential Decree No. 823/98 of 31 July 1998, 
On the regulation of folk and alternative medicine). The decree commissioned 
the Ministry of Health to strengthen the licensing law for alternative medicine, 
and tasked the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Finance 
jointly to find and prosecute illegal healers. It commissioned the Ministry of 
Information and the State Committee on Nationalities and Religion to control 
the mass media, filtering out advertisements for so-called medical services 
that could harm public health. In fulfilling this decree, the Ministry of Health 
created a special Folk and Alternative Medicine Committee (reorganized in 
2006 as a state enterprise) responsible for: proposing state policies regarding 
the development of the field; creating a database of alternative practitioners 
and regulating their activity; and issuing special permits to practise folk and 
alternative medicine to people without a degree in medicine. A permit can be 
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issued on the basis of the Ukrainian Association of Folk Medicine’s expertise 
and a positive decision by the special committee that includes specialists 
from the Ministry of Health and other health authorities. Folk and alternative 
medicine practitioners are forbidden to treat cancer, infectious diseases 
including STIs, HIV and contagious skin diseases, drug addiction and mental 
disorders that require immediate hospitalization. They are forbidden to assess 
psychological health, monitor and treat pregnancy complications, or perform 
surgical interventions including abortion. They are also not permitted to 
perform mass healing sessions with the use of hypnosis or other methods of 
psychic or bioenergetic influence (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010).
To a certain extent, the committee has organized the field of complementary 
and alternative medicine, but a number of goals have not yet been met. For 
instance, there is still no registry of alternative practitioners, which makes it 
difficult to regulate their activities. Many individuals continue to practise and 
advertise services unrelated to medicine (removal of curses, fortune telling, 
etc.) under cover of a licence from the Ministry of Health, further discrediting 
legitimate folk and alternative medicine practitioners. This caused the Ministry 
of Health to issue another order in 2003, which mandated an analysis of the 
implementation of legislation for folk and alternative medicine (Ministry of 
Health Order No. 267 of 19 June 2003, On controlling illegal medical practice 
in the field of folk and alternative medicine). Further, this Order mandated the 
recertification of practitioners with a new licence from the Ministry. However, 
the necessary legitimization of the field has still not been realized, a situation 
aggravated by massive, uncontrolled advertisements of pseudo-healing 
practices in the mass media.
According to the Ukrainian Association of Health Care Promotion, there 
are about 4000 alternative medicine practitioners in the country, but medical 
circles suggest a number at least 10 times higher. A small proportion of these 
practitioners are medical professionals specializing in folk and alternative 
medicine. The remainder do not possess any medical training. Moreover, 
according to the Ukrainian Association of Health Promotion, up to 70% of these 
so-called healers are neither professionally nor morally affiliated with healing. 
There are no exact data about the number of professional specialists in the field 
of folk and alternative medicine. A small proportion of them are employed at 
publicly owned facilities as reflexologists or specialists in folk medicine; the 
rest practise privately. They have minimal connection with mainstream health 
care. About 5.5 million people receive services from these so-called healers 
and this number does not show any signs of decreasing (Lekhan, Rudiy & 
Richardson, 2010). The majority of patients seeking alternative treatment from 
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healers live in rural areas, but a significant number of richer urban residents also 
prefer to consult with folk healers for a range of common symptoms (Stickley 
et al., 2013). The preference for folk healers also correlates with a lack of faith 
in biomedicine and a distrust of doctors (Stickley et al., 2013).
5.14 Health services for specific populations
Medical health care for prisoners is provided in accordance with the health 
care law as with the population at large. Care is normally provided directly in a 
prisoner’s cell. In emergencies, prisoners can be transported to a medical facility 
in the Department of Justice or to the health care facilities of the Ministry of 
Health with the appropriate security measures in place.
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6. Principal health reforms
The Ukrainian health system has preserved the fundamental features of the Soviet Semashko model against a background of other changes, which have developed along market economic principles. Although no 
fundamental reform has taken place, some changes in the health sector have 
been initiated and realized since independence; the most recent package of 
reforms was introduced from 2010. Three phases of the reforms were to be 
implemented over a four-year period (2010–2014), and started with changes to 
health financing to reduce fragmentation and prioritize primary care. Phase 
two was to pilot the programme in four regions (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, 
Vinnytsya oblasts and Kyiv city). In phase three, the pilot regions were then due 
to deepen the reforms, but these plans were put on hold in view of the unstable 
political situation.
Strengthening primary and emergency care, rationalizing hospitals and 
transforming the model of health care financing are ambitious aims in health 
care reforms and ones which often face strong resistance from patients and 
existing power structures. To implement these reforms at a time of severe 
economic constraint was an understandable but bold move. Fundamental issues 
such as the numerous institutional barriers, including constitutional difficulties, 
which have hampered reform efforts in the past, re-emerged. However, 
conflict and political instability have proved the greatest barriers to reform 
implementation. More recently, governments have necessarily concentrated on 
more pressing humanitarian concerns.
At the time of writing, the political situation was such that although health 
system reform was nominally high on the agenda, plans remained undeveloped 
and secondary to macroeconomic concerns. This has created space for special 
interest groups to lobby for the health system to be reformed in ways that serve 
their purposes. It is hoped that greater political, social and economic stability 
will provide a conducive environment for the introduction of far-reaching 
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reforms to address shortcomings in the Ukrainian health system, but that these 
reforms will also draw on the best available international evidence of what 
works to promote equity, quality and efficiency.
6.1 Analysis of recent reforms
Despite several health system reforms that have been adopted into legislation, 
only a few have been implemented throughout the system (Tarantino et al., 
2011). These earlier reform efforts are detailed in previous editions of this 
review (Lekhan, Rudiy & Nolte, 2004; Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010), 
and this chapter focuses on the principal health reforms since 2010.
In 2010, as part of the Ukraine Economic Reforms Programme for 2010–2014 
“Wealthy society, competitive economy, effective state”, a wide-ranging reform 
of the health service also began. The bold overall aim of the reform programme 
was to improve population health and to improve the accessibility of the health 
care system, but there was also the economic imperative to rationalize the 
system as well as pressure from the IMF, World Bank Group and other lenders 
to reform state-financed services (Tarantino, 2011); WHO, USAID and other 
partners have also shaped the reform direction. Reform priorities included: 
health financing reforms to change the budgetary model of health financing 
with integration and contracting, and eventually to transition to a social health 
insurance model (see Chapter 3); strengthening primary care (see section 5.3); 
strengthening emergency care (see section 5.5); rationalization of the whole 
network of health care facilities (see section 5.4); and improving the quality of 
care throughout the system (see section 2.8).
Three phases of the reforms were to be implemented over a four-year 
period (2010–2014) and started with changes to health financing to reduce 
fragmentation and prioritize primary care. Phase two was to pilot the 
programme in four regions as per the Law on the introduction of reforms to 
the health care system in Vinnytsya, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk regions and in 
Kyiv city, issued in July 2011. These pilot reforms separated the funding of 
different levels of care as the first cautious steps towards transforming health 
system financing mechanisms; modernizing primary and emergency care; 
developing modern health information management systems; and rationalizing 
inpatient and specialist care. The reforms were piloted in three oblasts (Donetsk, 
Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsya) and Kyiv city according to an action plan drawn up 
in December 2012. In phase three, the pilot regions were then due to deepen the 
reforms using a loan from the World Bank from the autumn of 2014, but these 
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plans were put on hold in view of the unstable political situation. These reforms 
would have led to the unified costing of health services, introduced contracting 
between purchasers and providers, and then introduced social health insurance 
(Tarantino et al., 2011).
Each area of the Ukraine Economic Reforms Programme had a working 
group; for health it was chaired by the Minister of Health and consisted of both 
internal and external health experts. The draft health reform legislation was 
then reviewed by international experts and posted online for public comment. 
The law governing the pilot reform programme was then submitted to the 
parliamentary health committee and passed into law by Parliament (Tarantino 
et al., 2011).
Strengthening primary and emergency care, rationalizing hospitals and 
transforming the model of health care financing are ambitious aims in health 
care reforms, and ones which often face strong resistance from patients and 
existing power structures. To implement these reforms at a time of severe 
economic constraint was an understandable but bold move. Fundamental 
issues such as the lack of clarity over what model of social health insurance 
would be most appropriate for Ukraine, and the numerous institutional barriers 
including constitutional difficulties, which have hampered reform efforts in 
the past, have been explored previously (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). 
However, conflict and political instability have proven the greatest barriers to 
reform implementation, despite relatively consistent support from international 
partners (see section 2.5). More recently, governments have necessarily 
concentrated on more pressing humanitarian concerns.
6.2 Future developments
In a study commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) in Ukraine, respondents identified “efficient health care for longer, 
healthier lives” as a key priority for the country post-2015, concluding that 
Ukraine requires (Libanova et al., 2013):
• reform of the health care management system, particularly funding 
for care;
• standards for a healthy lifestyle to be devised and promoted in society;
• economic and social motivations for people to be healthy;
• legal, economic, institutional and infrastructural conditions for leading 
a healthy lifestyle;
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• an efficient system of prevention and early diagnosis, especially for 
socially determined diseases;
• equal access to health care services for all citizens, regardless of their 
welfare and residence;
• accelerated development of the reproductive health care system;
• less employment in harmful and hazardous conditions;
• strengthened supervision of compliance with occupational safety 
standards, particularly by eradicating the use of alcohol in the workplace, 
and especially when it endangers life and other people’s health; and
• a reduction in the number of road traffic injuries.
The Health System Reform Strategy for Ukraine 2015–2025 was released for 
public discussion in November 2014 by the Health Strategic Advisory Group. 
Bold reforms are once again being advocated to create a people-centred system 
that is also outcome-oriented, so that the health system will meet the country’s 
health needs through a reorientation towards primary care, improved service 
quality and efficient, sustainable financing. The acknowledged challenge will 
be ensuring that these bold reforms are not just implemented but that they are 
sufficiently monitored and evaluated to ensure that systemic change is on track.
Survey data have shown that there is a broad consensus that something 
needs to change in the Ukrainian health system, with 79% of households and 
95% of physicians in one study agreeing that the system needs reforming (Luck 
et al., 2014). At the time of writing, the political situation was such that although 
health system reform was nominally high on the agenda, plans were yet to be 
elaborated and were secondary to macroeconomic concerns. This has created 
space for special interest groups to lobby for the health system to be reformed 
in ways that serve their purposes. It is hoped that greater political, social and 
economic stability will provide a conducive environment for the introduction 
of far-reaching reforms to address shortcomings in the Ukrainian health system, 
but that these reforms will also draw on the best available international evidence 
of what works to promote equity, quality and efficiency in health systems. 
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7. Assessment of the health system
The core challenges for the Ukrainian health system remain the limited protection of the population from the risk of catastrophic health care costs and structural inefficiency in the health system, which is supported by 
an inefficient system of health care financing. Health system weaknesses are 
also highlighted by increasing rates of avoidable mortality.
Patients and doctors alike recognize the need for fundamental reform of 
the Ukrainian health system; however, government reform efforts to date are 
viewed negatively and popular mistrust of doctors is strikingly high. Improving 
the quality of care is necessary as this is the main popular concern but also 
because improving the quality of care would save lives. To rebuild trust in the 
system it will also be necessary to tackle the issue of informal payments in a 
way that moves beyond sloganeering about corruption to tackling the underlying 
issues of low wages and popular perceptions. Concerns about affordability are 
linked to the prevalence of informal payments and the cost of pharmaceuticals 
for treatment and these concerns in themselves constitute a barrier to access.
7.1 The stated objectives of the health system
In 2002, Parliament ratified the long-term comprehensive programme “Health 
of the Nation for 2001–2011”, the aims of which were given as: improving the 
demographic situation; improving and strengthening the health of the nation; 
improving the quality and efficiency of health care; and ensuring social equity 
and the right of citizens to health protection. Moreover, every government on 
coming to power has announced its desire to reform the health system, but 
an explicit health strategy outlining the vision for such reforms has not yet 
been published.
After the Orange Revolution in 2005, the government approved a programme 
of activities called “Towards the People” (Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 
No. 115 of 4 February 2005), which listed the government’s responsibilities 
Health systems in transition  Ukraine130
including: the provision of health care free at the point of use; strengthening 
primary care (including its financing); and moving to an insurance-based 
system of health financing. The programme was further developed through 
President Yushchenko’s social initiatives, which were presented to society in 
2007, and included increasing the official salary of state employees (including 
health care workers) and the development of rural health care. However, these 
documents remained declarative and were not fully implemented (Lekhan, 
Rudiy & Richardson, 2010).
In 2010, the then Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko, approved 
the fundamental conceptual direction for health care reforms (Cabinet of 
Ministers Resolution No. 208 of 17 February 2010). After a change of power 
following elections in 2010, as part of President Yanukovych’s Programme 
of Economic Reforms for 2010–2014, titled “Wealthy society, competitive 
economy, effective state”, health care reforms were introduced in order to 
improve population health, as well as to provide equitable and fair access to 
services of reasonable quality for all citizens. Among the main aims of the 
reforms were: increasing the quality and accessibility of services; improving 
the efficiency of state financing; and encouraging the population to embrace 
healthier lifestyles. It was predicted that the full implementation of these reforms 
would significantly reduce premature mortality (including infant and maternal 
mortality and deaths from TB); reduce the share of people who could not access 
care for financial reasons; and reduce informal payments in the system.
In parallel to the implementation of the economic reform programme, in 2011, 
work began on a government-wide programme, “Health 2020: the Ukrainian 
dimension”, which was oriented towards promoting and strengthening 
population health and increasing equity in the financial burden associated 
with accessing medical services through the future development of the state 
health system and strengthening health services. The draft programme was 
approved by the government and, in 2013, a draft law for its implementation 
was put before Parliament, but it was withdrawn shortly afterwards and the 
programme’s fate is not known.
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7.2 Financial protection and equity in financing
7.2.1 Financial protection
Out-of-pocket spending on health in Ukraine is high. In 2012, 40.2% of THE 
was paid out of pocket by patients and their families (see section 3.1). Out-of-
pocket payments include: informal payments and gratuities for staff; transport 
costs for accessing care; and pharmaceutical costs. Of these, by far the biggest 
cost is pharmaceuticals. The average cost of an outpatient medical visit for 
someone with no chronic diseases is: US$ 1 for transport, US$ 2.5 in gratuities 
for staff, and US$ 14.4 on medicines; for a patient with three or more chronic 
conditions this jumps to: US$ 1.3 for transport, US$ 3.3 for gratuities, and US$ 
30.6 for medicines, per visit (Menon & Frogner, 2010). Most of the population 
pay out of pocket for their pharmaceuticals in both outpatient and inpatient care. 
The global economic crisis followed by political unrest and conflict in Ukraine 
have pushed up the price of pharmaceuticals and increases are happening in 
a chaotic and uncontrolled fashion in response to economic turmoil, while 
successive governments have struggled to mitigate the negative consequences 
of this process for the population. Out-of-pocket costs have the potential to 
push households into poverty and out-of-pocket spending can be catastrophic, 
particularly for households with members who have chronic conditions 
(Murphy et al., 2013b). This is likely to be exacerbated by the recent levying 
of VAT on pharmaceuticals, because the sick (particularly those with chronic 
diseases) who need these medicines are often the least able to afford such taxes 
(Gelders et al., 2006).
Both rich and poor alike pay for drugs and treatment out of pocket, but 
unquestionably it is the poorest and most vulnerable households that bear a 
disproportionate burden. A survey conducted in 2001 and 2010 found that in 
Ukraine fewer than half the respondents had sought care when they needed it 
in the previous four weeks and, of these, one fifth cited financial barriers as the 
reason why; half of them gave self-treatment as the reason, but this may also 
be used as a substitute for accessing the health system (Balabanova et al., 2012).
The necessity of paying out of pocket limits the affordability of care. The 
annual nationwide household survey conducted by the State Statistics Service 
found that, in 2011, 22.7% of households reported that they had to forego 
necessary medical care, which is considerably higher than it had been in 2010 
(14.9%), and even a bit higher than in 2009 when the global financial crisis 
hit (20.5%). This sharp reduction in the accessibility of medical care has been 
attributed to increased popular expectations from the health system as the 
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reform programme started in 2010. In 2012, the proportion of households where 
at least one member had foregone treatment fell, but it was still high (16.7%). In 
2013, the proportion of households where at least one member could not access 
necessary care, including medicines, increased once more to 21.6% and this 
was primarily due to the high cost of pharmaceuticals; 95.5% of respondents 
said that they had foregone care due to the high cost of pharmaceuticals and 
health services. Overall, in 8.3% of households, at least one member did not go 
to a polyclinic doctor when required; in 5.2% at least one member did not go to 
a dentist when required; 7.4% could not get a necessary diagnostic procedure; 
3.9% could not access inpatient care; and 13.9% had to forego required 
medication. However, these averages mask significant inequalities between 
income groups – the poorest households were 2.3 times more likely to forego 
necessary medical care than those in the richest decile.
7.2.2 Equity in financing
One of the main challenges faced by the health system in Ukraine is the 
mobilization of adequate resources in such a way as to guarantee equity in 
access to core health services. In accordance with the current requirements, 
health care financing should be both vertically and horizontally equitable; 
overall, however, the system of health care financing in Ukraine may be 
considered regressive. Although the main funding source – general taxation 
revenues – combines revenues from direct and indirect taxes, so the financing 
system can be considered generally progressive (Mossialos & Dixon, 2002), 
the progressiveness of financing from budgetary resources is reduced by a 
considerable volume of activities in the informal economy, especially as 
wealthier citizens conceal their income from taxation. National sources 
estimated that the size of the informal economy increased to 39% of GDP 
in 2009 and these estimates appear to be comparatively conservative (OECD, 
2011). In 2012, it had risen to 45% (Anon, 2013). Moreover, the allocation of 
resources according to the type of health service, challenges vertical equity in 
the system. Research conducted by the World Bank found that 70% of general 
government expenditure on health goes to hospitals, specialist facilities and 
sanatoria, although the poorest sections of the population use the services of 
these facilities considerably less frequently than wealthy citizens (World Bank, 
2008). The reforms initiated in 2012 sought to address this imbalance, but they 
have now been relegated in the face of ongoing conflict and crisis, and it is not 
yet clear what the aims of future reforms will be.
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However, direct payments for services undermine vertical equity in 
financing to an even greater extent than do inequitable allocation mechanisms. 
Although estimates of private health expenditure from different sources and 
using different methods vary greatly, even the most conservative suggest that 
they account for more than 40% of THE (see section 3.1). Overall, in the World 
Bank’s assessment, population payments for medical services in Ukraine are 
more regressive than in other countries of the WHO European region and 
OECD countries (World Bank, 2008).
The system of budget financing in place allows for a certain amount 
of redistribution of financial resources. Following decentralization after 
independence (see section 2.4), the available approaches for interbudgetary 
transfers did not equalize financial provisions for health expenditure because 
the prime concern was historical precedent in allocations to facilities, and 
differences in the age and sex structures and morbidity levels of populations 
living in different territories were not taken into account. The difference 
between maximum and minimum funding levels for health from territorial 
budgets was 2.1 times. Budgetary reforms undertaken in 2001 changed these 
budgetary transfers so they were calculated according to a single norm – per 
capita funding corrected by coefficients for the budgets of different levels 
and territories. The system led to a definite reduction (of up to 1.6 times) in 
the inequalities between residents in different regions of Ukraine. However, 
the formula, which gives the requirements for disbursements and associated 
level of transfer equalization, not only included the age and sex structure of 
the population but was also burdened with multiple correcting coefficients 
taking into account the resources involved (Lekhan, Rudiy & Richardson, 
2010). For example, a few coefficients linked financing to the characteristics 
and number of health personnel working in the health facility network, so the 
shortcomings of budgeting based on historical precedent were not overcome 
(World Bank, 2008). It also became a defining factor for the preservation of 
significant territorial inequalities in health care financing in connection with 
the presence of existing differences in regional resource provision. The health 
care reforms that began in 2010, did reduce inter-regional differences (up to 1.5 
times) but regional inequalities nevertheless remained (State Statistics Service 
of Ukraine, 2014b).
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7.3 User experience and equity of access to health care
7.3.1 User experience
Data on user experience is not routinely collected, but public satisfaction with 
the health system is low and the population of Ukraine is very critical of the 
condition of health services in their country. In a study conducted in 2010, only 
17.4% of the population was satisfied with their health system and, while this 
represents an improvement since 2001 when just 12.2% were satisfied, it is still 
very low in international comparison (Footman et al., 2013). The same study 
also found that recent users of the health system had lower satisfaction with 
the health system than non-users (Footman et al., 2013). A survey of service 
users conducted in 2009–2010, found that 37% were dissatisfied with some 
aspect of their care (Luck et al., 2014). The persistence of informal payments 
in the system is at least in part linked to this dissatisfaction as patients seek to 
access more responsive care and avoid waiting times by paying out of pocket 
(Onoshchenko & Williams, 2013; Stepurko, 2013). It is also one of the factors 
influencing the low levels of trust people have in the system (Luck et al., 2014). 
The overall responsiveness of the health system has not been high on the reform 
agenda (see section 2.9). In 2011–2013, a study found that responsiveness in 
the Ukrainian health system was below average at 4.9 on a 10-point scale 
(Kryachkova, 2014). Meeting people’s legitimate expectations about how they 
should be treated would likely help to rebuild trust in the system, but it would 
also be one of the most difficult reform challenges to overcome.
7.3.2 Equity of access to health care
Nominally, all benefits should be equitably distributed across the population. 
However, the inequities in financing mean that there are significant barriers 
to access in health care and that these barriers are greater for poorer and more 
vulnerable households (see section 7.2.1). In a household survey conducted in 
2009–2010, only 36% of respondents felt that everyone in their town/village had 
access to health care (Luck et al., 2014). The diffusion of informal payments 
deters the poorest groups and rural populations (most of whom are low-income) 
from using medical services most of all. Due to their inability to pay for medical 
services, both urban and rural poor more often do not seek medical care, or 
postpone it; moreover, low-income patients are more often refused treatment 
because they cannot pay for services or pharmaceuticals (Lekhan, Rudiy & 
Richardson, 2010). Vulnerable groups include many elderly people who rely 
on their state pensions as their main source of income and people with low 
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educational attainment as they find it hard to find well-paid employment. 
Inequality in access to health care is also demonstrated by access for people 
living in regions with different levels of economic development. Research 
shows that in the poorer regions in western Ukraine financial access to health 
services is lower than in the wealthier regions in eastern and central Ukraine 
(Lekhan & Shishkin, 2007).
Inequalities caused by out-of-pocket payments can also have a horizontal 
regional character, as people with the same income level living in richer 
regions pay more out of pocket than those living in poorer regions. Similarly, 
in villages and small towns, gratuities are smaller than in big cities (see section 
3.4). Horizontal equity in budgetary payments also impinges on the functioning 
of parallel health systems. Often, especially in emergencies, patients who use 
services in parallel health care facilities access services in the local statutory 
facilities, thereby taking a portion of the resources allocated to the financing 
of medical services for other patients in that territory who cannot access the 
parallel system (see section 3.6.1). The fragmentation of financial resources 
for health also exacerbates inequality. The move towards pooling resources to 
make more powerful pools at the regional level is being undone with a return 
to the extreme decentralization with divisions at the national, regional district/
municipal and village levels (Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 333-p of 
1 April 2014, On approval of the Concept of reforming the local self-government 
and territorial organization of power in Ukraine).
One of the more pressing problems for the Ministry of Health is how to 
reduce the scale of inequalities, particularly during an economic crisis that has 
led to a reduction in the amount of finances available for distribution.
7.4 Health outcomes, health service outcomes and 
quality of care
7.4.1 Population health
Data on trends in morbidity, mortality and the major risk factors in Ukraine 
since independence are provided in section 1.4. As detailed there, the main 
factors which have contributed to changes in population health are disputed, 
but it is probable that some of the fluctuations are the result of socioeconomic 
hardships, although changes in alcohol consumption patterns have underpinned 
them (Krasovsky, 2009; Meslé & Vallin, 2012). Against a background of high 
adult mortality from cardiovascular diseases and external causes, the strong 
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improvement in population health through the 1990s was the fall in infant 
mortality rates. These improvements are likely to reflect improvements in 
health care services in the perinatal period (Nizalova & Vyshnya, 2010; Meslé 
& Vallin, 2012). Other than this, it is not clear that the recent improvement in 
life expectancy since 2008 is the result of any specific policy intervention.
It has been argued that the Ukrainian health system is still designed for 
acute episodic disease management and therefore ill-equipped to deal with the 
noncommunicable disease burden it faces (Menon & Frogner, 2010). Despite 
recent improvements in life expectancy, in 2012, almost half the male deaths and 
one third of female deaths occurred at under 65 years of age (WHO Regional 
Office for Europe, 2014). This is considerably higher than premature mortality 
rates in countries of the EU. It was estimated that 25% of all premature deaths 
(at under 75 years of age) in 2004 could have been avoided with timely access 
to effective treatment; 17% could have been avoided with adequate prevention 
of major risk factors (smoking, alcohol, diet and road traffic accidents); and 
80% of deaths among working age males and 30% of deaths among working 
age females were from illnesses that could have been treated adequately at the 
primary care level (Menon & Frogner, 2010).
Very low treatment compliance rates for people living with chronic conditions 
may also be indicative of significant weaknesses in the Ukrainian health 
system. A survey conducted in 2009 found that compliance with prescribed 
treatments for hypertension, diabetes and high cholesterol is low, with less 
than half of respondents saying they followed all of the doctors’ directions in 
taking medications for managing their condition (Menon & Frogner, 2010), and 
a survey undertaken in 2001 and repeated in 2010 found similar results for the 
control of hypertension (Roberts et al., 2012b). While internal documents in 
the Ministry of Health from 2013 indicated that the pilot project for the partial 
reimbursement of pharmaceutical costs for the treatment of hypertension (see 
section 3.7.1) did improve adherence, wider implementation of this project is 
under threat due to the difficult economic situation in the country.
Cancer is not as prevalent in Ukraine as other noncommunicable diseases, 
which is likely to be linked to the relatively short average life expectancy 
(Menon & Frogner, 2010). Although there has been a cancer registry in Ukraine 
since 1996, its data cannot meaningfully be used as an indicator of health 
system performance by looking at indicators such as cancer survival rates.
Perhaps the only clear population health improvement that can be attributed 
to a specific policy intervention is in communicable disease control, with the 
number of new HIV cases falling in 2012 for the first time since 1995, as a result 
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of concerted efforts to implement harm reduction policies nationwide, which 
have included needle and syringe exchange programmes, education campaigns 
and methadone maintenance prescribing (UNAIDS, 2014). It is not yet clear 
how effectively these programmes will be able to continue in the territories no 
longer under the control of Kyiv, despite the relatively high burden of HIV in 
these territories (Holt, 2014; Owczarzak, Karelin & Phillips, 2015).
7.4.2 Health service outcomes and quality of care
Most direct indicators of health service outcomes are not available in the form 
of health service quality measures for Ukraine. As a process indicator, it can 
be said that the extremely low vaccination rates for children are indicative 
of extremely weak preventive care systems in Ukraine, but this weakness 
is less an issue of access than one of trust (Bazylevych, 2011; Luck et al., 
2014). More complex outcome measures, such as patient-reported outcome 
measures (PROMs), are not in general use. The quality of health services is 
not regulated by a specific piece of legislation in Ukraine. From the late 1990s, 
the standardization of health care has developed rapidly. Thousands of clinical 
protocols have been developed for different medical specialties. However, the 
level of the standards has remained low and, although their implementation 
should be checked regularly in accordance with an agreed quality control 
system, in reality the checks carried out are fairly formal; more in-depth 
assessments happen usually in connection with a patient complaint about the 
quality of care, or a court case or other conflict situation. Health personnel lack 
adequate motivation to improve the quality of their work and, in the case of 
adopting clinical standards, this is most often linked to the low remuneration 
of staff. As part of the reform programme begun in 2010, only in pilot regions 
do health workers in primary care receive salaries linked to the intensity and 
quality of their work (see section 3.7.2).
An evaluation of the quality of care for selected noncommunicable diseases 
(chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and chronic heart failure) in 
Ukraine, using a previously validated method, was conducted in 2009–2010 
(Peabody et al., 2014). Overall, the scores for quality of care were low, averaging 
47.4%, which was below the 50–60% range typically observed in other countries. 
Physicians performed best in taking a history and diagnosing the condition, but 
scored lowest in prescribing the standard effective treatment. This study found 
that there were no significant differences in quality of care between urban and 
rural facilities, or between the care provided in polyclinics or hospitals, but 
there was considerable regional variation (42–51%), with care in Crimea scoring 
lowest (Luck et al., 2014; Peabody et al., 2014). Indeed, the research indicated that 
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recent continuing medical education was the key factor impacting the quality 
of care provided by physicians. This is important because higher quality care 
can help mitigate some of the more intransigent socioeconomic determinants 
of health (Peabody et al., 2014). An evaluation of the Mother and Infant Health 
Programme similarly found that significant improvements in infant mortality 
rates were achieved through training health personnel and thereby changing 
attitudes and practices (Nizalova & Vyshnya, 2010). Nevertheless, there is a 
considerable gap between quality of care as it is measured and the quality 
of care as it is perceived by patients and the general population. Multiple 
coordinated surveys with households, physicians and service users conducted 
as part of the wider study found that 86% of households had only some or no 
trust in the medical profession in Ukraine (Luck et al., 2014).
Patient safety indicators such as those used for international comparisons 
elsewhere in Europe are not routinely collected. As such, it is not possible to 
assess the impact of reforms on the prevention of health care-related harm.
7.4.3 Equity of outcomes
Studies and data on health service outcomes in Ukraine cannot yet be 
meaningfully broken down by socioeconomic group, gender or geographical 
region.
7.5 Health system efficiency
7.5.1 Allocative efficiency
Under the Soviet Semashko system, resource allocation was conducted 
according to the number of beds and staff in health care facilities and not 
on population health care needs. The volume and quality of work conducted 
were not factors. This approach created inappropriate incentives for extensive 
development and the preservation of excessive and inefficient infrastructure, 
resulting in unjustified growth in outpatient appointments, unnecessary 
hospitalizations, longer hospital stays, and so on. The biggest health care 
facilities were also concentrated in the cities, towards which most health care 
resources were directed. Overall, this Soviet approach to allocating resources to 
health care facilities based on their size has been preserved in Ukraine despite 
recent reform efforts in four pilot regions.
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Formally, budgets at the health facility level are based on Ministry of Health 
norms, which define the staffing levels and other essential resources (such as 
the number of doctors) arising from the number of beds and visits to health care 
facilities and not from the demand for medical services. The imperative nature 
of these normative acts (if they are not fulfilled, there may be harsh sanctions) 
has been a contributory factor to the inflexibility of resource allocation in 
health care, leading to high routine expenditure (particularly wages, utility bills 
and the like) and limiting investments to improve the quality and efficiency 
of services for patients. Exacerbating this problem is the legislation, which 
prohibits the closure of health care facilities and the difficulties local authorities 
encounter when trying to reduce staff numbers.
At the same time, under the pressure of economic crises in Ukraine, there 
have been a number of specific structural changes in the health system. The 
acute shortage of state funding for health care became the main reason for 
changes in the most expensive sector – inpatient care. New norms for the 
maximum number of beds and staff per capita have been introduced and reduced, 
but they have provoked strong resistance from both the health care leadership 
and the many medical personnel at the local level. For the former it would mean 
a cut in funding and for the latter they could lose their jobs. Cutting the number 
of beds was achieved mainly by cutting hospital capacity (see section 5.1). As 
a result, the main saving from reducing bed numbers through the 1990s was 
insignificant in the face of dominant expenditure structures financing care 
irrespective of the volume of services provided. More radical ways of reducing 
the number of hospital beds by closing facilities generally only affected the 
smallest rural hospitals, which, as a rule, were turned into outpatient clinics. 
In a number of cases, the closure of these facilities was dictated not so much 
by expediency as by the limited resistance to their closure. Besides economic 
factors, the reduction in the size of the population served was also influential 
for reducing the number of hospital beds.
A reasonably high level of utilization against the background of poor access 
to inpatient care, which is extremely expensive for a significant proportion of 
the population, is strong evidence of the inefficiency of financing inpatient 
care by the number of bed-days. This pushes hospitals to keep beds open 
and fill them with patients, irrespective of whether they really need inpatient 
treatment. As a result, the dominance of funding for inpatient care in THE 
has been preserved, and spending on outpatient and particularly primary care 
remains far too low. This was the spur for reforms in pilot regions, which sought 
to reorient the system towards primary care, but the ongoing political crisis has 
prevented the scale-up of these pilots to the rest of the country.
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The reduction of bed numbers pushed the task of raising the efficiency of 
resource utilization into second place. In trying to preserve their bed capacity 
and to receive additional informal funds from the population, hospitals increase 
the volume of services, weakening the call for hospitalization to be necessary 
on medical grounds. The expansion of day and home care from polyclinics 
has not yet been accepted as a substitute for inpatient care. Unnecessary 
hospitalizations account for a third of all hospitalized patients (Lekhan, Rudiy 
& Richardson, 2010). It was found that nearly 13% of patients were receiving 
specialist outpatient care and 20% were receiving treatment using technologies 
which did not require hospitalization. The average cost of medical services for 
one patient based on total expenditure (not only those that are really covered by 
the budget) in an outpatient setting would be approximately four times lower, 
and for day cases two times lower, than the cost of inpatient treatment (Lekhan, 
Rudiy & Richardson, 2010). Human resources policies to change the skill mix 
and make greater use of nurses have not yet been explored at the policy level.
In addition, human resources are extremely unevenly distributed. The 
biggest staff shortages are in rural areas and in primary care. Measures taken 
by the Ministry of Health in the form of sending new graduates to work in 
underserved areas and specialties, and the introduction of some benefits for 
health workers working in rural areas have not brought the desired results (see 
section 5.3). Overall, as government funds are allocated according to inputs 
(linked mainly to beds and bed-days) with line-item budgeting for health 
care facilities and seniority-based salaries for doctors and nurses, according 
to national staffing norms, there is little incentive to make the system more 
efficient. Thus, the majority of public resources are still directed towards 
maintaining the existing infrastructure, despite recent reform efforts in four 
pilot regions. Real rationalization of the system will require strong political will 
as well as constitutional change so that the existing network of providers can be 
reduced. This is in addition to the universal resistance from local populations to 
the closure or downgrading of their local health care facilities, an issue which 
is particularly acute in Ukraine where problems with the basic infrastructure, 
such as roads, hamper access to other facilities.
7.5.2 Technical efficiency
Assessing the economic efficiency of the health system is not feasible, as 
this kind of research has not been conducted in Ukraine. Cost-effectiveness 
guidelines are not yet a feature of the system. Policy development around 
generic prescribing has also been limited, despite the significant cost of 
pharmaceuticals in Ukraine. Barriers to rational prescribing include the lack 
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of incentives for doctors to prescribe generics and pharmacists to dispense them 
but also the widespread lack of trust in the efficacy of unbranded medicines 
(Richardson, Sautenkova & Bolokhovets, 2014).
7.6 Transparency and accountability
Public participation in the development of health policy and programmes, or 
in setting the broader health agenda, are in their nascent stages in Ukraine. 
Although there are a number of legal provisions for public participation in the 
health sector and various patient groups, they have not yet played an active 
role in influencing decisions. Most influential has been the less formal protest 
channels used by social groups to challenge the most recent health reform 
programme, which began in 2010 (see section 2.9). Nevertheless, priorities are 
still formally set centrally by the Ministry of Health, although the direction 
more recently has been heavily influenced by international agencies involved 
in managing the economic crisis.
The fragmentation of the system along with the general lack of transparency 
makes it hard to see who would be responsible for health system monitoring 
and ensuring accountability – neither of which have been the focus of reform 
efforts to date. However, the current level of informality in the system would 
undoubtedly act as a barrier to effective monitoring, and tackling this in order 
to bring greater transparency to the system will prove a great challenge given 
that the health system is an embedded part of the Ukrainian economy, much 
of which is resolutely in the shadows (Bazylevych, 2009; Onoshchenko & 
Williams, 2013; Stepurko, 2013). A heavy reliance on informal practices within 
the Ukrainian health system is testament to the failure of formal institutions to 
satisfy the needs of most participants in the system (Bazylevych, 2011).
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8. Conclusions
Since the beginning of the new millennium, Ukraine has attempted to overcome the deep economic crisis of the 1990s and modernize the health care system to meet the needs of the population’s health. However, these 
actions did not have a clear strategy and were not supported by consistent policy. 
As a result, the health system has preserved the main features characteristic 
of the Semashko model, while losing its main positive – universal access to 
health care.
From 2006 to 2012, average life expectancy in Ukraine was increasing, 
albeit from a low base, despite the lack of progress in implementing health 
policies. However, the events of 2013 and 2014 will have reversed many of 
these gains with, at the time writing, almost 5000 killed in the violent conflict 
and 1.2 million displaced from their homes. A new and largely unanticipated 
humanitarian crisis is facing Ukraine and the health system is ill-equipped to 
cope with it. Even before the political turmoil and conflict began, the health 
system in Ukraine was weak and inequitable. The pilot reforms initiated in 2010, 
which aimed to reorient the system to one focused on primary care, were still in 
their nascent stages and their scale-up scheduled for 2013/2014 has been delayed 
indefinitely. In many respects, the pilots show that it is possible to change 
the system, even though the lack of meaningful reform since independence 
means that many of the inefficiencies of the system are deeply entrenched. 
However, there was not enough time to see if the reorientation of the system to 
one based on primary care could be embedded and rolled out nationwide, and 
whether changes to the way services are financed can improve efficiency in 
the longer term.
The successful implementation of health system reforms requires strong 
political will, but also a certain degree of popular consensus. Both local 
communities and health workers need to be engaged in the reform process and 
convinced of its benefits. Perhaps most importantly, health system changes 
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require policy windows, and while, for example, economic crises can focus 
efforts to make systems more efficient, political, social and economic turmoil 
push health sector concerns far down the policy agenda. A certain degree of 
stability is needed for changes to be made and implemented successfully, and 
creating such conditions is beyond the control of the health sector.
Research has shown that patients and doctors alike recognize the need for 
fundamental reform of the Ukrainian health system; however, government 
reform efforts to date are viewed negatively and popular mistrust of doctors is 
strikingly high (Luck et al., 2014). Addressing the concerns of communities and 
providers could provide a means of building trust when the next policy window 
opens. Improving the quality of care should be an explicit reform priority (as 
this is the main concern people have with the system) and linking quality 
improvements to purchasing reforms may be a powerful way to enlist physician 
support for new changes to the Ukrainian health system (Luck et al., 2014). 
Improving the quality of care could also save lives. To rebuild trust in the system 
it will also be necessary to tackle the issue of informal payments in the system 
in a way that moves needs beyond sloganeering about corruption to tackling the 
underlying issues of low wages and popular perceptions. Ensuring affordability 
should also be an explicit policy goal. Concerns about affordability are linked 
to the prevalence of informal payments and these concerns constitute a barrier 
to access, as do concerns about the cost of pharmaceuticals for treatment. 
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Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, official web portal: http://rada�gov�ua/en
President of Ukraine, official website: http://www�president�gov�ua/en
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine: http://www�kmu�gov�ua/control/en
Ministry of Health of Ukraine [in Ukrainian]: http://www�moz�gov�ua/ua/
portal
State Statistics Service of Ukraine: http://www�ukrstat�gov�ua
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of Health: http://uiph�kiev�ua
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9.3 HiT methodology and production process
HiTs are produced by country experts in collaboration with the Observatory’s 
research directors and staff. They are based on a template that, revised 
periodically, provides detailed guidelines and specific questions, definitions, 
suggestions for data sources and examples needed to compile reviews. While 
the template offers a comprehensive set of questions, it is intended to be used in 
a flexible way to allow authors and editors to adapt it to their particular national 
context. The most recent template is available online at: http://www.euro.who.
int/en/home/projects/observatory/publications/health-system-profiles-hits/
hit-template-2010.
Authors draw on multiple data sources for the compilation of HiTs, ranging 
from national statistics, national and regional policy documents to published 
literature. Furthermore, international data sources may be incorporated, such as 
those of the OECD and the World Bank. The OECD Health Data contain over 
1200 indicators for the 34 OECD countries. Data are drawn from information 
collected by national statistical bureaux and health ministries. The World Bank 
provides World Development Indicators, which also rely on official sources.
In addition to the information and data provided by the country experts, 
the Observatory supplies quantitative data in the form of a set of standard 
comparative figures for each country, drawing on the European Health for All 
database. The Health for All database contains more than 600 indicators defined 
by the WHO Regional Office for Europe for the purpose of monitoring Health 
in All policies in Europe. It is updated for distribution twice a year from various 
sources, relying largely upon official figures provided by governments, as well 
as health statistics collected by the technical units of the WHO Regional Office 
for Europe. The standard Health for All data have been officially approved 
by national governments. With its summer 2007 edition, the Health for All 
database started to take account of the enlarged EU of 27 Member States.
HiT authors are encouraged to discuss the data in the text in detail, including 
the standard figures prepared by the Observatory staff, especially if there are 
concerns about discrepancies between the data available from different sources.
A typical HiT consists of nine chapters.
1. Introduction: outlines the broader context of the health system, including 
geography and sociodemography, economic and political context, and 
population health.
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2. Organization and governance: provides an overview of how the health 
system in the country is organized, governed, planned and regulated, as 
well as the historical background of the system; outlines the main actors 
and their decision-making powers; and describes the level of patient 
empowerment in the areas of information, choice, rights, complaints 
procedures, public participation and cross-border health care.
3. Financing: provides information on the level of expenditure and the 
distribution of health spending across different service areas, sources of 
revenue, how resources are pooled and allocated, who is covered, what 
benefits are covered, the extent of user charges and other out-of-pocket 
payments, voluntary health insurance and how providers are paid.
4. Physical and human resources: deals with the planning and distribution of 
capital stock and investments, infrastructure and medical equipment; the 
context in which IT systems operate; and human resource input into the 
health system, including information on workforce trends, professional 
mobility, training and career paths.
5. Provision of services: concentrates on the organization and delivery 
of services and patient flows, addressing public health, primary care, 
secondary and tertiary care, day care, emergency care, pharmaceutical 
care, rehabilitation, long-term care, services for informal carers, palliative 
care, mental health care, dental care, complementary and alternative 
medicine, and health services for specific populations.
6. Principal health reforms: reviews reforms, policies and organizational 
changes; and provides an overview of future developments.
7. Assessment of the health system: provides an assessment based on the 
stated objectives of the health system, financial protection and equity 
in financing; user experience and equity of access to health care; health 
outcomes, health service outcomes and quality of care; health system 
efficiency; and transparency and accountability.
8. Conclusions: identifies key findings, highlights the lessons learned 
from health system changes; and summarizes remaining challenges and 
future prospects.
9. Appendices: includes references, useful web sites and legislation.
The quality of HiTs is of real importance since they inform policy-making 
and meta-analysis. HiTs are the subject of wide consultation throughout the 
writing and editing process, which involves multiple iterations. They are then 
subject to the following.
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•  A rigorous review process (see the following section).
•  There are further efforts to ensure quality while the report is finalized that 
focus on copy-editing and proofreading.
•  HiTs are disseminated (hard copies, electronic publication, translations 
and launches). The editor supports the authors throughout the production 
process and in close consultation with the authors ensures that all stages 
of the process are taken forward as effectively as possible.
One of the authors is also a member of the Observatory staff team and 
they are responsible for supporting the other authors throughout the writing 
and production process. They consult closely with each other to ensure that 
all stages of the process are as effective as possible and that HiTs meet the 
series standard and can support both national decision-making and comparisons 
across countries.
9.4 The review process
This consists of three stages. Initially the text of the HiT is checked, reviewed 
and approved by the series editors of the European Observatory. It is then 
sent for review to two independent academic experts, and their comments 
and amendments are incorporated into the text, and modifications are made 
accordingly. The text is then submitted to the relevant ministry of health, or 
appropriate authority, and policy-makers within those bodies are restricted to 
checking for factual errors within the HiT.
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Care Management and Public Health of the Ministry of Health.
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Maryna Shevchenko is Head of the Department of Health Economics and 
Medical Insurance at the Ukrainian Institute for Strategic Studies (UISS) under 
the Ministry of Health. She also has a PhD and is the author and co-author of 
more than 250 scientific publications on health system analysis, budget analysis 
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